Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a petition against their stepfather, to recover property belonging to their mother’s estate and sought damages of double the value of the property, based on Probate Code 859: “If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to ... an elder, ... or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or disposed of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse … the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered [and] in the court’s discretion ... for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Staggers died. His son was substituted in as the respondent in the probate proceeding. The court held that double damages and attorney fees under section 859 were punitive in nature and not available against the son, based on Code of Civil Procedure 377.42, which excepts from recovery against a successor “damages recoverable under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other punitive or exemplary damages.” The court of appeal vacated, reasoning that section 859 damages may be punitive in nature, but are not punitive damages. View "Hill v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Decedent Lyman Dezotell was killed in an automobile accident in November 2001. At the time of his death, decedent had been married for about eight months to Maria Dezotell. Decedent had met Maria online, traveled to Romania where she lived, spent about a month there, and ultimately married her in March 2001. Maria was pregnant with the couple’s first child when decedent was killed. The child, Roger Dezotell, was born in June 2002. Decedent had six daughters at the time of his death. Four were from an earlier marriage to Linda Bedard that ended in divorce: Renee, who was twenty years old; Beverly, who was nineteen, Sammie-Jo, then sixteen, and Nicole, who was fifteen. One daughter, Jennifer, then almost twenty-three, had been adopted. The sixth daughter, Melissan, then eight years old, was from a three-year relationship with Melissan’s mother that ended in 1994, when Melissan was one. Melissan later lived with her mother. Decedent enjoyed regular visits with Melissan on weekends, but provided little financial support. Based on decedent’s income from a fulltime job at IBM acquired about two years before his death, the trial court determined that decedent’s child support obligation for Melissan would have been $590 per month. The questions this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, in distributing the proceeds of a wrongful-death settlement to the decedent’s spouse and children, the trial court was bound by the provisions of an earlier settlement distribution, and, if not, whether the court erred in curtailing an evidentiary hearing to divide the settlement in proportion to the pecuniary injuries suffered. The Supreme Court held that that the trial court correctly concluded that it was not bound by the prior order, but erred in limiting the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Dezotell" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a disagreement among siblings regarding the allowance, validity, and interpretation of the will of their mother, Elaine Holbrook. David and Cheryl Holbrook, two of the testator’s six children and co-executors of her estate, joined by Charles Holbrook III (grandson), one of testator’s seven grandchildren (collectively, appellants), appealed two Superior Court decisions in favor of appellee Amy Holbrook, testator’s daughter. On appellee’s motion, the civil division dismissed appellants’ claims that the probate division both improperly allowed the will and concluded that the will was not conditional. The civil division then granted summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellants’ remaining claim that the will was unambiguous in creating a thirteen-part devise, rather than a six-part devise. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the civil division’s conclusions that the will was properly allowed and that it was unambiguous, but reversed and remanded on the issue of whether the will could be considered conditional. View "In re Appeal of the Estate of Elaine Holbrook" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a timely post-probate will contest but failed to timely issue a citation to Respondent, the executor of the estate, in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 137.090. Appellant filed a petition to enlarge time for issuing citations. The probate commissioner recommended that the petition be granted, determining that Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 2.25 granted the court discretion to extend the time limit for issuing citations. The district court dismissed the will contest, concluding that Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits. The court did not address whether Rule 2.25 applied in this matter. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order, holding (1) a failure to timely issue citations to the estate’s personal representative and the will’s devisees constitutes grounds for dismissal of a will contest; (2) Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits; but (3) the district court erred in failing to determine whether Petitioner demonstrated excusable neglect under Rule 2.25 when requesting an enlargement of time to issue the citations. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Black" on Justia Law

Fiduciary Trust Co. filed a complaint to determine the proper method of distributing the principal of a trust of which Manchester H. Wheeler Jr. was a beneficiary. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Fiduciary, concluding that the doctrine of res judicata did not control the construction of the disputed term of the trust. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the superior court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Fiduciary because (1) res judicata did not preclude the application of paragraph 2 of the trust, which governed the distribution of principal upon the trust’s termination; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the unambiguous terms of paragraph 2. View "Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Jay Richard Smith (Smith) died testate in 2013, survived by his wife Kathy (appellant), and the couple’s two minor daughters. At the time of his death, Smith was the beneficiary of the Jay Richard Smith Irrevocable Trust established by his parents, the provisions of which granted Smith an unrestricted testamentary power of appointment of the Trust assets remaining after his death. Following Smith’s death, appellant petitioned to probate Smith’s will. Thereafter, the probate court appointed appellant to serve as personal representative of Smith’s estate and appellee, Dana Ashford, to serve as Guardian Ad Litem representing the interests of the minor children. Appellant filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Construction of a Will, seeking construction of the Will by the probate court and a declaration as to whether Smith, under the terms of the Will, exercised the testamentary power of appointment granted him by the Trust. Appellee filed a response on behalf of the children, asserting that the language of the Will was clear and unambiguous, that no construction of the Will was necessary or appropriate, and that no justiciable controversy existed to support the declaratory relief sought. After reviewing the pleadings, motions, briefs and arguments of counsel, the probate court found that the Will was not ambiguous and that the court thus could not look beyond the four corners of the document to ascertain Smith’s intent. Further, the court decided that the plain language of the relevant provisions of the Will clearly and unambiguously showed Smith failed to exercise the testamentary power of appointment granted him by the Trust. Accordingly, the probate court ordered the Trust assets to be distributed pursuant to the terms of the Trust where no power of appointment had been exercised. Appellant appealed. Because the Supreme Court agreed the language of the Will was unambiguous, but disagreed with the probate court’s determination that Smith failed to exercise his testamentary power of appointment therein, it affirmed in part and reversed in part the probate court’s order in this case. View "Smith v. Ashford" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the children of William B. Ross, appealed the probate of William's estate. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the fifth and final accounting of the decedent’s guardian and sister, Nancy Howard, alleging that Howard breached her fiduciary duty, failed to correct a conflict of interest, and violated the law in failing to obtain approval for the challenged accounting. The trial justice found in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiffs’ appeal of the probate court order approving the fifth and final accounting. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived the evidence presented during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in finding in favor of Defendants. View "In re Estate of Ross" on Justia Law

More than fifty years ago, various real-property interests were distributed to three children under their mother’s will. Heirs of the original devisees argued over the proper construction of the will provisions and the quantum of royalty bequeathed to each sibling. At issue was whether double-fraction language in the will fixed the siblings’ devised royalty at 1/24 - allowing the fee owner the exclusive benefit of any negotiated royalty exceeding 1/8 - or whether the testatrix intended the devisees to share equally in all future royalties. The trial court rendered judgment that the testatrix’s will entitled each child to 1/3 of any and all royalty interest on all the devised land tracts. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, after considering the will in its entirety, the testatrix intended her children to share future royalties equally, bequeathing to each child a 1/3 floating royalty, not a 1/24 fixed royalty. View "Hysaw v. Dawkins" on Justia Law

Monschke, acting as personal representative for the estate of her mother, the decedent, filed suit for wrongful death and elder abuse against Timber Ridge Assisted Living, which petitioned to compel arbitration on the ground plaintiff, on behalf of decedent, had signed an agreement with an arbitration clause before enrolling decedent in the facility. The trial court denied the petition, finding the wrongful death claim had been brought on behalf of decedent’s surviving children, and the children were not parties to the arbitration agreement. The trial court also declined to submit the elder abuse claim to arbitration because of the possibility of conflicting rulings. The court of appeal affirmed. While a personal representative’s interests may not directly align with the interests of any particular heir, the personal representative’s duty is to stand in the position of the heirs, not the decedent. View "Monschke v. Timber Ridge Assisted Living, LLC" on Justia Law

William Lorenz died in 2010. The county court admitted William’s last will and testament and two codicils to formal probate and also appointed William’s daughter, Theresa Lorenz, as personal representative of the estate. Alice Shea, William’s former wife, filed a petition challenging the rejection of her claims in the estate, seeking the appointment of a special administrator and challenging the second codicil of William’s will. The county court awarded summary judgment to Theresa except in regard to Alice’s claims regarding alimony and interest on a late payment. The court of appeals affirmed the county court’s order but modified the court’s dismissal of Alice’s request for the appointment of a special administrator to reflect that the request should have been dismissed without prejudice. Theresa petitioned for further review, assigning three errors relating to the issue of the special administrator. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) erred in concluding that Alice’s filing of her claims and petition for allowance of those claims was sufficient written demand under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2726; and (2) erred in modifying the dismissal of Alice’s request for the appointment of a special administrator without prejudice. View "In re Estate of Lorenz" on Justia Law