Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether five beneficiaries of a Delaware trust could recover on their $88 million judgment against the individual trust established by a brother to one beneficiary and uncle to the rest. The judgment arose from the trustee's alleged bad faith and willful misconduct in handling the estate. A Master held that a spendthrift clause in the trustee's Trust precluded the beneficiaries from obtaining relief against the Trustee's interest. The Court of Chancery found that the beneficiaries' notice of exceptions to the Master's final report on the spendthrift issue was late, and that they forfeited their right to challenge the ruling. The beneficiaries appealed, arguing the Court of Chancery erred by not considering the merits to the beneficiaries' exceptions to the Master's ruling on the spendthrift issue. View "Mennen. v. Fiduciary Trust International of Delaware" on Justia Law

After John McClure’s death, his widow (Ellie) and his children (collectively, Siblings) embarked on contentious litigation regarding the McClure Family Trust. Ellie filed suit seeking to enforce an amendment to the Trust. The district court denied relief, concluding that, under the Trust’s plain language, Ellie had no interest in any of the Trust’s assets. The court also denied Ellie’s motion for partial summary judgment asking the court to forfeit Siblings’ interests for purportedly contesting the Trust’s validity. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Ellie had an interest in Trust assets, and therefore, the district court incorrectly concluded that the amendment was invalid; and (2) the district court correctly determined that Siblings did not forfeit their interest in the Trust. Remanded. View "In re Estate of McClure" on Justia Law

Drew Bowers (Ward) sustained a traumatic brain injury in 1981. As a result of the injury, he required 24-hour care. His mother, Patricia Bowers Edwards (Guardian) was appointed guardian of her son's person and property in 2004. As guardian, she was responsible for hiring approximately ten caretakers for Drew in his private residence. Two of the ten caretakers contracted to provide services for Drew were domestic workers, Deborah Sizemore and Brad Garrett. In 2013, Sizemore filed a "charge of discrimination" pursuant to the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, with the Attorney General's Office of Civil Rights Enforcement, claiming that her hours were dramatically reduced when she told the guardian she suffered from narcolepsy. Sizemore also claimed that she was sexually harassed at work by a male co-worker. She identified co-worker Garrett as a supporting witness in her complaint. The Guardian terminated the employment of both Sizemore and Garrett when she received the complaint from the Attorney General. The Guardian admitted she discharged Sizemore and Garrett from employment because the complaint was "the straw that broke the camel's back." Guardian moved for summary judgment arguing that Drew was the actual employer and that under section 1301 of the Act, a natural person did not meet the definition of "employer." Guardian further argued that under section 1302(B) of the Act, the prohibition of discriminatory practices did not apply to " . . .employment in the domestic service of the employer." The trial court denied Guardian's motion for summary judgment and Guardian brought this original action asserting immunity under the Act. Finding that indeed, Guardian was immune from suit under the Act, and that the trial court erred by not dismissing this case, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case. View "Edwards v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Ray Sandberg served in the United States Navy during World War II. Afterward, he worked for decades in dockyards and lumberyards. Throughout his work life, he had been exposed to asbestos. He contracted lymphoma, pleural disease and asbestosis relating to asbestos exposure. In 1999, he sued nearly 40 defendants who had some part in exposing him to asbestos. Most defendants settled; of the one that did not, Sandberg obtained a $1.5 million judgment. At age 84, Sandberg died. His daughter Judy Deggs, as personal representative of Sandberg's estate, sued additional companies that had not been named in her father's original lawsuit. The record of this case does not explain why the additional companies were not named in the 199 suit. The defendants here moved to dismiss this suit as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. On appeal, Deggs argued that the wrongful death claim she brought was a distinct statutory claim and that her injuries were not the same injuries her father suffered and sued for in 1999: her injuries were due to the loss of her father, which did not occur until he died. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal, finding that "[a] wrongful death 'action accrues at the time of death' so long as there is 'a subsisting cause of action in the deceased' at the time of death subject to exceptions no present here." The Court found insufficient cause to abandon that well-established precedent in this case. View "Deggs v. Asbestos Corp." on Justia Law

The decedent in this case executed two wills, the first in West Virginia in 2012 and the second in New York in 2014. The named executor of the West Virginia will (Plaintiff) filed a complaint in a West Virginia circuit court challenging the validity of the New York will. The executrix of the New York will (Defendant) moved to dismiss the complaint on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, Defendant argued that the West Virginia Court lacked jurisdiction because a New York probate court had already decided the New York will was valid. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the final order from the New York court did not foreclose further inquiry into the decedent’s will by a West Virginia court; (2) Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff’s only avenue to challenge the probate of the New York will in West Virginia was before the county commission was unavailing; and (3) Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to demonstrate that the probate of the New York will was improper. View "Mason v. Torrellas" on Justia Law

The United States appeals the district court’s determination that commissions claimed by Defendant F. Gordon Spoor as personal representative of the Louise P. Gallagher Estate and as trustee of the Louise Paxton Gallagher Revocable Trust have priority over a special deferred estate tax lien on property designated by agreement under I.R.C. 6324A. The court agreed with the United States that special estate tax liens on property designated by section 6324A, unlike estate tax liens on the gross estate pursuant to section 6324, are not subject to an executor’s claims for administrative expenses. The court also held that Spoor’s administrative expenses do not take priority over income tax liens imposed pursuant to section 6321. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Spoor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contested the legality of the decedent’s will. Plaintiff then filed a second notice of claim seeking reimbursement of money advanced to the decedent. A number of motions subsequently followed, along with an affidavit filed by Plaintiff indicating his intention to remove the case to the superior court for a jury trial. After a hearing, the probate court concluded that some of the matters were eligible for removal and the remainder were not. Plaintiff later filed a complaint alleging that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the matters decided at the hearing. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, as an appeal, it was untimely. Plaintiff argued in response that the action was not an appeal but an action challenging the probate court’s retention of jurisdiction over the case. The trial court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments, concluded that Plaintiff’s action was untimely, and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly treated the present action as an appeal but incorrectly determined that the appeal was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-186(a). Under the facts of this case, however, the appeal was filed prematurely. View "Connery v. Gieske" on Justia Law

Margie Wylie appealed the circuit court's affirmance of the Montgomery Probate Court's decision removing her as personal representative of the estate of Derrell Cockrell, appointing a successor personal representative for the estate, and assessing over $19,000 in costs against Wylie. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the circuit court did not exceed its discretion in affirming the probate court's decision to remove Wylie as personal representative. The record lacked supporting documentation of the probate court's fee award to the guardian ad litem, however, and orders from neither the probate court nor the circuit court provided sufficient information to perform a meaningful review of that decision. The Court therefore reversed that portion of circuit court's judgment affirming that award and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wylie v. Estate of Derrell Cockrell" on Justia Law

Judgment creditor Far West Industries filed suit against Michael Mona, who, together with Rhonda Mona, was a co-trustee of a family trust. A California court found that Michael committed fraud and awarded Far West a $17.8 million judgment against Michael. Far West domesticated the California judgment in Nevada against Michael and the family trust. The Nevada district court requested to examine Rhonda and ordered the Monas to produce some of Rhonda’s personal financial documents. When the Monas did not produce the documents the district court sanctioned them pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 and concluded that the funds on Rhonda’s three bank accounts were subject to execution by Far West pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 21.320 to partially satisfy the judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the post-judgment sanctions order, holding that the district court erred in (1) ordering Rhonda to produce documents and appear for an examination regarding her personal finances without Far West proceeding against Rhonda in her individual capacity or without the court clerk issuing a subpoena and Far West serving the subpoena on Rhonda; and (2) ordering Rhonda’s personal bank accounts to be executed upon pursuant to rule 37 and section 21.320 and to be applied to partially satisfy the judgment. View "Mona v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Maurice Ricard and his wife, Ella “Bernadette” Ricard, had five girls and one boy. Maurice had a will creating the Maurice M. Ricard Family Trust. The Trust provided that real property owned by Maurice would be held by the Trust for the use and benefit of Bernadette during her lifetime and that, upon the death of Bernadette, the Trust would terminate and the girls would receive the assets. Maurice died in 2002, after which the sisters sold their respective interests in the Trust to their brother. In 2010, after Bernadette died, the Trust terminated. The sisters subsequently sought to rescind their agreements and repurchase their respective interests. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreements were enforceable, and the sisters should not be allowed to rescind their agreements. View "In re Ricard Family Trust" on Justia Law