Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Gerri Rogers appealed a Probate Court order removing her as the personal representative of the estate of Ilse Martha Nagel. Appellee Sigrid Hansen argued that Rogers's appeal should have been dismissed because dismissed because Rogers failed to post bond as required by section 12-22-24, Ala. Code 1975. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with Hansen and dismissed the appeal. View "Rogers v. Hansen" on Justia Law

John McAdams, in his official capacity as Chancery Clerk of Harrison County, was appointed guardian of Sybil Bowden and Jonathan Dunn. In October 2003 the Chancery Clerk opened guardianship accounts for Dunn and Bowden at the Peoples Bank of Biloxi, Mississippi. Woodrow "Woody" Pringle III served as the Chancery Clerk's attorney. The Chancery Clerk was the sole signatory on both accounts. Two years later, Pringle closed the Bowden guardianship, without any authority to do so. The Bank issued Pringle a cashier's check payable to Bowden and Pringle, jointly. Pringle forged Bowden's signature, cashed the check, and retained the funds for himself. The Dunn account required a court order before disbursements could be made. The Bank paid checks drawn on the Dunn guardianship account, in the absence of a court order. The Chancery Clerk filed suit against the Bank alleging gross negligence, negligence, and conversion of a negotiable instrument. The Bank pleaded that the statute of limitations had run on these claims and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion. The Bank petitioned the Supreme Court and was granted leave to file this interlocutory appeal. The Court found that the Chancery Clerk filed his complaint May 8, 2013. The three transactions at issue occurred on January 24, 2005; June 11, 2008; and March 25, 2009. As to the conversion claims, the most recent transaction occurred more than four years before the filing of the complaint (well outside the three-year statute of limitations). However, negligence/gross negligence claims were subject to the "discovery rule." The Bank offered evidence that it sent statements to the Chancery Clerk concerning these transactions on the last day of each month. The Chancery Clerk offered no proof to dispute the Bank's assertion, although he claims he never received a Bank statement because Pringle removed the Bank statements delivered to the Chancery Clerk. "The statute-of-limitations issue is not a question of fact because reasonable minds could not differ [. . .] that the Chancery Clerk lacked diligence in failing to obtain and review any account statements for more than a year and a half on one account and more than eight years on the other." The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the Bank its motion for summary judgment because the Chancery Clerk's claims expired due to the applicable statutes of limitation. View "Peoples Bank of Biloxi, Miss. v. McAdams" on Justia Law

Before he died, John Markey entered into a contract with his second wife, Frances, to make and not revoke a mutual will providing that, upon the death of whomever died later, the couple’s estate would be divided equally between John’s son, David, and Frances’s granddaughter. After John died, Frances breached the contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. Approximately nine months after Frances’s death, David filed suit to enforce the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that a breach of contract regarding mutual wills is neither a “claim” in probate nor a will contest and is therefore subject to the three-month statute of limitations for suits challenging the distribution pursuant to a probated will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of “claim” under the Probate Code includes an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. Remanded to consider the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code. View "Markey v. Estate of Markey" on Justia Law

Before he died, John Markey entered into a contract with his second wife, Frances, to make and not revoke a mutual will providing that, upon the death of whomever died later, the couple’s estate would be divided equally between John’s son, David, and Frances’s granddaughter. After John died, Frances breached the contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. Approximately nine months after Frances’s death, David filed suit to enforce the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that a breach of contract regarding mutual wills is neither a “claim” in probate nor a will contest and is therefore subject to the three-month statute of limitations for suits challenging the distribution pursuant to a probated will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of “claim” under the Probate Code includes an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. Remanded to consider the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code. View "Markey v. Estate of Markey" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the tragic death of Myroslava Kotsovska, who was fatally injured when defendant Saul Liebman, for whom decedent worked as a caretaker, inadvertently struck her with his car. Petitioner Olena Kotsovska, as administratrix of the decedent's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Liebman. Liebman did not dispute that decedent's injuries were the result of his negligence. Instead, Liebman argued that, because decedent was his employee, petitioner could recover only under the Workers Compensation Act. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it would need to decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether decedent was an employee or an independent contractor and explained the factors that it should consider in reaching that conclusion. The judge also informed the jury that it should give whatever weight it deemed appropriate to the facts. The jury returned a verdict in favor of petitioner, found that decedent was an independent contractor and awarded decedent's estate a total of $525,000 in damages. Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed. Relying on the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions in "Kristiansen v. Morgan," (153 N.J.298 (1998)), and "Wunschel v. City of Jersey City," (96 N.J.651 (1984)), the panel concluded that the Division had primary jurisdiction over the dispute regarding decedent's employment status. The panel rejected defendant's challenges to the damages award, reversed the judgment on liability only, and remanded the matter to the Division for a determination of decedent's employment status. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Compensation Act divested the Superior Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the decedent's employment status once defendant raised an exclusive remedy provision of the Act as an affirmative defense. Further, the Court addressed whether the jury charge was deficient enough to require reversal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction to resolve the dispute based on the dispute over the decedent's employment status. Further, the Court could not conclude that the jury instruction given confused or otherwise mislead the jury. Consequently, the Court reversed the Appellant Division and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Estate of Kotsovska v. Liebman" on Justia Law

B.K.J. appealed a district court order appointing J.W. and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. ("G.A.P.S"), as her co-guardians. B.K.J.'s niece, J.W., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and a conservator on grounds B.K.J. suffered mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease and dementia and had shown decline in her ability to care for herself and her finances. Particularly, J.W. asserted B.K.J. had over $600,000 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties and had allegedly been taken advantage of monetarily by certain friends and family members. After a hearing for emergency guardianship, the district court appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as emergency co-guardians to B.K.J. pending further hearing. The district court appointed a physician and a visitor to examine B.K.J., and an attorney to represent B.K.J. as guardian ad litem. A hearing was held on the petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that a guardianship was necessary for B.K.J., and that she did not oppose the appointment of First International Bank as her conservator. The court-appointed physician, the court-appointed visitor, B.K.J.'s guardian ad litem, and others testified regarding the extent of B.K.J.'s incapacity, the necessity of a guardian, and who should be appointed as B.K.J.'s guardian. B.K.J. testified that she did not want J.W. appointed as her guardian and nominated two of her friends, F.C. and T.C., to be appointed as her co-guardians. The district court appointed First International Bank as B.K.J.'s conservator and appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians, concluding the evidence established they were the proper and best qualified persons to serve as her guardians and represent the best interests of B.K.J. B.K.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of B.K.J." on Justia Law

Mary is the child of the marriage of Marion and Herbert Sanders. Marion executed a will in California, placing her separate property assets in the Trust and providing that Mary would receive the Trust income during her lifetime. Upon Mary’s death, the remainder of the Trust was to be distributed “for the benefit of the then living issue” of Mary. The will defined ‘’issue" as lawful lineal descendants of all degrees, including legally adopted children. If Mary had “no living issue” surviving, Jody was to become the income beneficiary of the Trust. In 2013, Mary adopted Andrew, the adult son of a close friend, and sought a declaration of Andrew's rights. The probate court concluded that Andrew did not fall within this definition of “issue” because he had been adopted as an adult under Texas adoption statutes. The probate court believed that a Texas parent-child relationship did not encompass the same rights and duties as a California parent-child relationship. The court of appeal reversed. California cannot devalue a parent-child relationship simply because it was created, whether by biology or adoption, in a sister state that imposes different rights and duties. Those policy choices do not alter the status of the relationship. View "Sanders v. Yanez" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression regarding the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 91-5-33, known as the “Slayer Statute.” John Armstrong, a severely mentally ill man, killed Joan Armstrong, his eighty-year-old mother. This fact was not disputed by any party. The Circuit Court determined that John was not competent to stand trial for the murder of Joan, and John was committed to the state hospital at Whitfield. Based on the Slayer Statute, John’s four siblings requested that the devise to John in their mother’s will be declared void. The chancellor granted their motion, and John, through his court-appointed guardian ad litem, appealed. Finding that a hearing to determine John’s mental status at the time of the murder was necessary prior to granting the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Joan Armstrong" on Justia Law

Margaret Oakland appealed a judgment dismissing her objection to the probate of the will of her father, John Gassmann, after a jury found she failed to establish his will was the product of an insane delusion. She also appealed an order denying her motion for a new trial. Oakland was Gassmann's only biological child. Her parents separated and subsequently divorced after Gassmann experienced incidents in which he believed his wife and others were involved in a conspiracy to poison him for his farmland. In the divorce proceeding, a psychiatric and psychological evaluation by a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist diagnosed Gassmann with a "delusional disorder." After divorcing Oakland's mother, Gassmann began a relationship with Bonnie Bowman, which lasted until his death in February 2012, and he developed a close relationship with Bowman's three children. In December 2011, Gassmann executed a will after he was diagnosed with terminal cancer. Gassmann's estate plan devised certain property to Oakland and his will operated with a revocable living trust to devise his interest in his family's farmland to other individuals, including some of Bowman's children. According to Oakland, Gassmann would have devised his farmland to her but for his insane delusion. According to Bell State Bank & Trust, Gassmann was misdiagnosed with a delusional disorder in the 1993 divorce, but actually suffered from a brain tumor and related acromegaly, and he had the tumor removed in 1995. According to Bell State, Gassmann's symptoms disappeared after the surgery, but his relationship with Oakland remained distant and disconnected because Gassmann did not approve of her decisions about education, employment, and marriage. The district court granted Bell State's motions in limine, but generally informed Oakland the motions could be revisited in the context of the evidence presented at trial, including the parties' experts' opinions about the symptoms of Gassmann's alleged insane delusion. The court advised Oakland it did not then know the extent of the experts' testimony about Gassmann's alleged insane delusion and would allow her to introduce evidence covered by the motions in limine to the extent her experts relied on that evidence to conclude Gassmann was suffering from an insane delusion. A jury returned a verdict finding Oakland failed to establish Gassmann's will was the product of an insane delusion, and the district court thereafter denied her motion for a new trial. Upon further review of Oakland's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's order, and affirmed. View "Estate of Gassmann" on Justia Law

The testator in this case prepared a holographic will providing that, if he and his wife died at the same time, specific charities would inherit his estate and providing that his wife would inherit his estate if he predeceased her. The will contained no provision addressing the disposition of the testator’s estate if he lived longer than his wife. The testator’s wife predeceased him. The courts below entered judgment in favor of the heirs at law and against the charities, finding that the testator died intestate. Specifically, the courts excluded extrinsic evidence of the testator’s intent, concluding that the will was unambiguous and failed to provide for the circumstance in which the testator’s wife predeceased him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an unambiguous will may be reformed to conform to the testator’s intent if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the will contains a mistake in the expression of the testator’s intent at the time the will was drafted and also establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted. Remanded for the trial court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence. View "In re Estate of Duke" on Justia Law