Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Jacquelin Stevenson (Mother) was the sole lifetime beneficiary of two trusts created by the will of her husband, who died in 1988. The residual beneficiaries of the two trusts were her sons, Thomas Stevenson III and Daniel Stevenson II (collectively, the Stevenson brothers), and her daughters, Respondents. The Stevenson brothers were also co-trustees of the two trusts from 1999 to 2006. Respondents alleged that while the brothers were co-trustees, they violated their fiduciary duties by unlawfully taking money from the trusts. Respondents claimed the Stevenson brothers stole approximately five million dollars from the two trusts. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision reversing in part a circuit court order which granted Petitioners summary judgment on Respondents' individual cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. The sole issue on appeal was whether this cause of action survived summary judgment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was sufficient evidence to allow the aiding and abetting claim to survive summary judgment; the aiding and abetting claim survived Mother's death. The Court affirmed the court of appeals, who reversed summary judgment in favor of petitioners. View "Bennett v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment determination that an option agreement was supported by consideration and that the option price of $50,000 would be used in calculating the decedent’s wife’s elective share.After the decedent died without a will, a dispute arose between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s wife of more than thirty years about the disposition of the decedent’s one-half interest in the partnership he formed with his son. The son argued that he had a valid contractual option to purchase the decedent’s entire one-half interest in the partnership for $50,000 according to an option agreement executed between the father and son. The wife argued that her elective share should be based upon the full value of the partnership, which she valued at approximately $1 million. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the option agreement was testamentary in nature, executed in the guise of a partnership agreement; (2) the option agreement contradicted the public policies and principles of the elective share statutory scheme and was unenforceable against the wife for the purposes of determining her elective share; and (3) the wife was entitled to her elective share of the decedent’s augmented estate, which included the value of the decedent’s undivided one-half interest in the partnership. View "Young v. Young" on Justia Law

Richard Howarth, Jr. died in an airplane crash in 2012. Howarth was piloting the plane, which was the property of M&H Ventures, LLC. Howarth was also the sole member of the M&H. In 2013, Howarth’s widow, Cyndy, as executrix of Howarth’s estate, wrongful death beneficiary of Howarth, and next friend of minor daughter Cynthia Howarth, along with adult daughter Juliet Howarth McDonald (the wrongful death beneficiaries), filed suit against the LLC, alleging that Howarth’s death had been caused by the negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness of M&H Ventures and others. M&H Ventures filed a motion to dismiss, and, subsequently, a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the wrongful death beneficiaries could not recover because the success of their claims depended on proving that Howarth’s own negligence had caused his death. In response, the wrongful death beneficiaries argued that, because M&H Ventures, as an LLC, owned the aircraft and all of Howarth’s negligent actions had been performed as a member of this LLC, they could recover from M&H Ventures for Howarth’s negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of M&H Ventures. Because the comparative negligence statute prevented a plaintiff from recovering for negligence attributable to the injured person, and Howarth’s wrongful death beneficiaries were seeking recovery for Howarth’s own negligence, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Howarth v. M & H Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed a circuit court order approving the redrafting of Dean Nelson’s will. The change in the will was proposed upon the petition of Dean’s conservator after Dean was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. Elizabeth Nelson, Dean’s wife, argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in permitting the conservator to adopt the new will, which eliminated a trust established for Elizabeth’s benefit consisting of Elizabeth’s lifetime, one-half interest in the residue of Dean’s estate. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court’s decision to authorize the conservator to change the will was an abuse of discretion due to the lack of adequate factual findings. View "In re Guardianship of Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court ruling that the Commissioner of Accounts had subject matter jurisdiction to hear a petition for aid and direction initially filed with the Commissioner seeking construction of the decedent’s will and the determination of his heirs. The court held (1) Appellant had standing to bring this appeal because the circuit court could potentially determine that he was a beneficiary of the will on remand, and Rule 5:25 also did not bar this appeal because challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time; and (2) the Commissioner did not exceed his authority when he, without a referral from the circuit court, conducted a hearing and produced a report interpreting the decedent’s will and determining his heirs. View "Gray v. Binder" on Justia Law

The district court did not err in denying a motion for relief from a formal testacy order under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) filed by Appellant, the decedent’s wife. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in determining that Rule 60(b) did not apply in this case and that, rather, Appellant’s motion for relief from the formal testacy order must be considered under Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-317; (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to modify a formal testacy order under section 72-3-317(4); (3) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s request for imposition of a constructive trust; and (4) the personal representative was entitled to attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 72-12-206. View "In re Estate of Erickson" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute among the children of decedent Dorothy Rita Beam concerning the distribution of her estate. Decedent’s daughter, Dorothy Marian Meadows (“Marian”), filed a petition to probate Decedent’s 2014 will and codicil, and Marian’s siblings, John Beam, Jr., Margaret Beam, and Jayne Heggen (collectively, “Caveators”), filed a caveat alleging that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will and codicil. After a trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Caveators, finding that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity and awarding attorney’s fees to Caveators. Marian appealed, arguing, among other things, the evidence did not support a finding that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "Meadows v. Beam" on Justia Law

Douglas Ghee, as personal representative of the estate of Billy Fleming, deceased, appealed a circuit court order dismissing his wrongful-death claim against USAble Mutual Insurance Company d/b/a Blue Advantage Administrators of Arkansas ("Blue Advantage"). The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed this appeal as being from a nonfinal order. View "Ghee v. USAble Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Respondent Arthur Sweatt appealed a circuit court order denying, in relevant part, his motions to reconsider certain orders in his divorce from Patricia Sweatt. He argued the court erred: (1) in denying his motion to abate the divorce; (2) in granting the motion of petitioner Kathleen Paine, administrator of the estate of Patricia Sweatt, to amend by substitution; (3) in distributing the marital property more than six months after the dissolution of the marriage; (4) in finding him, but not Paine, to have been non-compliant with court rules; (5) by denying him due process and equal protection of the law; and (6) in its valuation of the marital real property. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "In the Matter of Patricia Sweatt & Arthur Sweatt" on Justia Law

Shannon Evans appealed an order granting Gerald Feldmann ownership of certain property from Leonhard Feldmann's estate. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in finding an inter vivos gift and did not err in finding the proceeds of the standing crop passed with the devise of real property. “The appellate court does not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or substitute its judgment for the trial court's decision merely because it would have reached a different result. Standing crops at the time of death pass with the real estate to which they are attached unless otherwise specified in a will.” View "Estate of Feldmann" on Justia Law