Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Glenvin Albrecht ("Glenvin") appealed, and Mark Albrecht ("Mark"), the personal representative of the estate ("the Estate") of Sharleen Albrecht ("Sharleen"), cross-appealed orders in an informal probate denying Glenvin's claims against the Estate. Glenvin argued that the district court's decision to deny Glenvin a recovery of jointly held marital assets transferred by Sharleen to the parties' son, Mark, should be reversed because, prior to Sharleen's death, she transferred the assets in violation of restraining provisions in a pending divorce proceeding. Glenvin further contended the district court abused its discretion in denying Glenvin's request for a recovery under principles of equity and its finding that Sharleen had not engaged in economic misconduct during prior divorce proceedings was clearly erroneous. The Estate argued that the district court improperly extended the time to commence an action against the Estate and erred as a matter of law in determining that Glenvin held the status of a surviving spouse with regard to the Estate. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order holding that Glenvin was a surviving spouse, denying Glenvin's request for contempt, the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for equitable relief and the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for relief from Sharleen's economic waste. View "Estate of Albrecht" on Justia Law

Glenvin Albrecht ("Glenvin") appealed, and Mark Albrecht ("Mark"), the personal representative of the estate ("the Estate") of Sharleen Albrecht ("Sharleen"), cross-appealed orders in an informal probate denying Glenvin's claims against the Estate. Glenvin argued that the district court's decision to deny Glenvin a recovery of jointly held marital assets transferred by Sharleen to the parties' son, Mark, should be reversed because, prior to Sharleen's death, she transferred the assets in violation of restraining provisions in a pending divorce proceeding. Glenvin further contended the district court abused its discretion in denying Glenvin's request for a recovery under principles of equity and its finding that Sharleen had not engaged in economic misconduct during prior divorce proceedings was clearly erroneous. The Estate argued that the district court improperly extended the time to commence an action against the Estate and erred as a matter of law in determining that Glenvin held the status of a surviving spouse with regard to the Estate. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order holding that Glenvin was a surviving spouse, denying Glenvin's request for contempt, the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for equitable relief and the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for relief from Sharleen's economic waste. View "Estate of Albrecht" on Justia Law

Richard and Kathryn are the beneficiaries of their parents’ multi‐million dollar trust, which is administered by Richard, Kathryn, and a corporate trustee. When their father died, the two fell into “irreconcilable” disputes. Kathryn hired Oxford to advise her. The trust paid Oxford’s fees. Oxford advised Kathryn to create one trust for Kathryn and her children, and another for Richard and his. Richard agreed. They moved the trust's situs from Indiana to South Dakota. Ultimately, they could not agree on the terms. When Kathryn refused to sign Richard’s proposed agreement, he unsuccessfully petitioned a South Dakota state court to order the trust's division. Richard alleges that he suffered financial losses and that his sister refused to sign the agreement because she received negligent advice from Oxford. Richard sued Oxford on behalf of the trust, asserting his capacity as a beneficiary and a co‐trustee. The complaint identified Kathryn as an “involuntary plaintiff.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Richard lacks capacity to bring suit on behalf of the trust under either Illinois or South Dakota law, which prohibits a trust beneficiary from suing a third party on behalf of a trust (absent special circumstances that were not alleged). State law and the trust agreement require a majority of trustees to consent to such a suit; that consent was missing. View "Doermer v. Oxford Financial Group, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking to prevent the sale of land held in Allen F. Willey’s revocable trust. The district court determined that Plaintiffs - the grandchildren of Mr. Willey - were no longer beneficiaries of the trust as a result of their father’s 2014 lawsuit against Mr. Willey and his wife. The Supreme Court held (1) the 2014 suit constituted a “challenge” to the trust even though the suit was filed during Mr. Willey’s lifetime; and (2) the in terrorem clause in Mr. Willey’s trust did not violate public policy. View "EGW v. First Federal Savings Bank of Sheridan, Wyoming" on Justia Law

In consolidated actions, brothers-appellants Alex and David Peterson claimed, among other things, that their mother, appellee Mary Peterson, and their brother, appellee Calhoun Peterson, had breached their duties as executors of the will of Mary’s husband, Charles Hugh Peterson, and as trustees of a bypass trust created by that will. This appeal stemmed from the superior court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment filed by Mary. Of the many allegations of the complaints, the superior court specifically addressed two of them: one was Alex’s and David’s allegation that Mary and Calhoun, as trustees, had not properly considered the testator’s stated intention “to provide for the proper support and education of my descendants taking into account and consideration any other means of support they or any of them may have to the knowledge of the Trustees.” With regard to this issue, the superior court ruled against Alex and David for two reasons: (1) because Item 21 of the will provided that a decision of the majority of the trustees would be controlling only so long as Mary was one of the majority, Alex and David would be entitled to income under the bypass trust only if Mary approved it; and (2) because of the requirement that Mary be a part of the majority of executors or trustees for one of their decisions to control, because of the benefits granted to Mary under the trusts, and because of her power to appoint trust property, the primary purpose of the trusts was to support Mary, and there was thus “no requirement that income be provided to either [Alex or David].” The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that based on the facts of record, these conclusions did not warrant the grant of summary judgment to Mary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Peterson v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff unsuccessfully sued Bartsch’s estate, claiming to be Bartsch’s son, unintentionally omitted from his father’s will. The court of appeal upheld a finding that Bartsch was aware of plaintiff’s existence when he executed his will, having reluctantly made court-ordered child support payments to plaintiff’s mother for many years. Plaintiff separately sued the attorney who represented the executor and the executor, alleging intentional fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment, because the defendants stated under penalty of perjury that decedent had no children when they filed the probate petition, did not serve notice of their petition on plaintiff, and “willfully failed to inform the Court [that plaintiff was Bartsch’s son], depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to assert a claim. He also alleged that the way defendants stated the petition’s allegations made him believe that decedent “was not aware that he had a son or had forgotten it,” leading him to incur significant legal fees. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff could not establish any damages because it was established that he had no interest in Bartsch’s estate. His claims are based entirely on the defendants' representations in connection with the probate proceeding and are, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege, Civil Code 47(b). View "Herterich v. Peltner" on Justia Law

The central issue at issue in this case involved a dispute between a mother and son, Carolyn Ware (“Carolyn”) and Richard Ware (“Richard”), regarding the distribution of shares of stock of three closely held corporations. The shares were being held by the estate of the deceased husband/father, Frankie Don Ware (“Frankie”). Frankie’s will directed that the shares be distributed to a testamentary trust. The bylaws of the corporations (in which Frankie, Carolyn, and Richard were the sole shareholders) required any outstanding shares of stock be offered to the corporations prior to any transfer. Carolyn, the executrix, filed a petition to close Frankie’s estate and to distribute Frankie’s assets (including the shares) to the trust. Richard filed an objection to the closing of the estate, asserting the corporate bylaws of the three corporations. Carolyn responded, arguing that Richard lacked standing to object. The chancellor found for Richard and required Carolyn to offer the shares back to each corporation prior to transferring the shares to the trust. Carolyn subsequently appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found Richard lacked standing to object to the closing of Frankie’s estate because the injury for which he sought relief pertained to the corporations only. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Matter of the Estate of Frankie Don Ware" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a question of who could bring a civil action on behalf of the estate of a deceased person when the personal representative of the estate is also a potential defendant in the action. Alice Shaw-Baker lived in Charleston and had no immediate family. She allegedly reached an agreement with Bessie Huckabee, Kay Passailaigue Slade, and Sandra Byrd that if they would care for her in her final years, she would leave them the assets of her estate. In her last will (executed 2001), she left her entire estate to Huckabee, Slade, and Byrd, and named Huckabee the personal representative. Shaw-Baker died in February 2009. Betty Fisher was Shaw-Baker's niece and closest living relative. Shortly after Shaw-Baker's death, Fisher filed an action in probate court challenging the 2001 will and the appointment of Huckabee as personal representative. Fisher removed the probate action to circuit court. Then purporting to act as Shaw-Baker's "real representative," Fisher brought this action against Huckabee, Slade, and Byrd, and Peter Kouten (a lawyer who represented the first three). Fisher primarily alleged Huckabee, Slade, and Byrd breached their duty to take suitable care of Shaw-Baker. Fisher brought the action under section 15-5-90 of the South Carolina Code (2005). The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming Fisher did not have standing to bring the survival action. The question of who may bring a civil action arose under Rule 17(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that section 62-3-614 of the South Carolina Probate Code allowed for a special administrator to be appointed, "in circumstances where a general personal representative cannot or should not act." The term "real representative . . . is mentioned nowhere in the modern Probate Code." The circuit court, and later the court of appeals, analyzed the issue as whether Fisher qualified as Shaw-Baker's real representative: neither court considered Rule 17(a). "Although the result the courts reached was not erroneous, the analysis was misplaced." After the defendants challenged Fisher's status as the real party in interest, she did not ask for "a reasonable time . . . for ratification . . . or joinder or substitution." In that circumstance, the Supreme Court held Rule 17(a) provided for dismissal, and the circuit court did not err. View "Fisher v. Huckabee" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a question of who could bring a civil action on behalf of the estate of a deceased person when the personal representative of the estate is also a potential defendant in the action. Alice Shaw-Baker lived in Charleston and had no immediate family. She allegedly reached an agreement with Bessie Huckabee, Kay Passailaigue Slade, and Sandra Byrd that if they would care for her in her final years, she would leave them the assets of her estate. In her last will (executed 2001), she left her entire estate to Huckabee, Slade, and Byrd, and named Huckabee the personal representative. Shaw-Baker died in February 2009. Betty Fisher was Shaw-Baker's niece and closest living relative. Shortly after Shaw-Baker's death, Fisher filed an action in probate court challenging the 2001 will and the appointment of Huckabee as personal representative. Fisher removed the probate action to circuit court. Then purporting to act as Shaw-Baker's "real representative," Fisher brought this action against Huckabee, Slade, and Byrd, and Peter Kouten (a lawyer who represented the first three). Fisher primarily alleged Huckabee, Slade, and Byrd breached their duty to take suitable care of Shaw-Baker. Fisher brought the action under section 15-5-90 of the South Carolina Code (2005). The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming Fisher did not have standing to bring the survival action. The question of who may bring a civil action arose under Rule 17(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that section 62-3-614 of the South Carolina Probate Code allowed for a special administrator to be appointed, "in circumstances where a general personal representative cannot or should not act." The term "real representative . . . is mentioned nowhere in the modern Probate Code." The circuit court, and later the court of appeals, analyzed the issue as whether Fisher qualified as Shaw-Baker's real representative: neither court considered Rule 17(a). "Although the result the courts reached was not erroneous, the analysis was misplaced." After the defendants challenged Fisher's status as the real party in interest, she did not ask for "a reasonable time . . . for ratification . . . or joinder or substitution." In that circumstance, the Supreme Court held Rule 17(a) provided for dismissal, and the circuit court did not err. View "Fisher v. Huckabee" on Justia Law

The district court did not err when it declined to apply Montana’s anti-lapse statute, Mont. Code Ann. 72-2-717(2), to the Armond W. Tonn Testamentary Trust.Armond W. Tonn’s last will and testament created a trust for the benefit of his three children - William Tonn, Marc Tonn, and Elizabeth Sylvis. When William passed away, the trustee began to distribute one-third of the Trust income to the William Heirs and two-thirds to Elizabeth after Marc passed away. Concerned about the unequal Trust income distributions, the William Heirs filed a petition claiming that in addition to the one-third William Tonn share, they were entitled to one-half of the principal and income attributable to Marc’s share of the Trust. The district court granted summary judgment to the Elizabeth Heirs and awarded them Marc’s share of the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, where Armond specifically listed the order in which he wanted distributions to take place and where the William Heirs were not included in the distribution of Marc’s one-third share of the Trust, Armond’s intent regarding distribution was clear and the anti-lapse statute did not apply. View "Tonn v. Estate of Elizabeth Sylvis" on Justia Law