Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A "squabble" erupted between family members over the property of the deceased patriarch. The patriarch-settlor appointed defendant Melissa Reynoso (a granddaughter of the settlor) as trustee. In this proceeding, the trial court determined Reynoso was the most reliable and credible of the family members. The trial court found that other family members were not credible. Reynoso sold real property of the trust to Karen Bartholomew (a daughter of the settlor). Plaintiff Anthony Pizarro (a grandson of the settlor) filed a petition for relief against Reynoso concerning the sale of the real property. The court denied the petition and ordered Pizarro and others to pay the trust’s attorney fees and costs. On appeal, Pizarro contended the trial court erred in finding that Reynoso acted properly as trustee. However, the Court of Appeal concluded he failed to make a focused, organized, and coherent argument for why the Court had to reverse the order. Therefore, the Court concluded he forfeited the argument. Pizarro and Bartholomew contend that the award of attorney fees and costs against them was improper. The Court reversed the award of attorney fees and costs to the extent it imposed personal liability, rather than liable solely from their shares of trust assets. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. View "Pizarro v. Reynoso" on Justia Law

The administrator of a decedent's estate appealed an interlocutory district court order compelling the administrator to file a federal estate tax return for the decedent's estate and elect portability of the Deceased Spousal Unused Exclusion Amount pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A. 2010. The surviving spouse sought the order, and benefits from the portability election. The administrator argued the district court erred on several grounds: lack of jurisdiction; issues with federal preemption; the surviving spouse's lack of standing; and that the order was contrary to an antenuptial agreement entered into between the surviving spouse and the decedent. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "In the matter of Estate of Vose" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from two consolidated appeals from proceedings in the county court. The first appeal was from the court’s final order appointing a conservator for Marcia Abbott, and the second was from the court’s order that acted both as a judgment in a trustee removal proceeding and as a final order denying fees and expenses in the conservatorship proceeding. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed the first appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal to the extent it pertained to the first appeal, holding that the conservatorship appointment order became moot upon Marcia’s death while the first appeal was pending; and (2) affirmed the remaining trust and conservatorship issues, including the order removing the successor trustee, declining to surcharge him, disposing of competing attorney fee applications, and otherwise disposing of the trust and conservatorship proceedings. View "In re Conservatorship of Abbott" on Justia Law

After Loyola Kaiser’s husband, Albert Kaiser, died, Heartland Trust Company, as Loyola’s conservator, filed an application in the county court seeking authority to file the elective share it argued was due to Loyola as Albert’s surviving spouse. The county court denied the application. Heartland appealed, arguing that the county court’s decision to deny its application did not conform to the law, was not supported by competent evidence, and was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court did not err when it denied Heartland’s request for authorizing to file for the elective share of Albert’s estate on Loyola’s behalf. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Kaiser" on Justia Law

Two co-conservators filed a motion to intervene in a lawsuit involving their ward in order to seek relief from a judgment based on a settlement agreement. The superior court denied the motion, and the co-conservators appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the co-conservators were entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Alaska Civil Rule 24 and that the denial of their motion to intervene was not harmless error. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's order denying the motion to intervene and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hopper v. Estate of Goard" on Justia Law

FMR Corp. n/k/a FMR LLC, Fidelity Management Trust Company, and Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC (collectively, "Fidelity") appealed a circuit court order denying their motion asking the court to compel Elizabeth Howard n/k/a Elizabeth Hart ("Hart") to arbitrate Fidelity's dispute with her regarding her responsibility to indemnify Fidelity for losses it might suffer if Hart's stepchildren prevailed on claims they asserted against Fidelity that were the subject of a separate pending arbitration proceeding. In 2006, Hart's husband, Frederick Howard, opened an individual retirement account with Fidelity ("the Fidelity IRA"), funding it with money previously been held in a retirement account administered by Howard's former employer. Although Howard had previously designated his three children from a prior marriage as beneficiaries of the employer's retirement account, he did not designate any beneficiary for the Fidelity IRA at the time it was opened or at anytime thereafter. Howard died in 2011. His will left all his personal property to the children, explaining that Hart "has a sizeable separate estate of her own." However, because Howard never designated a beneficiary for the Fidelity IRA, Fidelity distributed the money held in that account to Hart in accordance with the terms of the Fidelity IRA, which provided that any assets in the account would become the property of a surviving spouse when the account holder died if no beneficiary had been named. The Howard children unsuccessfully challenged that distribution in Probate Court. Then the Howard children sued Fidelity and Hart, asserting claims of undue influence, fraud, and conversion against Hart and a claim of negligence against Fidelity, contending their father was incompetent at the time the Fidelity IRA was opened and that Hart was the impetus behind the opening of the Fidelity IRA, Fidelity was negligent for failing to implement adequate procedures governing its online-account-opening process that would prevent either fraudulent activity or invalid actions by incompetent individuals. Fidelity moved the Circuit Court to compel arbitration, noting in its motion that Howard, Hart, and the Howard children had all executed documents related to accounts with Fidelity that contained arbitration provisions. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the circuit court denied Fidelity's motion notwithstanding the submission of competent evidence establishing Fidelity had a right to arbitrate these claims. View "FMR Corp. n/k/a FMR LLC, et al. v. Howard n/k/a Hart" on Justia Law

In 2014, Emma’s son successfully petitioned to be appointed as the new conservator of Emma’s estate. Thereafter, the son filed an amended inventory of the estate’s assets. In 2014, Emma’s son, as conservator, moved to have financial details regarding the value of the estate removed from the publicly available docket in the case. The probate court denied the motion. The son filed a motion to reconsider and to amend the judgment. While the court had the matter under consideration, the conservator filed a request for the financial information to be removed from the public docket as an accommodation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The probate court then certified a question to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court discharged the reported question, holding that the question could not be answered consistent with the Court’s basic function as an appellate court and instead sought an advisory opinion on an issue that may be rendered moot by subsequent decision-making. View "In re Conservatorship of Emma" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Supreme Court has held “that the first court to properly take jurisdiction of a wrongful death action in our state courts shall, so long as the action is pending, have exclusive jurisdiction, and any other subsequently-filed action for the same death shall be of no effect.” Despite this holding, Janice Davis, after filing an action for the wrongful death of her father, Richard Davis, and while that action was pending, filed three additional, separate wrongful-death actions, two of which were against the same defendant. Because these three subsequent actions were of “no effect,” they were properly dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments dismissing the three subsequently filed wrongful-death actions. View "Estate of Richard B. Davis v. Blaylock" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a property damage claim filed by the Hayes Family Trust with its insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty. When the parties could not agree on the amount of loss, Hayes invoked an appraisal process provided by the policy to calculate the loss incurred. After Hayes sought the district court's assistance with the appointment of an umpire, the parties participated in the appraisal process, which resulted in a unanimous award. State Farm paid the balance of that award, and Hayes accepted payment. But despite State Farm's payment, at Hayes's request, the district court confirmed the award and entered judgment in favor of Hayes. Hayes promptly moved for an award of prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and costs under a prevailing party statute. In response, State Farm moved to vacate or amend the judgment. Finding that the parties settled any dispute over the amount of loss, the court agreed with State Farm and vacated its order confirming the appraisal award and the judgment. Hayes appealed the order vacating judgment in an attempt to recover prejudgment interest, fees, and costs. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "In re: Hayes Family Trust" on Justia Law

The sole question on appeal in this matter was whether the decedent's handwritten name at the beginning of the document was a "signature" as contemplated by AS 13.12.502(b). This was an issue of first impression, and the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s conclusion that a testator’s handwritten name in the exordium clause of a purported holographic will was sufficient to satisfy the signature requirement in AS 13.12.502(b) unless the instrument was otherwise incomplete. View "In Re Estate of Baker" on Justia Law