Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case, delivered by The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, concerns the right of succession to the role of estate administrator, specifically in situations where a third-party administrator has been appointed. The deceased, George Landing, Jr., left behind two minor daughters and no will. His ex-wife initially served as the estate's administrator. She later voluntarily resigned and appointed Jim McGough, a local attorney and guardian to Landing's daughters, to the position.One of the daughters, Emma Landing, sought to replace McGough as the administrator of her father's estate upon reaching the age of majority. She argued that under 58 O.S. § 135, she had superior right to the role and the court could not refuse her request. The District Court of Tulsa County denied her request, prompting her appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion in appointing the estate's administrator and that it did not abuse this discretion in refusing Emma's request. The court rejected Emma's argument that she had an absolute right to replace the existing administrator. It noted that granting such a right would lead to uncertainty and confusion in probate matters and could undermine the orderly settlement of estates. The court also affirmed that the trial court had not found Emma incompetent to serve as administrator but had simply decided there was no good reason to replace McGough. The order of the District Court was therefore affirmed. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF LANDING" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona, the appellant, Yvette Rosenberg, contested the validity of a beneficiary deed executed by her late uncle, Alex Brandt, which left two properties to Marilyn Sanders, Brandt's former girlfriend. Rosenberg claimed that Sanders procured the deed through undue influence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sanders, holding that Rosenberg had not presented evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Sanders unduly influenced Brandt in executing the deed. The court of appeals reversed, adding a new ninth factor to the existing eight-factor test for undue influence, namely the relevance of a grantor's post-execution statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona affirmed the trial court's decision and held that adding a grantor's post-execution statements as a new ninth factor in the undue influence test was unnecessary. The Court found that Brandt's post-execution statements were not relevant to the claim of undue influence as they did not address his state of mind, mental condition, or the circumstances present at the time of the execution of the deed. The Court concluded that Rosenberg's evidence of susceptibility and the existence of a close relationship between Brandt and Sanders were insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The Court also found that Rosenberg's inferences did not create a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Sanders exerted undue influence at the time of executing the deed, or whether the deed was the product of Sanders' undue influence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanders. View "ROSENBERG v SANDERS" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, a dispute arose over the distribution of a deceased person's estate, particularly a 1978 Ford pickup truck. The decedent was Ronald Glen Kemmer, who died intestate and was survived by his four adult children: Travis Kemmer, Becky Mastley, Collette Cole, and Ronda Gilge, referred to as the Heirs. Travis Kemmer served as the Personal Representative (PR) of the Estate. The Heirs could not agree on the disposition of the truck, and a conflict arose over whether a binding agreement had been reached and whether Travis Kemmer, as PR, had breached his fiduciary duties by not drafting a written agreement on the truck's distribution.The Court found that the PR was not obligated to draft a formal written agreement. The plain language of Montana's Uniform Probate Code (MUPC) requires a written contract executed by all successors to alter the amounts to which they are entitled under the laws of intestacy, and this requirement was not fulfilled in this case. The Court also held that the PR had no duty to piece together emails and texts to determine whether there was a meeting of the minds among successors or to take responsibility for putting any such agreement in writing.As such, the Court reversed the District Court's order that had concluded that the PR had a duty to draft a written agreement and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Kemmer" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the primary issue was whether two documents, both named as the will of Janice Evensen, met the statutory requirements to be valid holographic wills. Holographic wills are handwritten wills that may be deemed valid even if they do not satisfy the usual requirements for valid wills, such as being properly witnessed, as long as the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator’s handwriting.Janice Evensen had created two wills - one in 1994 and another in 2007. Both wills were typewritten but contained handwritten alterations and additions by Evensen. Neither was properly witnessed. After Evensen's death, the Alaska Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Alaska SPCA) sought to have both wills recognized as valid and admitted to probate.The Supreme Court held that the 1994 will met the statutory requirements for a valid holographic will and reversed the superior court's contrary conclusion. The court found that Evensen's handwritten additions to the 1994 will satisfied the statutory requirement that the “material portions” — words identifying the property and the devisee — be in her handwriting. Therefore, the 1994 will was a valid holographic will, and it reflected Evensen's testamentary intent.However, the court affirmed the superior court's decision rejecting the 2007 will. The court found that since the original of the 2007 will was never found, there was a rebuttable presumption that Evensen had revoked it. The Alaska SPCA failed to provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption of revocation. Therefore, the 2007 will was not a valid will.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Janice V. Evensen" on Justia Law

In this case from the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court considered an appeal from a successful will contest. The decedent, Rita A. Walker, died at the age of 84 and her son, Mark E. Walker, filed a petition for formal probate of a will purportedly executed by Rita shortly before her death. This will named Mark as the sole beneficiary and personal representative of Rita's estate, omitting her three other sons. One of these other sons, Michael J. Walker, contested the will, alleging that Rita lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution and that the will was the product of undue influence.The county court held a bench trial and concluded that while the will was validly executed, it would not admit it to probate because Mark had failed to prove Rita's testamentary capacity at the time of execution and that the will was the product of undue influence. The court ordered the case to proceed intestate and appointed Michael as personal representative.Mark appealed, arguing that the county court erred in excluding from evidence a document purported to be a prior will signed by Rita, which he contended was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant to the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the document was admissible under a hearsay exception and was relevant. The court found that the document had a tendency to show that Rita had a constant and abiding scheme for the distribution of her property, rebutting charges of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. Therefore, the court reversed the county court's order refusing to admit the proposed will to probate and remanded the case for the county court to reconsider the existing record, including the contested document, in determining whether Mark met his burden of proving testamentary capacity and whether Michael met his burden of proving undue influence. View "In re Estate of Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Mark executed powers of attorney appointing his spouse, Dorothy, as his agent for health care and property. He also executed a will. Mark revoked the will and executed a new one as he was dying from cancer 17 years later. Mark’s sisters contested the new will because it changed Mark’s disposition of his interests in certain family businesses to their detriment and to the benefit of Dorothy. They allege that Dorothy, as the primary beneficiary, exerted undue influence over Mark to procure the preparation of the new will. Mark's wealth had come from a family business, founded by their father; Mark and Dorothy were married 24 years and had no children.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed judgment for Dorothy. What constitutes undue influence depends on the circumstances of each case, and the fiduciary-relationship presumption must be applied with caution in the context of marital relationships. Although Mark’s power of attorney for property created a fiduciary relationship with Dorothy as a matter of law, the circuit court’s directed finding that Dorothy did not procure the preparation of the will was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court reiterated its repudiation of the debilitated-testator theory of presumptive undue influence. View "In re Estate of Coffman" on Justia Law

Appellants Walmart and New Hampshire Insurance Company appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s determination that the employee’s widow, Sue Jordan, was entitled to medical and death benefits. More specifically, they challenged the Commission’s application of the presumption set forth in Idaho Code section 72-228 where there was unrebutted prima facie evidence indicating that the employee’s death arose in the course of his employment. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission. View "Jordan v. Walmart Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

In this will contest, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court on remand granting Bender's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial, holding that the jury verdict should be reinstated.Upon the death of Russell Tank, Jason Bender, Russell's neighbor and farm tenant, offered Russell's last will and testament, which named Bender as the Estate's sole heir and personal representative, for probate. Plaintiffs, Russell's four children, brought this action challenging the validity of the will based on a lack of testamentary capacity, insane delusions, and undue influence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court remanded on the undue influence claim brought by daughter Sherri Castro. The jury returned a verdict for Sherri, finding that Bender unduly influenced Russell's will. The circuit court granted Bender's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bender unduly influenced the will and that Bender must be removed from serving as personal representative of Russell's Estate. View "In re Estate of Tank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge finding Jane Furnas in contempt for failing either to refinance or to list property for sale according to an agreement, holding that there was no error.Furnas, who together with Anthony Cirone owned property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship, filed a petition to partition the property. The parties settled on an agreement wherein Cirone would make monthly payments to Furnas, who would either keep the mortgage current and refinance or list the property for sale. The agreement was incorporated in a decree. Anthony later died and Plaintiff, his daughter acting as personal representative of his estate, filed a complaint for contempt alleging that Furnas had failed to comply with the terms of the decree. The judge found Furnas in civil contempt. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Furnas's right of survivorship was terminated and that the agreement was enforceable by Cirone's estate. View "Furnas v. Cirone" on Justia Law