Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Charlotte A. Wintersteen’s motion to amend her petition for court supervision of a trust to include a claim challenging the validity of the most recent amendment to the trust, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to amend the original petition as futile.Charlotte, the widow of Lee R. Wintersteen, sought court supervision of the Lee R. Wintersteen Revocable Trust Agreement upon learning that she had been removed as a beneficiary in a subsequent amendment to the trust. The circuit court granted the petition and assumed supervision of the trust. When Charlotte sought to amend her petition, however, the circuit court concluded that the amended petition would be futile because it was time-barred under S.D. Codified Laws 55-4-57(a)(1) where more than one year had passed since the date of Lee’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Charlotte’s claim was time-barred; and (2) Charlotte could not take advantage of the relation-back doctrine for her extinguished claim. View "In re Wintersteen Revocable Trust Agreement" on Justia Law

Givens, a Missouri resident, suffered from renal failure, was on dialysis for about 10 years and had experienced multiple strokes. In 2009, she suffered an additional injury from gadolinium dye, a substance used in MRIs, joined a class action related to the dye, and received about $255,000 in settlement proceeds. Givens signed an agreement allowing the National Foundation for Special Needs Integrity to manage a trust for her benefit while she lived. Givens named herself as the only beneficiary. Givens died a month after funding the trust, leaving more than $234,000. Givens failed to specify a remainder beneficiary. The Foundation claimed that the agreement entitled it to retain any remaining trust assets. Givens’s Estate claimed that it is entitled to the money for the benefit of Givens’s children, arguing that the agreement is ambiguous and should be construed against the Foundation, or that the court should use its equitable power. The district court rejected the Estate’s arguments. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the agreement ambiguous on the key question. The overwhelming weight of evidence shows that Givens intended that any remaining assets pass to her children rather than to the Foundation. The court did not address equitable theories or a laches defense. View "National Foundation For Special Needs Integrity, Inc. v. Reese" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Plaintiffs in this alleging that certain assets should have been distributed to the estate of the decedent in this case, holding that the district court improperly granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs.In 2003, the decedent established an individual retirement account (IRA) with Mesirow Financial (Mesirow IRA) and designated Alyssa Jane D’Amore, his then-wife, as beneficiary. The couple divorced, but the decedent never revoked the beneficiary of the designation. The decedent later transferred the majority of his Mesirow IRA assets to a TD Ameritrade IRA. Upon the decedent’s death, Mesirow distributed the remaining assets in the Mesirow IRA to D’Amore. Plaintiffs, the primary beneficiary of the decedent and the executor of the decedent’s estate, filed suit against D’Amore, alleging that the Mesirow assets should have instead been distributed to the decedent’s estate. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The First Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to enter summary judgment for D’Amore, holding that because a request to transfer all assets was never made, the beneficiary designation was never revoked and D’Amore was entitled to the remaining assets in the account upon the decedent’s death. View "Cooper v. D'Amore" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Plaintiffs in this alleging that certain assets should have been distributed to the estate of the decedent in this case, holding that the district court improperly granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs.In 2003, the decedent established an individual retirement account (IRA) with Mesirow Financial (Mesirow IRA) and designated Alyssa Jane D’Amore, his then-wife, as beneficiary. The couple divorced, but the decedent never revoked the beneficiary of the designation. The decedent later transferred the majority of his Mesirow IRA assets to a TD Ameritrade IRA. Upon the decedent’s death, Mesirow distributed the remaining assets in the Mesirow IRA to D’Amore. Plaintiffs, the primary beneficiary of the decedent and the executor of the decedent’s estate, filed suit against D’Amore, alleging that the Mesirow assets should have instead been distributed to the decedent’s estate. The district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The First Circuit reversed and remanded with directions to enter summary judgment for D’Amore, holding that because a request to transfer all assets was never made, the beneficiary designation was never revoked and D’Amore was entitled to the remaining assets in the account upon the decedent’s death. View "Cooper v. D'Amore" on Justia Law

The probate court disqualified one of two co-personal representatives nominated in decedent's will. The disqualified nominee had a felony conviction for DUI. The probate court ruled that this was a conviction for an infamous crime as provided in 58 O.S.2011, section 102(2), and as defined in In re Dunham's Estate, 74 P.2d 117, and Briggs v. Board of County Commissioners, 217 P.2d 827. The disqualified nominee appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal because the change in case law that Bishop sought could only be ordered by the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court declined to grant her relief: “the Legislature has tacitly approved the ‘Dunham’ interpretation of infamous crime to mean a felony under Oklahoma law. [. . .] Bishop admits that she has a felony conviction under Oklahoma law for D.U.I. and thus has a conviction for an infamous crime. By the express command of statute, she is not competent to serve as an executor.” View "In the Matter of the Estate of Middleton" on Justia Law

The first appeal in this case involved claims by the estate of Vera Cummings (the Estate) against Community Health Systems, Inc. (CHSI) under New Mexico state law, against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and against Mountain View Regional Medical Center (Mountain View) under state law. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of the appeal by: (1) entering an order approving the stipulated dismissal with prejudice of the appeal of the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of the claims against CHSI; (2) affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claims under the FTCA for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (3) directing the district court to vacate its judgment in favor of Mountain View and to remand the claims against Mountain View (but not the claims against CHSI) to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On remand to the district court, however, it went beyond the Tenth Circuit’s mandate by vacating its dismissal of the claims against CHSI and remanding those claims to state court. CHSI appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed the order vacating the dismissal of the claims against CHSI and remanded those claims to state court. The Tenth Circuit also rejected the Estate’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Estate of Vera Cummings v. Community Health Systems" on Justia Law

The first appeal in this case involved claims by the estate of Vera Cummings (the Estate) against Community Health Systems, Inc. (CHSI) under New Mexico state law, against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and against Mountain View Regional Medical Center (Mountain View) under state law. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disposed of the appeal by: (1) entering an order approving the stipulated dismissal with prejudice of the appeal of the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of the claims against CHSI; (2) affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claims under the FTCA for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (3) directing the district court to vacate its judgment in favor of Mountain View and to remand the claims against Mountain View (but not the claims against CHSI) to state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On remand to the district court, however, it went beyond the Tenth Circuit’s mandate by vacating its dismissal of the claims against CHSI and remanding those claims to state court. CHSI appealed. The Tenth Circuit reversed the order vacating the dismissal of the claims against CHSI and remanded those claims to state court. The Tenth Circuit also rejected the Estate’s motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Estate of Vera Cummings v. Community Health Systems" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a guardian’s attorney fees should be paid from a protected person’s estate when the fees were incurred in responding to pleadings to remove the guardian and to move the protected person to an assisted living facility.Beverly Sears, the guardian in this case, moved for her attorney fees incurred in a dispute seeking to remove her as guardian and to move the protected person to a facility. The parties settled, with Sears agreeing to step down as guardian but the parties deciding that the protected person would not be moved to a facility. Sears moved for her attorney fees paid from the estate. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that without a resolution of factual matters relating to the necessity of the services in administering the guardianship or the reasonableness of the fee amount, the court was unable to meaningfully review the circuit court’s decision. View "In re Conservatorship of Bachand" on Justia Law

Appellant James Bulen (James) and respondents (the Gaynor beneficiaries) were extended family members who were cobeneficiaries of a trust (Trust) created by their grandfather or great-grandfather (Grandfather). Years after Grandfather's death, these individuals and others engaged in contentious disputes over the management and control of the Trust. After the probate court resolved these disputes, the Gaynor beneficiaries filed a surcharge petition against the cotrustees, and later added James as a respondent based on his alleged de facto trustee status. The Gaynor beneficiaries alleged that James and the cotrustees wrongfully withdrew trust assets and then used these assets to file and defend probate petitions in attempting to persuade the probate court to adopt their management plan. The Gaynor beneficiaries sought reimbursement of all funds improperly withdrawn from the Trust. Focusing on the paragraphs of the surcharge petition related to the prior probate litigation, James moved to strike the claims against him under California's anti-SLAPP statute. The probate court found the claims were not governed by the anti-SLAPP statute and denied the motion. James appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Gaynor v. Bulen" on Justia Law

John Dixon appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action to remove Billie Dixon as trustee of the Shirley A. Dixon Trust and sought reimbursement, an accounting and court supervision of the trust. In 2013 Billie, as trustee, sued John to reform a warranty deed their father executed conveying a tract of McKenzie County real property to John. Billie contended William Dixon intended to reserve the mineral interests as property of the trust. The district court agreed and reformed the warranty deed to reserve and except the minerals and retain the mineral interests as property of the trust to be distributed in accordance with the trust's terms and conditions. Shortly after the reformation action was commenced in 2013, John sued Billie seeking an accounting of the trust, her removal as trustee, court supervised administration of the trust, reimbursement of the trust for unauthorized distributions, and his attorney fees expended in the action. During multiple trial postponements, Shirley Dixon died in 2015. About two months before the scheduled February 2017 trial, Billie moved for summary judgment dismissal of the lawsuit. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the case was not moot and genuine issues of material fact precluded disposition by summary judgment. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dixon v. Dixon" on Justia Law