Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Lawrence Belt had the right to withdraw funds from joint bank accounts owned by Lawrence and Lila Belt during their marriage by virtue of W.Va. Code 31A-4-33.After Lawrence withdrew funds from the joint bank accounts, both he and Lila died. Lawrence’s estate, through his executrix (Petitioner), and Lila’s estate, through her executor (Respondent) disputed the ownership of the funds Lawrence withdrew from the joint accounts. The circuit court split the funds in half to prevent the perceived unjust enrichment of Lawrence’s estate. The Supreme Court reversed and entered judgment in favor of Petitioner, holding that the withdrawals from the joint accounts by both Lawrence during the marriage were proper under section 31A-4-33 pertaining to joint bank accounts with the right of survivorship, an therefore, Lawrence was entitled to the balance of the funds left in the joint accounts by way of survivorship. View "Wakim v. Pavlic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the county court concerning the distribution of the Sheila Foxley Radford Trust, holding that the county court had insufficient evidence upon which it could base its findings.The county court concluded that a gift from Sheila Foxley Radford to Mary Radford was in satisfaction of Mary’s inheritance from the trust. The gift preceded the trust’s restatement but was acknowledged by Mary as an inheritance in a contemporaneous writing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the transcript before it was insufficient to support the decision of the county court, and the matter must be remanded for a new hearing. View "In re Estate of Radford" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order enforcing a stipulated agreement in adversary proceedings seeking to debar an attorney from submitting claims to asbestos trusts. The trusts were created through the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of entities exposed to significant asbestos liability. In Golden v. California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 782 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2015), the panel held that assessing the validity of a settlement agreement is a question of state contract law. In this case, the district court never addressed whether federal law governed this case, and it was unclear whether the district court was even aware that the trusts contended that federal law controlled its decision. Furthermore, the district court also did not apply Golden to the settlement at issue. Accordingly, the court remanded so that the district court can decide whether federal or state law governs (including whether the federal law argument has been waived), and what impact, if any, Golden has on this case. View "Mandelbrot v. J.T. Thorpe Settlement Trust" on Justia Law

This case involves the revocation of a will due to after-born children of the testator. The probate court determined the will did not contemplate the birth of future children, and therefore their birth revoked the will. The named beneficiary appeals. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hobbs v. Winfield" on Justia Law

Edwyna Ivey ("Edwyna") appealed a circuit court judgment denying her petition for an omitted-spouse share of the estate of her late husband, R.E. Ivey ("R.E."). In 1975, R.E. executed a will leaving the entirety of his estate to his first wife, Nancy, or, in the event Nancy preceded him in death, to his and Nancy's four children: Sharyl Eddins ("Sharyl"), William "Robbie" Ivey, Dell Moody, and Ty Ivey, in equal shares. R.E.'s 1975 will was the only will he ever executed and that he never executed a codicil to that will. Sharyl was named executor of R.E.'s estate. Even though Sharyl offered evidence indicating that R.E. and Edwyna had agreed that "what was hers would stay hers and what was his would stay his" in an attempt to prove that R.E. intentionally omitted Edwyna from his will, the Alabama Supreme Court determined she failed to offer evidence proving either that R.E.'s will indicated that Edwyna's omission was intentional or that R.E. intentionally disinherited Edwyna because he had made nontestamentary transfers to her intended to be in lieu of a testamentary provision. By failing to prove that either exception enumerated in section 43-8- 90, Ala. Code 1975 applied, Sharyl failed to prove that the omission of Edwyna from R.E.'s will was intentional, despite what other evidence might have indicated. The Court's reversal of the denial of Edwyna's omitted-spouse claim is therefore in accord with the legislature's intent in enacting 43-8-90 –- to avoid the unintentional disinheritance of a spouse who marries a testator after the execution of the testator's will. View "Ivey v. Estate of R.E. Ivey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s application to probate his father’s will. Plaintiff allegedly learned about his father’s will more than three years after he and his brother commenced an informal probate proceeding to administer their father’s intestate estate. The father’s other two children objected to probating the will. The district court granted summary judgment to the objectors and dismissed the amended petition as time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in determining that the three-year statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s application to probate his father’s will; (2) in determining that Plaintiff failed to prove elements of equitable estoppel; and (3) in rejecting Plaintiff’s argument of equitable tolling. View "In re Estate of Fuchs" on Justia Law

This civil action arose out of the alleged mishandling of the Conservatorship of Victoria Newsome. Victoria Newsome’s mother and conservator, Marilyn Newsome, filed suit against former chancellor Joe Dale Walker, Chancellor David Shoemake, and other parties. Victoria’s severely infirm condition was the result of medical malpractice. A trust was established out of the proceeds from settlement of the malpractice case. Newsome raised numerous claims seeking redress, and a full accounting of the conservatorship, when the two chancellors were sanctioned by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the doctrine of judicial immunity applied to bar Newsome’s claims, made on behalf of the Victoria Newsome Conservatorship, against former chancellor Joe Dale Walker and Chancellor David Shoemake. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court of Simpson County granting a Rule 54(b) dismissal. In addition, the Court granted Keely McNulty’s Motion to Strike Allegation and others involved in the administration of the conservatorship. View "Newsome v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment entered by the probate court in favor of David Gourevitch, a qualified beneficiary of a 1907 trust, on Gourevitch’s complaint for a declaratory judgment that Maxwell is not a beneficiary of the trust, holding that Gourevitch’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court additionally held that Gourevitch did not receive the benefit of tolling because he had the full ability to determine why Maxwell was receiving trust income distributions under a circumstance contrary to a certain provision in the trust when he was serving as a trustee but did not commence legal action until twelve years after ending his service as a trustee. View "In re George Parsons 1907 Trust" on Justia Law

Anita White appealed the Chancery Court of DeSoto County’s confirmation of title to certain real property located in Yalobusha County to Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”). Anita claimed the property through the residuary clause of Charles William White’s (“Bill’s”) will. Tommy claimed the property through an earlier conveyance from his father and long-time partner, Bill. The chancellor found the earlier conveyance valid. Anita appealed. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of C.W. White v. White" on Justia Law

The will submitted to probate in this case satisfied the statutory requirements for valid execution, particularly the requirement of attestation, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the testator’s estate. The challenger of the will petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the will did not satisfy the requirement of Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 4-102(3) that the will be “attested…by two or more credible witnesses.” Specifically, the challenger argued that attestation requires that the witnesses sign, either upon the same sheet as the signature of the testator or on some sheet physically connected with it, and that the witnesses signed a page of the will not physically connected with the page the testator signed. The Court of Appeals held (1) when the testator and the witnesses sign on separate pages of a multi-page will, attestation does not require that the pages be “physically connected” at the time of signing; and (2) the circuit court properly found that the presumption of due execution attached to the will. View "Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio" on Justia Law