Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The State Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) filed a petition for an ex parte protective order on behalf of an elderly woman against her adult daughter and caregiver, after receiving allegations of financial abuse made by the elderly woman’s other family members. The superior court found those allegations to be unfounded and denied the protective order. The elderly woman’s estate and the caregiver daughter sought attorney’s fees against the State in connection with both the protective order and conservatorship proceedings. The superior court awarded full reasonable fees arising from the denial of the protective order, finding that OPA’s protective order petition was brought without “just cause,” under the fee-shifting provision of AS 13.26.131(d). The superior court declined to award attorney’s fees arising from the proceeding to establish a conservatorship because the State had not “initiated” the conservatorship proceeding as required for fees under AS 13.26.131(d). The State appealed the first award, and the caregiver daughter and the estate of the woman cross-appealed the denial of the second award. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that AS 13.26.131 did not apply to elder fraud protective order proceedings; nor did Alaska Civil Rule 82. Instead, AS 44.21.415 contained a cost-recovery mechanism that allowed private parties to recover attorney’s fees against the State in such proceedings. So the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s fee award in the elder fraud protective order proceeding. And because the State did not initiate the conservatorship proceeding here, no attorney’s fees are available against the State in that proceeding. View "Alaska Office of Public Advocacy v. Estate of Jean R." on Justia Law

Sarunas Abraitis, the former executor of his mother’s estate, applied to admit his mother’s will to probate. The will provided that if Abraitis’s father predeceased his mother, her entire estate would be divided equally between Abraitis and his brother, Vytautas. The matter was assigned to Judge Laura Gallagher. While the estate was being administered, Vytautas died. Abraitis subsequently filed an application to probate a different, later will that his mother executed and that bequeathed to him the entire estate. Vytautas’s former wife, Vivian, filed a complaint to contest the later will. The action was also assigned to Judge Gallagher. Abraitis filed two actions in prohibition alleging that Judge Gallagher lacked jurisdiction. As grounds for the writ, Abraitis referred to collateral proceedings regarding his mother’s guardianship and federal and state tax proceedings, arguing that because none of the parties objected or moved to intervene in the tax cases, the probate court was precluded from hearing any matter concerning the estate. The court of appeals dismissed Abraitis’s complaints in prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abraitis had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and that Judge Gallagher did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the probate court action. View "State ex rel. Abraitis v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Three individuals (the Conservators) were appointed guardians and conservators of Mary Novotny. The Conservators established the Mary D. Novotny Trust. Catherine Novotny was a beneficiary of the Trust, and the conservators were the trustees. When a dispute over the Trust arose between the trustees and Catherine, the circuit court granted reimbursement of expenses to the trustees. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Conservators and awarded them reimbursement and future expenses. Catherine appealed. The Supreme Court remanded, holding that there was no evidence in the record that supported the basis for reimbursement under S.D. Codified Laws 55-3-13, and therefore, the circuit court erred in granting the Conservators’ motions for expenses. View "In re Guardianship of Novotny" on Justia Law

The issue at the heart of this dispute concerned the ownership of property formerly owned by decedent Kenneth Liebler. Liebler's daughter, appellant Melanie Carne (as putative successor trustee to the Kenneth Liebler Irrevocable Trust dated December 21, 2009 (the "2009 Trust")), filed a second amended petition to confirm the validity of the 2009 Trust, Carne's status as successor trustee of the 2009 Trust, and the assets of the 2009 Trust. In her petition, Carne sought to confirm that certain real property previously owned by Liebler ("the Via Regla property"), had been properly transferred to the 2009 Trust. Liebler's grandson, defendant-respondent Dillon Hasting, filed an opposition to the petition. Hasting was a beneficiary of the Liebler Revocable Declaration of Trust dated February 27, 1985 (the "1985 Trust"). In his opposition, Hasting contended that the 2009 Trust was not a valid trust because Liebler had not properly transferred title to the only asset allegedly in the 2009 Trust, the Via Regla Property. In support of this contention, Hasting noted that Liebler held legal title to the Via Regla Property as trustee of the 1985 Trust, and the 2009 Trust contained no language indicating that Liebler was acting as the trustee of the 1985 Trust at the time of the purported transfer to the 2009 Trust. The trial court entered an order denying Carne's petition for the two reasons set out in Hasting's opposition. On appeal, Carne argued the trial court erred in denying her petition. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the language in the 2009 Trust was sufficient to convey the Via Regla Property to the 2009 Trust and that Liebler was not required to execute a separate deed in order to effectuate such conveyance. Furthermore, the Court concluded that, because at the time the 2009 Trust was created, the 1985 Trust was a revocable inter vivos trust, and Liebler was the sole trustee who owned no interest in the Via Regla Property as an individual, Liebler's signature on the 2009 Trust was sufficient to "to convey good title" to the Via Regla Property from the 1985 Trust to the 2009 Trust. View "Carne v. Worthington" on Justia Law

Appellee filed a notice of appeal from a probate order approving a settlement agreement among Appellants. Upon Appellee’s motion, the circuit court extended the time to lodge the record. Appellee subsequently filed a motion asking the court to enter a nunc pro tunc order clarifying its findings of fact relating to the order granting the extension because that order did not include the findings required by Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 5(b). The circuit court entered the nunc pro tunc order. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in entering the nunc pro tunc order because Rule 5(b) had not been complied with at the time the original motion for extension of time was granted. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s nunc pro tunc order, as the extension order complied with Rule 5(b); (2) affirmed the circuit court’s order approving the settlement agreement, as the settlement was in the best interest of the Estate of J.D. Ashley, Sr.; and (3) denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss Appellee’s appeal and their motion for sanctions, as Appellee timely lodged the record for his appeal and Appellee’s appeal was not frivolous. View "Ashley v. Ashley" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the circuit court concluded that Bernard Bossio had proven that the parties in this case intended to enter into and were bound by the terms of a 1990 stock purchase agreement requiring the Estate of Luigi Bossio to sell to Bossio Enterprises the corporate shares owned by Luigi Bossio at the time of his death in 2007. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit clear error in concluding that Bernard Bossio proved, with clear and convincing evidence, the terms of the 1990 stock purchase agreement. View "Estate of Luigi Bossio v. Bossio" on Justia Law

Following the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to James Phillips and Larry Wyman Phillips in their capacity as co-executors of the estate of Opal Anderson Phillips (Opal), Mary Elizabeth Oravec appealed, arguing the trial court erred in its determination that Opal’s 2007 will should have been admitted to probate. Specifically, Oravec argued that the 2007 will violated the terms of a previous joint will that contractually could not be revoked by Opal. In 1997, Opal and her husband George executed a single will that recited only that it was a "joint" will. George died in 1998, and in 2004, Opal drafted a new will, expressly revoking the 1997 joint will. The attorney who drafted the 2004 will testified that Opal disinherited Oravec because she had loaned Oravec a significant amount of money during life, Oravec had not repaid the loans, and that Opal believed Oravec "had already received enough." Opal died in February 2014, and James and Larry offered the 2007 will for probate. Oravec filed a caveat, contending that: (1) the 1997 joint will was intended to be both joint and contractually binding; (2) as a result, Opal could not revoke the 1997 joint will after she benefitted from its probate; and (3) because of this fact, the 2007 will was invalid. The operative question in this case was whether Opal had any contractual obligation to George arising from the 1997 will that prevented her from revoking that will and changing her testamentary plan following George’s death. The Supreme Court found no evidence of any such obligation, and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Oravec v, Phillips" on Justia Law

In this lengthy estate dispute, Testator’s daughter (Daughter) appealed several rulings of the circuit court, including the circuit court’s denial of her request for relief from an order under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Daughter relief under section 15-6-60(b); (2) did not err when it considered extrinsic evidence to interpret Testator’s last will and testament and subsequent codicil; (3) properly approved the personal representative’s proposed distribution of Testator’s assets; (4) did not err in reforming the will and codicil; and (5) did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Testator’s grandson. View "In re Estate of Bickel" on Justia Law

Hiroaki (Rocky) Aoki, the founder of the Benihana restaurant chain, formed the Benihana Protective Trust (BPT) in 1998 to hold stock and assets relating to Benihana. In 2002, Rocky married Keiko Aoki. In September 2002, Rocky executed a partial release of his testamentary power of appointment whereby Rocky could appoint only his descendants at the time of his death. In December 2002, Rocky executed a second release further restricting his power to appoint by excluding any descendants who were non-resident aliens. After Rocky’s death, the BPT trustees commenced this proceeding seeking a determination as to the validity of the September and December releases. The Surrogate Court decreed the September and December Releases invalid on the grounds that Rocky was not aware that the Releases were irrevocable and that Rocky’s execution of the Releases was not voluntary. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Keiko failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the Releases were signed as a result of fraud or other wrongful conduct. View "Aoki v. Aoki" on Justia Law

Before Russell Banks died, Russell and his brother, David Banks, owned together fifteen parcels of real estate in Sussex County, Delaware. The granting language of the deed to each parcel stated that the property was conveyed to the brothers as “joint tenants with right of survivorship.” David asserted that this language granted joint tenancies with right of survivorship (WROS) and that the properties passed to him in full upon Russell’s death. Mackie Banks, the executrix of Russell’s estate, filed an inventory for Russell’s estate asserting that the properties were conveyed to the brothers as tenants in common and that the Estate held a fifty percent ownership interest in the properties. David filed a petition to quiet title on the properties. The Court of Chancery granted David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the language conveying the property as “joint tenants with right of survivorship” was sufficient to create a joint tenancy WROS and not a tenancy in common. View "Banks v. Banks" on Justia Law