Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Bobby Gibson filed a legal-malpractice action against Joe Montgomery and his law firm, Williams, Williams and Montgomery, P.A. (“WWM”), alleging wrongful conduct in connection with the administration of his late wife Debbie's estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to Montgomery and WWM. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Bobby timely filed his Notice of Appeal and raised four issues: 1) whether the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel barred his claims, 2) whether judicial estoppel precluded his malpractice action, 3) whether the thirty-day period provided in Section 11-1-39 required dismissal, and 4) whether there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of his legal-malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: Bobby's claims were not precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; judicial estoppel did not preclude Bobby's legal-malpractice action; there was no merit to Montgomery's Section 11-1-39 argument; and there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed. View "Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery, P.A." on Justia Law

Roy Volk and Pamela Dee Volk had a son, RBV, in the fall of 2000. In 2011, the marriage was dissolved. At the time of the divorce, Roy owned two term life insurance policies. While a statutorily-mandated temporary restraining order was still in effect, Roy changed the beneficiary designations on both policies and designated his sister, Valerie Goeser, as the new beneficiary. Just over four months after the divorce was final, Roy died. Valerie received the life insurance proceeds from both policies. Pamela subsequently filed this action on behalf of RBV against Valerie and Roy’s estate seeking a constructive trust over the insurance policy payouts for the benefit of RBV. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Valerie, concluding that Valerie was not unjustly enriched when she received Roy’s life insurance proceeds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Valerie was unjustly enriched because Roy’s errors in changing the beneficiary of his life insurance under the statutorily-mandated restraining order invalidated his designations on the insurance policies, and a constructive trust was created on RBV's behalf as a result of these errors. Remanded. View "Volk v. Goeser" on Justia Law

WEB2B filed for bankruptcy and turned over its balances to the Chapter 7 trustee. RAC filed suit claiming the balances of an express trust, resulting trust, or constructive trust. WEB2B provided automated clearinghouse and electronic-check conversion services to RAC. The bankruptcy court dismissed RAC's claims and granted summary judgment to the trustee. The court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's decision, concluding that the parties' processing agreement had no requirement to segregate RAC funds, nor a definite, unequivocal, explicit declaration of trust. Therefore, there was no express trust in this case. The district court did not err in concluding that the undisputed facts here do not show with reasonable certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt that a resulting trust exists. Finally, the district court properly concluded that RAC had identified no clear and convincing evidence of conversion sufficient to justify imposing a constructive trust on the remaining funds. View "Rent-A-Center East, Inc. v. Leonard" on Justia Law

Before Genevieve Franke’s death in 2014, she had been a resident of a nursing home. In 2013, Genevieve agreed to sell her farmland to her son John Franke at a price below its fair market value. Laurie Berggren, Genevieve's daughter, subsequently petitioned for the appointment of a conservator. The court appointed Laurie as Genevieve’s temporary conservator and Cornerstone Bank as Genevieve’s permanent conservator. Both Genevieve and John appealed. Before the parties filed briefs, Genevieve’s attorney filed a suggestion of death stating that Genevieve had died. Genevieve, through her attorney of record, sought an order to dismiss the appeal as moot and to vacate the county court’s order appointing a permanent conservator. John, in turn, moved for an order reviving the appeal. The Supreme Court overruled both of these motions, holding (1) Genevieve’s attorney has no standing to represent her in the Court after her death; (2) Genevieve’s death has abated John’s appeal, for which he has standing, because her competency and need for a conservator are moot issues; and (3) the abatement of John’s appeal does not require the Court to vacate the county court’s orders appointing a conservator. View "In re Conservatorship of Franke" on Justia Law

This case was an appeal from the district court’s decision to affirm a magistrate court’s summary dismissal of the Estate of John Cornell’s claims involving the administration of a trust. John and his sister, Toni Johnson, were beneficiaries of their parents’ trust. When the time came to distribute the assets, Johnson refused, which led John to file a petition for the administration of the trust and removal of Johnson as trustee. Shortly after filing the petition, John committed suicide. Consequently, the magistrate court granted Johnson’s motion to dismiss John’s petition. Kareen Cornell, John’s surviving spouse, subsequently petitioned the magistrate court for administration of the trust and to remove Johnson as trustee. The magistrate court once again granted Johnson’s motion to dismiss, basing its decision on the trust distribution survivorship clause and on abatement of the claims. John’s Estate appealed, and the district court affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Estate argued that its claims survived John’s death. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Estate of Cornell v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Murl Tribble and Janet Sargent, and Defendant, Polly Pickens, were three adult sisters involved in a dispute over the Estate of their deceased mother. Plaintiffs alleged (1) beginning at the time of their father’s death, Defendant engaged in a scheme to convert their mother’s property to her own use, to the prejudice of the Estate and Plaintiffs as beneficiaries; and (2) Defendant attempted to deal her scheme by not disclosing non-probate assets while acting as executrix of their mother’s estate. The jury awarded Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $94,124, which the circuit court directed to be paid into the Estate. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial, holding (1) Defendant’s argument that the Supreme Court should dismiss this action as untimely was without merit; (2) the circuit court did not err in entering judgment as a matter of law to the effect that a fiduciary relationship existed between Defendant and her mother; and (3) Plaintiffs established a sufficient factual basis for their claims of breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with Plaintiffs’ expectancy, conversion, constructive fraud, and actual fraud to go to the jury. View "Pickens v. Tribble" on Justia Law

Caveators James Ayers, Nancy Davis, and Debra Hilty, siblings of testator Donald Ayers (“Donald”), appealed a superior court judgment, entered after a jury verdict, upholding Donald’s last will and testament that left the entirety of his estate to Donald’s remaining sibling, Carol Ayers (“Carol”). Donald was divorced with no children, and his four siblings were his closest relatives, but discord between the siblings had developed during the last years of the life of their mother. Donald had no will prior to April 2009. After a discussion about Donald’s wishes for his property after his death, Carol, using a form she found on the internet, prepared a will for Donald which she gave him to review; it left the entirety of his estate to Carol and named her as executor, and in the event she predeceased him, named Carol’s daughter, Tammy Cook, as beneficiary and executor. That same day, with Carol as a passenger, Donald drove to the courthouse where two deputy clerks witnessed the will’s execution. After being informed that the will did not need to be filed with the court, Donald and Carol left, taking the will with them. Donald died on January 17, 2012. Carol filed the will for probate, and Caveators asserted that at the time of the will’s execution, Donald was laboring under the exercise of undue influence by Carol and Tammy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ayers v. Cook" on Justia Law

Correne Vaage, surviving spouse and special personal representative of the Estate of Lowell H. Vaage, appealed a judgment dismissing its claim to reform a personal representative's deed issued by the John Vaage estate to Lowell Vaage. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court's finding the Lowell Vaage estate failed to prove fraud or mistake sufficient to reform the personal representative's deed was not clearly erroneous. View "Estate of Vaage" on Justia Law

Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist, three stepchildren of Clarence Erickson and two spouses of the stepchildren, appealed a judgment granting a motion by Clarence Erickson's biological son, Curtis Erickson, to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). After Clarence Erickson died in December 2010, Curtis petitioned to rescind certain real and personal property transfers by Clarence to the appellants and to invalidate his September 2010 will. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment concluding that undue influence was exerted over Clarence when executing his will and while transferring real and personal property to the appellants, that Clarence lacked capacity to transfer money and real property, and that Clarence lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will. The court denied the appellants' motion to amend the findings and judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b). The appellants then moved to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), asking the district court to require repayment of the purchase prices the appellants paid for real property transfers invalidated by the court's judgment. The Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law for clerical errors or mistakes arising from oversight or omission under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Curtis Erickson's motion to correct the judgment under Rule 60(a). View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law

Norman Ussery appealed a circuit court order dismissing his action in a will contest against Alan Terry ("Alan"), as executor of the estate of Donald R. Terry ("Donald"). Ussery argued that the circuit court's dismissal of his complaint conflicted with "Hons v. A. Bertolla & Sons," (537 So.2d 456 (Ala. 1988)), a case in which the Alabama Supreme Court interpreted the application of sections 43-8-199 and -200, Ala. Code 1975, included in the will-contest provisions of the Code. Alan argued in response: (1) that Ussery appealed as to only one of two grounds that Alan said were the circuit court's bases for dismissal; (2) that the circuit court ruled that joinder of indispensable parties was not possible and that Ussery failed to appeal that ruling; (3) that the circuit court correctly dismissed the will contest pursuant to the joinder requirements under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) that "Hons" should have been overruled to the extent that it held that absent parties could be joined beyond the six-month period prescribed by 43-8-199. The Supreme Court disagreed with Alan's contentions on appeal, and reversed the circuit court. "After Ussery filed his complaint, the circuit court first should have determined whether it was a proper complaint under the provisions of 43-8-199. Then, if it was determined that the complaint met the statutory requirements, the circuit court, upon appropriate motion, should have joined 'interested parties' who were absent." View "Ussery v. Terry" on Justia Law