Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Sandy Botteicher ("Botteicher") appeals from a judgment dismissing her claims against Pam and Darwin Becker (collectively "Beckers") and awarding the Beckers $5,000 for their attorney fees. Botteicher and Pam Becker are sisters and heirs to their mother's estate. Following the death of their father in January 2015, Pam Becker was appointed legal guardian for their mother who was residing in a nursing home. Their mother died in July 2015. A third party was appointed personal representative of their mother's estate ("the estate"). Following the filing of the closing documents by the personal representative, Botteicher filed a number of petitions or motions. In her petitions, Botteicher sought to set aside what the parties refer to as the "Warehouse" transaction, a real property transfer in Dickinson that occurred in 2010 and 2011. Botteicher also requested an evidentiary hearing, objected to the final accounting, sought formal testacy proceedings, sought the disqualification of the attorney representing the personal representative, moved for the appointment of herself as the personal representative and sought to keep the estate open by alleging that numerous items of her mother's personal property were missing from the inventory and appraisement. The probate court denied all of the petitions or motions filed by Botteicher. The court denied the petition seeking to set aside the Warehouse transfer after concluding the personal representative, not Botteicher, had "standing" to assert an action to challenge the Warehouse transfer in the probate proceedings, and that the request to set aside the property transfer was "not properly in front of the Court." In the probate proceedings, Botteicher was attempting to personally initiate an action against the Beckers to set aside a transfer made by the decedent. The probate court issued an order approving the inventory and appraisement as well as the final account and distribution. Botteicher did not appeal the final decree of distribution. Approximately one month after the probate proceedings were closed, Botteicher and her daughter, Alexandra Botteicher, brought this action against the Beckers, alleging multiple claims regarding the estate's transactions under the Beckers. Unsuccessful, Botteicher challenged the district court's determination that some of her claims were previously resolved in separate probate proceedings and were barred by res judicata, that her claim for interference with the right of burial and her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress could be dismissed as a matter of law, and that the Beckers were entitled to an award of attorney fees. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Botteicher v. Becker" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the Forsyth County, Georgia Probate Court’s finding that Emanuel Gladstone breached his fiduciary duty as conservator for his incapacitated wife, Jacqueline Gladstone. The court entered a judgment against Gladstone and his surety, Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, for $167,000 “on the settlement of accounts and as damages” and $150,000 in punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s judgment. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Ohio Casualty’s petition for certiorari, and the Georgia Supreme Court directed the parties to address two questions: (1) whether the appellate court erred in holding that a conservator’s bond covered punitive damages even though such damages were not expressly provided for under OCGA 29-5-40 et seq. or under the provisions of the bond itself; and (2) if a conservator’s bond did cover punitive damages, did the Court of Appeals err in holding that because the probate court complied with OCGA 29-5-92 (b) (4) in imposing sanctions against the petitioner, compliance with the procedures for imposing punitive damages under OCGA 51-12-5.1 was not required. The Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative, rendering the second question moot. View "In re Estate of Gladstone" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment orders in an action where creditors were attempting to collect on judgments against Vertical and Defendant Reuter by levying assets now belonging to Reuter's wife. Leaving aside the question whether creditors have made a sufficient showing to justify piercing the corporate veil, the court held that creditors' tenancy-by-the-entirety theory failed under Missouri law. In this case, no reasonable jury could conclude that there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence that Reuter and his wife participated in the tortfeasor partnership as a married couple, and thus summary judgment in their favor for the claims seeking to pierce the corporate veil and reach the assets that once belonged to them as a married couple was proper. In regard to plaintiff's alternative theory, the court held that the bankruptcy court correctly determined that Reuter did not own 50 percent of the Trust as a settlor, and thus creditors' allegation that he fraudulently transferred his share to his wife necessarily failed. View "Cutcliff v. Reuter" on Justia Law

Fred W. Suggs, Jr., as personal representative of the Estate of Frances W. Gray, deceased, appealed a circuit court order denying his Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for relief from judgments entered by the circuit court on the basis that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter those judgments. Frances ("the wife") died testate in September 2011, and the Probate Court issued letters testamentary to her husband, Floyd Gray ("husband"), establishing him as the personal representative of his wife's estate. The husband died testate in January 2012, and the probate court issued letters testamentary to Elizabeth Gray ("Gray"), establishing her as the personal representative of the husband's estate. The probate court then appointed Suggs as the successor personal representative of the wife's estate. Gray and Suggs thereafter sold the house in which the husband and the wife had lived. They had owned the house as tenants in common; there was no survivorship provision. Before the sale of the house, both Gray and Suggs agreed that the net proceeds from the sale would be held in a trust account the law firm representing both estates. At some point, Suggs sent the law firm a letter stating that the wife's estate had a "claim" against the husband's estate and instructing the law firm not to disburse any proceeds to the husband's estate until the "matter" was resolved. While the administration of both estates was pending in the probate court, Gray filed a declaratory-judgment action, asserting that a controversy existed between her and Suggs concerning the disbursement of the proceeds held in the law firm's trust account, specifically, asserting that Suggs was withholding consent to disburse that portion of the proceeds belonging to the husband's estate. Suggs moved to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action, arguing the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion. Suggs then filed an answer and a counterclaim, alleging fraud, conversion, embezzlement, breach of the duty of loyalty, and breach of fiduciary duty. Under the facts of this case, the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the declaratory-judgment action concerning disbursement of the proceeds held in the law firm's trust account. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a portion of the summary judgment entered in the declaratory-judgment action, which ordered one-half of the proceeds be disbursed to the husband's estate. Because Suggs filed a counterclaim concerning ownership of certain assets that were clearly within the probate court's jurisdiction, the probate court retained jurisdiction over those estate assets and because the administration of neither estate was removed to the circuit court pursuant to statute, the circuit court's judgments purporting to exercise jurisdiction over those assets were a nullity. That portion of the summary judgment concerning the proceeds from certain assets was vacated. View "Suggs v. Gray" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether a revocation clause, contained within a notarial testament that was found to be void for failure to include an attestation clause, could be valid as an authentic act and thereby revoke two prior testaments, resulting in an intestate succession. Charles Harlan died on November 26, 2015, survived by his second wife, Xiaoping Harlan, and his four adult children from his first marriage. The children filed a petition in the district court, seeking to have the decedent’s March 9, 2000 testament filed and executed and to have Hansel Harlan named as executor of the succession; Xiaoping filed a petition to nullify the probated March 9, 2000 testament, to have Hansel removed as executor, and to have herself appointed as administratrix of the succession. Xiaoping further sought to file a purported notarial testament, executed on June 5, 2012 and containing a revocation of all prior testaments, along with a March 1, 2014 codicil. The district court found no valid revocation. The appellate court ruled that the invalid testament nevertheless met the requirements of La. C.C. art. 1833 so as to qualify as an authentic act, capable of revoking prior testaments pursuant to La. C.C. art. 1607(2). The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in reversing those parts of the February 24, 2016 and the June 6, 2016 district court judgments, which found that the invalid 2012 testament did not contain a valid authentic act that revoked the March 9, 2000 and the May 24, 2007 testaments, and the appellate court erred in rendering judgments holding that the March 9, 2000 and the May 24, 2007 testaments were revoked by the absolutely null 2012 testament. View "Succession of Charles George Harlan" on Justia Law

In this case, a trustee sold at foreclosure property once owned by a convicted fraudster and there were surplus proceeds. The trial court concluded that the lis pendens was inadequate to give the County any interest in the property because the criminal court had ordered restitution but had not ordered the property levied upon to satisfy the restitution award. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of the surplus proceeds to the trusts. The court held that the County had no interest in the property as it was not seized and, on their own, the lis pendens and temporary restraining order did not mandate a different result. View "Integrated Lender Services v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In this case, a trustee sold at foreclosure property once owned by a convicted fraudster and there were surplus proceeds. The trial court concluded that the lis pendens was inadequate to give the County any interest in the property because the criminal court had ordered restitution but had not ordered the property levied upon to satisfy the restitution award. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of the surplus proceeds to the trusts. The court held that the County had no interest in the property as it was not seized and, on their own, the lis pendens and temporary restraining order did not mandate a different result. View "Integrated Lender Services v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Emerita Cruz Joya appealed a probate court order approving the final accounting and settling the estate of Norman Casserley (Decedent). Joya had filed a creditor's claim against Decedent's estate based on a criminal restitution order entered in her husband's favor, which was recorded after Decedent's death. The court rejected Joya's argument that her claim was entitled to priority either as a recorded lien or under the state Constitution's restitution provision. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the probate court’s rejection of Joya’s claim, and affirmed. View "Estate of Casserley" on Justia Law

At issue was the proper procedure before an orphans’ court when an interested party files a petition to caveat a will and when an interested party requests that the orphans’ court transmit an issue to the circuit court for a trial by jury.In this case, the Court of Appeals held (1) when it enacted Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 5-207(b), the General Assembly intended to mandate a judicial probate hearing as the single procedure after a party files a petition to caveat, and as such, an automatic stay is not required when a petition to caveat a will is filed; (2) when an interested party in a caveat case makes a request to transfer undecided factual issues to a circuit court, the orphans’ court is required to transmit the issues to a court of law pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 2-105(b); and (3) in this case, the orphans’ court did not err in refusing to stay the judicial probate proceeding simply because a petition to caveat was filed, but the court did err when it refused a party’s request to transmit unresolved factual issues to a court of law, and the error was not harmless. View "Shealer v. Straka" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from a circuit court’s order revoking the clerk of court’s issuance of letters of appointment and the clerk’s statement of informal probate and appointment of personal representative, holding that the circuit court’s order was not a final order from which an appeal can be taken.On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court erred in its revocation without giving Appellant notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court held that, until further proceedings determined the rights of the parties as it related to the appointment of a personal representative and to the probate of the decedent’s will, the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction under S.D. Codified Laws 15-26A-3(2). View "Estate of Stanton W. Fox" on Justia Law