Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

At issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was a matter of first impression: the effect of 20 Pa.C.S. 7710.2 (enacted in 2006) upon the scope of the assets used to calculate the pretermitted spousal share. The named beneficiaries of the Trust upon Decedent’s death were his then-wife Joanne, and the children born to Decedent and Joanne. Pursuant to the terms of the Trust, Decedent had the prerogative to receive any portion of the trust income during his lifetime, to draw any amount of the trust principal for his own welfare, comfort, and support, and to terminate the Trust. Joanne died on August 15, 2010. On December 13, 2010, Decedent prepared a Last Will and Testament. Approximately one year later, on December 30, 2011, Decedent married Appellee Mary Jo Kulig. Since the will had been executed before his second marriage, it made no provision for Kulig, nor did the will include any indication that Decedent had contemplated remarriage when he executed it. On February 3, 2012, barely one month after marrying Kulig, Decedent died, survived by Kulig and by appellants (his children), Carrie Budke and James Kulig. By the terms of the Trust, if Joanne predeceased Decedent, the balance of the Trust corpus was to be divided and distributed to Children according to the Trust’s terms. Kulig undisputedly was entitled upon Decedent’s death to an ERISA benefit plan. The parties stipulated that Kulig, a pretermitted spouse under Pennsylvania law, was entitled to receive the same share of Decedent’s estate to which she would have been entitled had he died intestate. The Children filed a petition for declaratory judgment before the Orphans’ Court seeking a declaration that the Trust was excluded from Kulig’s pretermitted spousal share. Kulig opposed the petition, arguing primarily that, in calling for the application of the same interpretive principles to trusts that apply to wills, Section 7710.2 of the Code established that inter vivos trusts, like other assets, must be considered part of the intestate estate for purposes of calculating the pretermitted share. The Superior Court held Section 7710.2 mandated application to the Trust of the same presumption applicable to the will under Subsection 2507(3). Accordingly, the estate comprising the pretermitted spousal share necessarily included the Trust corpus. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s determination that the revocable inter vivos trust at issue should have been included in Decedent’s estate for purposes of discerning the pretermitted spouse’s statutory entitlement under 20 Pa.C.S. 2507. View "Re: Trust Under Deed of D. Kulig; Apl of Budke" on Justia Law

Appellants Tomeka and Marlon McElroy appealed a circuit court judgment denying their will contest. In 2010, Tracy McElroy filed a petition to probate the will of Clifton McElroy, Jr. Tracy was the executrix; the will was self-proving in accordance with the requirements of section 43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975. The probate court admitted the will to probate and issued letters testamentary to Tracy. Later that year, appellants filed a will contest in the probate court, alleging that Clifton's signature on the will was forged and that, therefore, the will was not properly executed. Appellants were both Clifton's heirs and beneficiaries under his will, and demanded that their will contest be transferred to the circuit court pursuant to 43-8-198, Ala. Code 1975. Tracy moved to dismiss the will contest, arguing that because the will had already been admitted to probate, the contest could not ben filed pursuant to 43-8-190, Ala. Code 1975. Generally, "[o]nce the administration and settlement of an estate are removed from the probate court, the probate court loses jurisdiction over the estate, and the circuit court obtains and maintains jurisdiction until the final settlement of the case." However, in this case, the administration of Clifton's estate was not properly removed from the probate court; therefore, the circuit court never obtained jurisdiction over the administration of Clifton's estate. Thus, the circuit court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the will contest, and the judgment entered by the circuit court on the will contest was void. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "McElroy v. McElroy" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a Chancery Court judgment setting aside inter vivos gifts made by Sheila West. Acting through a durable power of attorney granted by her mother, Dorothy Johnson, Sheila West removed her brother’s, niece’s, and nephew’s names from certificates of deposit originally created by Dorothy Johnson, and replaced them with her own name and the names of her two daughters. Sheila’s brother, Ron Johnson, petitioned the chancery court to set aside these amendments as an improper transfer of an inter vivos gift. Following a trial on the matter, the chancellor found that Sheila did not overcome a presumption of undue influence in making what amounted to inter vivos gifts and thereby reverted ownership of the CDs to their original form. THe Mississippi Supreme Court found that because Dorothy Johnson retained an ownership interest in all of the CDs at issue, neither the original conveyance nor Sheila’s subsequent transfers could be considered inter vivos gifts. Therefore, the chancellor erred in his analysis of the issue. Also at issue in this matter was whether Sheila West engaged in self-dealing under the durable power of attorney granted to her by Dorothy Johnson. Finding that Sheila failed to overcome the burden of undue influence created by the confidential relationship between herself and Dorothy, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to revert the CDs to their status prior to Sheila’s 2010 amendments. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dorothy Johnson" on Justia Law

The circuit court did not err by concluding that a holographic writing did not comply with Va. Code 64.2-403 or -404.After the decedent died, the executor of the decedent’s estate submitted the decedent’s will and a writing written across a divider in a binder filled with estate planning documents that the executor argued was a codicil. The circuit court clerk admitted the will to probate but concluded that the writing was not a validly executed codicil. The executor appealed. The circuit court refused to probate the writing as a codicil, concluding that it did not comply with the statutory requirements set forth in section 64.2-403. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the circuit court’s rulings that the writing was neither signed in the manner required by section 64.2-403(A) nor intended to constitute a codicil. View "Irving v. Divito" on Justia Law

Timothy Betz appealed a district court order under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, prohibiting him from filing any new litigation or documents in existing litigation without first obtaining leave of court. In 1994, the Emelia Hirsch June 9, 1994, Irrevocable Trust was created. Trust beneficiaries were Emelia Hirsch's three children and ten grandchildren, including Betz. In 2003, Emelia requested the district court to dissolve the trust. In 2008, after protracted litigation, the district court entered an order reforming the trust from an irrevocable trust to a revocable trust, which was affirmed on appeal. Betz continued litigation relating to the trust: in February 2017, Betz moved the district court to reopen the case and moved to immediately vacate the 2008 order. The district court filed a notice stating the case had been resolved, it would not be reopened, and no further order would be entered. Although Betz filed an objection to the court's notice and again requested the case be reopened, no appeal was taken of the court's February 2017 denial. In March 2017, Carolyn Twite and Duane Hirsch ("the co-trustees") moved the court seeking a pre-filing order against Betz. In April 2017, after a hearing, the presiding judge issued a notice of proposed findings and order. Betz filed a response in opposition to the proposed findings and order. Thereafter, the district court presiding judge entered an order under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, finding that Betz was a vexatious litigant. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the order, it affirmed. View "Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust" on Justia Law

Defendants Alan Johnson, Joseph McDonald, and William Saturley, appealed a probate court order which set aside “decantings” from two 2004 irrevocable trusts of which plaintiffs, David A. Hodges, Jr. (David Jr.), Barry R. Sanborn, and Patricia Sanborn Hodges, had been beneficiaries, and which removed defendants Johnson and Saturley as cotrustees of those trusts. The decantings at issue eliminated the future beneficial interests of plaintiffs. The trial court ruled that the decantings were void ab initio because McDonald, as the decanting trustee, and Johnson and Saturley, to the extent they assisted as co-trustees in facilitating the decantings, failed to “give any consideration to the [plaintiffs’] beneficial interests.” The trial court also determined that it “best serves the interests of all beneficiaries to order removal of . . . Saturley and Johnson as co-trustees.” Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hodges & Johnson" on Justia Law

Mary Ann Vig, as personal representative of the Estate of Junietta Swenson, appealed the dismissal of the Estate’s action against Willis Swenson. The Estate argued that Junietta Swenson lacked capacity to execute a July 2012 quit claim deed conveying her home in Noonan to her son, Willis Swenson, and that he converted rent and grain proceeds when he subleased her farmland. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding Junietta Swenson was legally competent to execute the quit claim deed, or in finding that Willis Swenson did not convert the proceeds of a sublease of land he leased from Junietta Swenson. View "Vig v. Swenson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff’s claims of undue influence in this action seeking to void a trust established by the decedent eight days before his death. Plaintiff, the decedent’s wife, argued that there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the trust and that Defendant, the drafter of the trust, used his position to procure the trust. When Defendant separately filed a complaint seeking to establish the will established by the decedent at the same time he established the trust as the last true will and testament of the decedent, Plaintiff filed a counterclaim asserting that the will was executed under Defendant’s undue influence and was therefore void. The circuit court sustained Defendant’s plea in bar to the counterclaim and then granted summary judgment to Defendant on the complaint claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing, with prejudice, Plaintiff’s claims of undue influence. View "Kim v. Kim" on Justia Law

Once funds are withdrawn from a bank account held by a married couple as tenants by the entirety, the funds cease to be entireties property.Husband and Wife in this case deposited funds in a joint checking account designated with a right of survivorship. Husband later withdrew the majority of the funds from the joint account and placed them in a certificate of deposit (COD) issued solely in his name. After Husband died, the trial court concluded that the COD was an asset of Husband’s estate because the funds ceased to be entireties property when withdrawn from the joint account. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the COD belonged to Wife because the funds were impressed with the entireties and could be traced to the joint account. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the COD issued to Husband from funds withdrawn from the joint bank account belonged to Husband’s estate, not to Wife. View "In re Estate of Calvert Hugh Fletcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Florence Larson, mother of Dwight and Doug Larson, properly and without undue influence, gifted her shares in the family farm corporation to Doug. Specifically, the court held (1) the district court did not err in finding no undue influence by Doug over Florence; (2) Dwight could not raise the argument that the gift of stock certificates was a contract for which Doug offered no consideration for the first time on appeal; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that Florence made a valid gift of company stock certificates to Doug. View "Larson v. Larson" on Justia Law