Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions of state law to the California Supreme Court: California Probate Code 249.5 provides that, for probate purposes, "a child of the decedent conceived and born after the death of the decedent shall be deemed to have been born in the lifetime of the decedent if the child or his or her representative proves by clear and convincing evidence that," inter alia, "[t]he decedent, in writing, specifies that his or her genetic material shall be used for the posthumous conception of a child of the decedent." Cal. Prob. Code 249.5(a). Does a writing that specifies that some genetic material of the decedent shall be so used satisfy 249.5(a), regardless whether the genetic material specified in the putative writing includes the genetic material actually used to conceive the claimant child? Or must the genetic material identified in the putative writing include the genetic material actually used to conceive the claimant child? View "Delzer v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions of state law to the California Supreme Court: California Probate Code 249.5 provides that, for probate purposes, "a child of the decedent conceived and born after the death of the decedent shall be deemed to have been born in the lifetime of the decedent if the child or his or her representative proves by clear and convincing evidence that," inter alia, "[t]he decedent, in writing, specifies that his or her genetic material shall be used for the posthumous conception of a child of the decedent." Cal. Prob. Code 249.5(a). Does a writing that specifies that some genetic material of the decedent shall be so used satisfy 249.5(a), regardless whether the genetic material specified in the putative writing includes the genetic material actually used to conceive the claimant child? Or must the genetic material identified in the putative writing include the genetic material actually used to conceive the claimant child? View "Delzer v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Charles Fleig in this case challenging the rights in Charles’s checking account at Sunlight Federal Credit Union.Here, Charles and Wendy Fleig executed a signature car to add Wendy to Charles’s checking account at the Credit Union. The signature card failed to indicate whether the account would be subject to rights of survivorship. The membership and account agreement, however, provided that joint accounts had rights of survivorship unless otherwise indicated on the signature card. After Charles died, his Estate sued Wendy and the Credit Union, asserting several causes of action, including a claim for declaratory judgment regarding ownership of the checking account. The district court concluded that the signature card did not create rights of survivorship, that the account was held by Wendy and Charles as tenants in common, and that fifty percent of the account proceeds passed to the Estate and fifty percent passed to Wendy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding Wendy had a right of survivorship in the checking account because the signature card and the membership and account agreement formed the contract between the Fleigs and the Credit Union and unambiguously expressed the intent that joint accounts have rights of survivorship. View "Fleig v. Estate of Charles F. Fleig" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lease clause requiring a remainderman that leased real estate from a life tenant for one year ending on October 31, 2015 to pay unspecified real estate taxes made her liable for 2015 taxes that became due and payable on December 31. The life tenant died in August. The county court determined that the lease agreements controlled the lessor’s and lessee’s respective obligations to pay taxes, found the leases to be ambiguous, and ordered the life tenant’s Estate to reimburse the remaindermen. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, because the Estate did not own the property on December 31, 2015, and the leases did not obligate the decedent to pay taxes that had not yet become due, the county court erred in ordering the estate to reimburse the remaindermen for the real estate taxes they paid. View "In re Estate of Karmazin" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal arose from a 2010 civil suit filed by Carol Clement against Russell Puckett. After Puckett’s death in 2014, Clement substituted the Estate of Russell Puckett (the “Estate”) as the defendant in the suit and served the Estate. The Estate moved to dismiss the suit due to failure to timely serve process under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The Estate argued that the statute of limitations had expired before Clement perfected service. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Estate appealed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Because the trial court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the Estate. View "Estate of Russell Puckett v. Clement" on Justia Law

This case involved the issue of whether and to what extent superior courts have authority to intervene in the administration of nonintervention estates. Todd Rathbone was named personal representative of his mother's estate in her nonintervention will. Glen Rathbone, Todd's' brother and beneficiary of the will, took issue with Todd's administration of the estate and filed a petition requesting an accountancy under RCW 11.68.110. He then filed an action under chapter 11.96A RCW, the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), requesting the trial court construe the will in his favor. The trial court held it had the authority to construe the will under RCW 11.68.070 and, in the alternative, TEDRA itself gave the trial court authority to construe the will. The court ruled in favor of Glen's construction of the will and overrode the interpretation of Todd. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the trial court had authority to construe the will but on the separate basis that Glen had invoked authority under RCW 11.68.110 when he filed his petition for an accounting. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutory provisions under TEDRA did not give the trial court authority to construe the will in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the authority invoked under the nonintervention statutes, such as RCW 11.68.110 and .070, was limited to resolving issues provided under each statute. View "In re Estate of Rathbone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court ruling that an option agreement was void and ordering Wayne Snaza, as trustee of the Dennis Snaza Family Trust, to distribute the net income and residue of the principle of the trust to the beneficiaries upon completion of its term.Wayne gave notice of his intent to exercise his rights under the option agreement to purchase the real property held by the Trust. The circuit court concluded that the option agreement was void because it could not survive the contemporaneous execution of deeds to the same real property, and even if the option agreement was valid, Wayne waived his rights when the real property was transferred to the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Wayne presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that the property was already conveyed before the option agreement became effective, the circuit court did not err in finding the option agreement invalid; and (2) the circuit court did not violate Wayne’s due-process rights or abuse its discretion by ordering Wayne to distribute the Trust at the conclusion of its term and in accordance with the Trust instrument. View "In re Dennis Snaza Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court compelling Defendant to return real property transferred to him by his late father and the jury verdict requiring Defendant to pay general and punitive damages to his father’s estate but reversed the court’s order requiring Defendant to pay the Estate’s attorney fees.In this case involving the consolidation of both probate and civil actions, the Estate of the decedent argued that Defendant exercised undue influence over the decedent and that Defendant converted the decedent’s property and violated his confidential relationship with the decedent in doing so. The Estate also sought punitive damages for Defendant’s alleged fraudulent behavior. The jury returned a verdict awarding the Estate general and punitive damages. The circuit court then ordered the real property previously transferred to Defendant returned to the Estate. The circuit court also awarded the estate attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) possessed subject matter jurisdiction and authority to adjudicate disposition of contrast property; (2) did not err by not granting Defendant summary judgment or by consolidating the probate and civil case; (3) properly denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial; and (4) did not have statutory authority to assess attorney fees against Defendant. View "Estate of Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux" on Justia Law

In 2002 a Greyhound bus struck and killed Claudia. Her daughter, Cristina, age seven, witnessed the accident. In 2016 Cristina settled claims against Greyhound and other potentially responsible persons for $5 million. Klein, Cristina’s stepfather, believes that Cristina allocated too much of the settlement to herself as damages for emotional distress and not enough to him. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that Cristina conspired with state judges, law firms, Greyhound, and others, to exclude him from financial benefits. Klein sued as the purported administrator of Claudia’s estate although he had not been appointed as administrator. Klein and Cristina became co-administrators, but Klein was soon removed by a state judge. Defendants asked the federal judge to dismiss the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which only the U.S. Supreme Court may review the civil state court judgments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal on the merits. Collateral litigation in federal court is blocked by principles of preclusion and by Rooker's holding that errors committed in state litigation cannot be treated as federal constitutional torts. The court noted that the “long and tangled history" of the case was caused by Klein’s (or his lawyer’s) "inability or unwillingness to litigate as statutes and rules require.” They had neither briefed the proper issue on appeal nor attached the judgment, as required. “They are not entitled to divert the time of federal judges” and will be penalized for any further attempts. View "Xydakis v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

In 2002 a Greyhound bus struck and killed Claudia. Her daughter, Cristina, age seven, witnessed the accident. In 2016 Cristina settled claims against Greyhound and other potentially responsible persons for $5 million. Klein, Cristina’s stepfather, believes that Cristina allocated too much of the settlement to herself as damages for emotional distress and not enough to him. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that Cristina conspired with state judges, law firms, Greyhound, and others, to exclude him from financial benefits. Klein sued as the purported administrator of Claudia’s estate although he had not been appointed as administrator. Klein and Cristina became co-administrators, but Klein was soon removed by a state judge. Defendants asked the federal judge to dismiss the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which only the U.S. Supreme Court may review the civil state court judgments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal on the merits. Collateral litigation in federal court is blocked by principles of preclusion and by Rooker's holding that errors committed in state litigation cannot be treated as federal constitutional torts. The court noted that the “long and tangled history" of the case was caused by Klein’s (or his lawyer’s) "inability or unwillingness to litigate as statutes and rules require.” They had neither briefed the proper issue on appeal nor attached the judgment, as required. “They are not entitled to divert the time of federal judges” and will be penalized for any further attempts. View "Xydakis v. O'Brien" on Justia Law