Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case was an interlocutory appeal stemming from a law suit by Mautrice Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries against The Service Companies Inc., (“FSS”), following Vaughn’s fatal heart attack at work. Plaintiffs Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries sued for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged Vaughn’s supervisor would not let her leave work to see a doctor despite complaints of severe chest pain and a headache. Following the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court granted FSS leave to bring this interlocutory appeal. FSS argued the circuit court erred by finding a factual dispute existed as to whether FSS had “an actual intent to injure” for purposes of determining whether the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act exclusively governed plaintiffs’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ common-law false-imprisonment claim was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not produce evidence of intent to detain. "The plaintiffs may not merely rest on the pleadings and allegations alone." The Court found summary judgment in favor of FSS proper, reversed the trial court’s ruling denying summary judgment, rendered judgment in favor of FSS finally dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint and this action with prejudice. View "The Service Companies, Inc. v. The Estate of Mautrice Vaughn" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal stemming from a law suit by Mautrice Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries against The Service Companies Inc., (“FSS”), following Vaughn’s fatal heart attack at work. Plaintiffs Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries sued for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged Vaughn’s supervisor would not let her leave work to see a doctor despite complaints of severe chest pain and a headache. Following the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court granted FSS leave to bring this interlocutory appeal. FSS argued the circuit court erred by finding a factual dispute existed as to whether FSS had “an actual intent to injure” for purposes of determining whether the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act exclusively governed plaintiffs’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ common-law false-imprisonment claim was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not produce evidence of intent to detain. "The plaintiffs may not merely rest on the pleadings and allegations alone." The Court found summary judgment in favor of FSS proper, reversed the trial court’s ruling denying summary judgment, rendered judgment in favor of FSS finally dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint and this action with prejudice. View "The Service Companies, Inc. v. The Estate of Mautrice Vaughn" on Justia Law

During his lifetime, Joseph Baumgart created a trust that had been court supervised for thirty-five years. Petitioners, income beneficiaries of the trust with one exception, filed suit against Trustees seeking to reopen previous accountings, remove Trustees, and appoint an independent third-party trustee on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, trust mismanagement, material omission, self-dealing, and other breaches of fiduciary duties. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Trustees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err when it determined that one trustee’s relationship to the party who leased trust property did not support a charge of self-dealing; (2) did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioners’ request to replace Trustees with a neutral, third party trustee; and (3) did not err when it ruled that there were no material omissions in the accountings. View "In re Trust of Baumgart" on Justia Law

Billhartz left more than $20 million to his four children when he died. His estate tax return claimed a deduction for more than $14 million because the amounts paid to the children through a trust were paid pursuant to Billhartz’s contractual obligation under a marital settlement agreement with his first wife. The IRS disallowed the deduction in full and issued a notice of deficiency. The Estate filed suit. Before trial the Estate and the IRS settled; the IRS conceded 52.5% of the claimed deduction. Soon after the settlement, Billhartz’s children sued the Estate in state court, claiming that they were entitled to a larger portion of their father’s fortune and that their prior acceptance of a lesser amount had been obtained fraudulently. The Estate asked the Tax Court to vacate the settlement on the basis that, were the children to prevail, the settlement would bar the Estate from claiming an estate tax refund for any additional amount paid to the children. The Tax Court rejected the Estate’s arguments, and entered a decision reflecting the terms of the settlement agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Tax Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to set aside the settlement. View "Billhartz v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Prior to his death and after consulting a lawyer about divorcing Wife, Husband changed the beneficiary on his term life insurance policy from Wife to Respondents, his parents and sister. Less than four months before Husband’s death, Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage to Husband. Following Husband’s death, the district court dismissed the dissolution proceeding. Wife subsequently filed suit against Respondents, alleging that Husband’s transfer violated Minn. Stat. 518.58(1)(a), which prohibits the transfer of “marital assets” by a party who contemplates commencing a marriage dissolution. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 518.58(1)(a) did not apply to Wife’s claim because her dissolution proceeding abated upon Husband’s death and the statute applies only in current dissolution proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the language of section 518.58(1)(a) limits the statute’s application to pending dissolution proceedings, the statute did not provide Wife, who was no longer a party to a marital dissolution proceeding, a remedy in this case. View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

James Myers, Sr. executed his last will and testament in 2008, and died in 2012. He was survived by his wife and two sons, appellant James Myers, Jr. and appellee Anthony Myers. Appellant was appointed executor by the will. After a motion by Appellee and a hearing, the probate court entered an order on August 1, 2014, finding that Appellant had violated his fiduciary duty in numerous ways, removing him as executor, and appointing a county administrator to replace him. Appellant appealed his removal as executor. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Myers v. Myers" on Justia Law

In this action, the surviving children of the decedent disputed both the informal probate process brought by their stepfather as well as the validity of a 1997 will that devised to the stepfather all of the mineral rights from their mother’s estate. The district court granted summary judgment for the stepfather and concluded that the contestants had not offered sufficient evidence to challenge the decedent’s testamentary capacity or to support their allegations of undue influence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by permitting the stepfather to initiate probate proceedings on the decedent’s estate fourteen years after her death; and (2) did not err in granting summary judgment to the stepfather on the contestants’ objections. View "In re Estate of Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed they were lured into making investments from which their money was “appropriated” and sued Nathan and Vertical Group. The district court entered an order of default against Vertical, but did not award damages at that time. Nathan filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The district court closed the matter during the bankruptcy. Nathan proposed a Chapter 11 plan. The plaintiffs objected and brought an adversary proceeding, restating their allegations and asserting that their claims were non-dischargeable. The bankruptcy court agreed, rejected Nathan’s plan, awarded actual and punitive damages, and determined that Nathan’s bankruptcy estate acquired his interest in the Kathleen Trust, into which Nathan and his wife had transferred assets before his bankruptcy, but did not identify a specific value of Nathan’s interest. The court converted Nathan’s bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The trustee tried to reach Trust assets. The court concluded that Nathan’s powers as a co-trustee were property of his bankruptcy estate, but Nathan lacked authority to act as trustee without Kathleen’s consent and only Kathleen could revoke the trust. Plaintiffs reopened the original action to determine damages and to collect the Vertical judgment from Trust assets. The district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, which recommended awarding actual damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees in the amount awarded in the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. The district court adopted the findings and entered a default judgment against Vertical. The Eighth Circuit dismissed Nathan’s appeal for lack of standing and affirmed as to Kathleen. View "Cutcliff v. Reuter" on Justia Law

Joseph Schmidt executed the will at issue in this case on July 20, 2010. Schmidt was a disabled Marine Corps veteran who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions since the early 1970's; he also had vision and hearing difficulties. He was treated as a disabled veteran and received disability benefits from the Veterans Administration (“VA”) until his death in 2013. He was appointed a VA guardian and conservator in 1974. Dale Groenenboom was appointed as successor guardian of Schmidt’s person and property in 1976, and served in such capacity until Schmidt’s death. In 1997, Schmidt entered into the personal care home owned and operated by Charles Reeves. Jr. and his wife, Jerry, and he resided there the remainder of his life. The Reeveses were compensated monthly for their services. The Will named Groenenboom as executor and the Reeveses and Groenenboom as the beneficiaries. In the Will, Judith Webb, Schmidt’s twin sister and sole named heir at law, was expressly excluded from inheriting from Schmidt’s estate. Groenenboom filed the petition to probate the Will. Webb filed a motion to deny the Petition and the accompanying Settlement, as well as an objection and caveat to them, contending that Groenenboom and the Reeveses breached their fiduciary duties owed to Schmidt; that they committed fraud against Schmidt and the probate court; that Schmidt was unduly influenced by them within the meaning of OCGA 53-4-12; and that Schmidt lacked testamentary capacity at the time the Will was executed. The probate court entered a final order dismissing the Petition, finding that Groenenboom did not “make out a prima facie case” to admit the Will to probate in that Groenenboom “failed to produce the subscribing witness [to the Will] for examination at the hearing despite the fact that they were neither shown to be deceased or inaccessible.” After review, the Supreme Court found the Will had a self-proving affidavit, so it could have been admitted into probate without testimony of the subscribing witnesses or other proof for the purpose of showing that the formalities of execution were met. The probate court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Reeves v. Webb" on Justia Law

Lillian and Jimmie Lee Johnson were married for 37 years, and together, raised her grandniece, Jessica Rogers. In 2005, Ms. Johnson made a will that included a number of bequests to Rogers. Ms. Johnson died in 2011, and Mr. Johnson then sought to probate her will. Rogers filed a caveat, asserting that she had been adopted by Ms. Johnson after the will was made, which would entitle her to an intestate share of the estate Although Rogers was unable to point to any statutory adoption by Ms. Johnson, she claimed nonetheless that she had been adopted pursuant to the equitable doctrine of “virtual adoption.” The probate court agreed that Rogers was “virtually adopted” by Ms. Johnson after she made her will, and so, the probate court admitted the will to probate, but subject to Rogers taking an intestate share of the estate. Mr. Johnson appealed, arguing the doctrine of virtual adoption had no application in a case in which the decedent disposed of her entire estate by will. The Supreme Court agreed, and for that reason, affirmed the admission of the will to probate, but reversed that part of the judgment holding Rogers was entitled to an intestate share. View "Johnson v. Rogers" on Justia Law