Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, contending that they were entitled to Frederica Thea's Trust's assets and seeking declaratory and equitable relief. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion seeking leave to file a second amended complaint. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the claims alleged in the proposed second amended complaint would not withstand a motion to dismiss. In this case, plaintiffs lacked standing to sue in their individual capacities. Further, a California statute with a one-year statute of limitations applies to plaintiffs claims and, while the district court did not apply the statute of limitations to plaintiffs' individual claims, all of plaintiffs' claims on behalf of the estate are time-barred. View "Thea v. Kleinhandler" on Justia Law

Lorene and Harley Walter owned a certificate of deposit account with Bank of America. The account was a survivorship account and a payable-on-death account. After Harley died and while Lorene was still alive, the Bank distributed the funds in the account to Dwight Eisenhauer and Jo Ann Day, the named beneficiaries on the account, in equal sums. The Bank violated its deposit agreement with the Walters in doing so because these payments were made before Harley’s death. Eisenhauer, using his power of attorney, deposited his check into an account in Lorene’s name, making himself beneficiary upon her death. After Lorene died, Eisenhauer, as the independent executor of Lorene’s estate, sued the Bank for breach of the deposit agreement. The jury found that the Bank had failed to comply with the agreement but that the estate suffered no damages. The trial court subsequently granted judgment for Eisenhauer notwithstanding the jury’s verdict and rendered judgment for the amount that had been distributed to Day, plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Eisenhauer, as the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the estate suffered no damages. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Eisenhauer" on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jameer Woodley was killed in a school bus accident. The decedent’s parents, who qualified as co-administrators of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against the Southampton County School Board and three bus drivers. A jury awarded damages to the statutory beneficiaries, including the decedent’s three older brothers. Plaintiffs presented to the trial court two proposed irrevocable trusts to receive the funds awarded to their minor sons. The trial court rejected the proposed trusts and directed payment of the awards to the clerk of court. The clerk later advised Plaintiffs that the funds would be deposited in a savings account at a bank with a rate-of-return of .10 percent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it refused to direct payment of the minor beneficiaries’ awards to the personal representatives and instead ordered that the awards be placed in a bank account maintained by the clerk of court. View "In re Woodley" on Justia Law

In this familial dispute over property, it was uncontradicted that the decedent Kenneth Walker deeded to his sister, Catherine Brooks, approximately forty acres of property in two separate transfers before his death. The question was whether the property was deeded to Brooks freely, or subject to an equitable mortgage which would require her to return it to Decedent's estate. After review, the Supreme Court held that no equitable mortgage existed; accordingly, the Court remanded. View "Walker v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The decedent resided in Appellants’ long-term skilled nursing care facility between March and August, 2010. Due to the alleged abuse and neglect inflicted upon her throughout her stay, Decedent suffered a multitude of injuries and illnesses that eventually resulted in her death. Appellee filed suit claiming Appellants knowingly sacrificed the quality of care given to their residents. Relevant to this appeal, Appellants filed preliminary objections seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement which Appellee signed, along with general admission paperwork upon Decedent’s admission to the facility. Appellants appealed the Superior Court’s decision affirming, in relevant part, the trial court’s order overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration and reserving for trial the underlying negligence action filed by Appellee, daughter of the decedent, and executrix of Decedent’s estate. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wert v. Manorcare of Carlisle" on Justia Law

Susan filed two actions challenging the disposition of the trust estate under an amendment to her mother’s trust that gave substantial gifts to her mother’s gardener, her friends, and caregivers. The probate court authorized the trustee to use trust assets to defend against those actions. The trust contained a no-contest clause and a provision giving the trustee the power to “litigate” and “employ” and “reasonably compensate . . . attorneys” regardless of the outcome of a challenge. Susan argued that the provision was, in effect, a no-contest clause that may not be enforced under current provisions of the Probate Code, absent a determination that her challenges lack merit and were brought without probable cause and, in all events, may not be enforced until the validity of the amendment containing the authorization has been adjudicated. The court of appeal affirmed; the defense directive is not an element of the no-contest clause. View "Doolittle v. Exchange Bank" on Justia Law

The last will and testament of Donald Amundson provided for his entire estate to be distributed to the Donald G. Amundson Trust. The Trust owned farmland jointly with the Kenneth Amundson Trust, which was set up by Donald Amundson's brother. Donald Amundson's Trust declaration directed the Trust assets were to be distributed upon his death to four charities, with the remainder distributed to ten nieces and nephews. Debra Magers and Gladys Gleason were initially appointed as co-personal representatives of the Estate. Magers, Gleason, and Todd Graveline were appointed as co-trustees of the Trust. John Widdel, Jr. represented all parties in relation to the administration of the estate. Magers eventually became sole personal representative and trustee of the Trust and Estate. In August 2013, the beneficiaries of the Estate petitioned for court determination of reasonableness of fees and for settlement and distribution of estate. The petition objected to the fees charged by Magers and Widdel for their services to the Estate and Trust. In September 2014, the district court found Magers had breached her fiduciary duty in several ways, which included paying Widdel large fees without question. The court also found administration of the Estate and Trust was not complicated and Widdel's fees were unreasonable in light of the nature of the work performed. The court ordered Widdel to return attorney's fees in the amount of $95,000. Widdel appealed the district court judgment ordering him to repay $95,000 of the attorney's fees he charged in the administration of the Estate. He argued the district court abused its discretion in finding the attorney's fees were unreasonable, and that the district court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of substituting his professional corporation as the named party on the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the fees charged by Widdel were unreasonable and in finding Widdel could properly be held personally liable on the judgment. View "Estate of Amundson" on Justia Law

In December 2012, P.M., the son of V.A.M., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and conservator for his father. V.A.M. was 81 years old at the time of the petition; he had seven children. A guardian ad litem recommended the district court appoint a third-party limited corporate guardian and a third-party limited corporate conservator. In May 2013, V.A.M. and some of his children, including D.N., P.M., K.J., and T.M., reached an agreement and stipulated a limited guardianship and limited conservatorship were necessary. The stipulation specified V.A.M.'s rights and the guardian and conservator's duties. The court appointed Guardian, Fiduciary & Advocacy Services as the limited guardian and First International Bank & Trust of Fargo ("Bank") as the limited conservator. T.M. and K.J. responded to the Bank's petition to sell V.A.M.’s farmstead. T.M. stated that he was not opposed to leasing the farmstead, but he was in favor of purchasing the property. T.M. and K.J. opposed the request to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims and claimed V.A.M. had no desire to pursue any legal claims and should not have to pay for pursuing any claims. D.N. responded to the petition, requesting V.A.M. be able to retain his farmstead and the court grant the petition to allow the Bank to assign V.A.M.'s possible legal claims to his children. V.A.M. also responded to the petition. He stated that he was in favor of selling the farmstead to T.M. He also stated that he did not have any claims against T.M., that he was opposed to the Bank assigning any of his claims to his children, and that he was opposed to the Bank providing his financial information and tax returns to his children. After a hearing, the district court approved the sale of the real property and the assignment of claims. The court authorized the Bank to sell the farmstead to T.M. The court also authorized the Bank to assign to V.A.M.'s children, in equal shares, any and all possible claims V.A.M. held for undue influence, lack of capacity, or breach of fiduciary duty. The court ordered the Bank was not authorized to disclose any of V.A.M.'s financial information or tax returns to V.A.M.'s children. T.M. and K.J. appealed the order authorizing V.A.M.'s conservator to assign V.A.M.'s legal claims, arguing that the district court erred in creating a "sub-conservator" to investigate and decide whether to pursue V.A.M.'s legal claims. D.N. argued the court assigned V.A.M.'s legal claims to his children and did not create a "sub-conservator." The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the district court's order, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of V.A.M." on Justia Law

The two children (“Children”) of the Decedent challenged the Decedent’s 2008 last will and testament and inter vivos trust, which changed his 2004 estate plan to leave full ownership of his entire property to his third wife and the Children’s second stepmother (“Stepmother”), thereby effectively disinheriting the Children. The district court reinstated Decedent’s 2004 estate plan, concluding that the Stepmother had exerted undue influence over Decedent’s execution of the 2008 testamentary documents. The court, however, refused to award the Children attorney fees from Decedent’s estate. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that insufficient evidence existed to support the district court’s finding of suspicious circumstances with respect to the 2008 documents. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court, holding (1) the Court of Appeals exceeded its standard of review by making its own findings of fact and reweighing the evidence on the undue influence issue; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees. View "Cresto v. Cresto" on Justia Law

Limestone Products, Inc., jointly owned by Ronald (Ronnie) Lampkin and James Oldrum (J.O.) Smith, Jr., operated with a line of credit personally guaranteed by Lampkin and Smith. Limestone was in the business of selling rock, predominantly to Lampkin's company, Lampkin Construction. Following Smith's death and his estate's subsequent refusal to guarantee Limestone's line of credit, Lampkin formed Delta Stone, a new corporation which operated on the same property, made use of the same facilities, and sold rock to the same clients to whom Limestone had sold. Lampkin sought a declaratory judgment against the Smith estate's executors that he was violating no fiduciary duties in continuing to sell Limestone's inventory. The executors counterclaimed, seeking lost profits and attorneys' fees. The chancellor bifurcated the trial and determined, in the liability stage, that Lampkin had breached his fiduciary duty to Limestone by usurping a corporate opportunity. In the damages phase of the trial, the chancellor heard expert testimony, assigned an award of damages to the Smith estate, and denied the executors' request for attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and punitive damages. The executors appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Finding that the chancellor erred in his calculation of damages, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Lane v. Lampkin" on Justia Law