Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This dispute concerned injuries sustained by Steven Johnson when he fell off a haystack while helping his father feed cattle on property owned by the Dale C. and Helen W. Johnson Family Revocable Trust. Steven and his wife (together, Appellants) sued the Trust, a co-trustee, and a successor co-trustee (collectively, Appellees), claiming that Appellees were negligent in a number of respects. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that the Trust owed Steven no duty of care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that even if the Trust owed Steven the duty to exercise reasonable care, the negligence claim could not survive because no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Trust acted unreasonably or breached a duty to Steven. View "Johnson v. Dale C. & Helen W. Johnson Family Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

Brunton sued her brother, Kruger, as trustee of the trusts established by their late parents and as representative of their estates, and individual family members. Brunton, who was not named a beneficiary of the trusts, alleged undue influence and her mother’s diminished capacity. The elder Krugers had consulted with an accounting firm (Striegel) for estate planning. They provided Striegel with confidential information about their family, income, assets, and goals. Striegel provided information to the attorney who prepared the Krugers’ trust documents and wills. Brunton and the Estates issued subpoenas seeking discovery of the information and documents. A CPA at Striegel complied with the Estates’ subpoenas, but did not provide the documents to Brunton. Striegel invoked the Illinois Public Accounting Act (225 ILCS 450/27), governing confidentiality of records. The circuit court ordered Striegel to produce tax documents, but held that the estate planning documents were privileged. Brunton then issued deposition subpoenas to a Striegel CPA and a non-CPA employee, seeking production of the estate planning documents. The court again found the estate planning documents privileged, but held that Striegel had waived the privilege by providing the documents to the representative of the Estates. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The privilege belongs to the accountant, not the client, and there is no testamentary exception to the privilege, but the accountant waived the privilege by disclosing information to one party. He cannot claim the privilege to avoid disclosure of the same information to the other party. View "Brunton v. Kruger" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute between appellant Shalanda Sanders (née Riley) and her purported biological half-brother, appellee Curtis Riley over the estate of Clifford "Colonel" Riley, who died without leaving a will. Shalanda claims the right to inherit from Mr. Riley as a child born during the marriage of her mother and Mr. Riley and, alternatively, based on the equitable doctrine known as "virtual adoption." Curtis filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of virtual adoption, arguing that there is insufficient evidence of an agreement by Mr. Riley to adopt Shalanda and the required partial performance of that agreement. The trial court granted Curtis’s motion. In doing so, however, the court did not view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to Shalanda as the party opposing summary judgment, and genuine issue as to any material fact regarding virtual adoption. The court also misinterpreted the requirement of partial performance of the agreement to adopt and erroneously concluded that an established virtual adoption can be undone by showing that the child formed a relationship with her natural father after she learned of his existence when she was a teenager. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of partial summary judgment to Curtis. View "Sanders v. Riley" on Justia Law

Rebecca Breaux brought an age discrimination action against her employer ASC Industries on May 6, 2012. On May 24, 2013, Breaux’s attorney Lurlia Oglesby filed a statement in accordance with Rule 25(a)(3) noting that Breaux had died. The district court stayed the action pending the substitution of parties. After the ninety days allotted for the substitution of a party passed without any motion being filed, ASC Industries moved for the action to be dismissed. On the next business day, September 3, 2013, the district court granted ASC Industries’ motion to dismiss. On October 1, 2013, Oglesby filed a motion on behalf of Breaux’s estate to alter or amend the judgment of dismissal. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's centered on whether personal service of a suggestion of death on a deceased-plaintiff’s estate was required in order for the ninety-day time limit to run for the substitution of a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 25. The Court held that personal service was required. View "Sampson v. ASC Industries" on Justia Law

Daniel Ukkestad, co-trustee of the Larry Gene Mabee Revocable Trust, appealed a probate court order denying his petition to confirm that two parcels of real property are part of the Trust's assets. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the probate court erred in denying the petition, and accordingly reversed the probate court's order and remand with directions that the probate court enter an order granting the petition. View "Ukkestad v. RBS Asset Finance, Inc." on Justia Law

Before he died, the Decedent transferred two quarter sections of Indian trust land located in Tripp County, South Dakota, to his son. The Decedent’s estate (the Estate) filed this action arguing that the Decedent lacked the requisite mental capacity or was unduly influenced by his son when he transferred the land. Specifically, the Estate requested that the court compel the Decedent’s son to make application to the Secretary of the Interior for the transfer of the Indian trust property to the Estate. The circuit court denied the Estate’s request and dismissed the action, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the parcels held in trust by the United States. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. View "Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the extent to which a bankruptcy estate may reach a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust that consists entirely of payments from principal under the Probate Code of the state of California. The beneficiary claimed that Cal. Prob. Code 15306.5 caps the bankruptcy estate’s access at twenty-five percent of his trust interest. The bankruptcy trustee sought to reach more than twenty-five percent of the beneficiary’s interest under Cal. Prob. Code 15301(b) and 15307, which it argued was not subject to the section 15306.5 cap. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the beneficiary, concluding that section 15306.5 establishes an “absolute maximum cap on what is recoverable by a judgment creditor at 25 percent.” The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed. To resolve the issue as to whether a bankruptcy estate may access more than twenty-five percent of a beneficiary’s interest in a spendthrift trust such as the one in this case under other sections of the Probate Code, the Ninth Circuit requested that the California Supreme Court exercise its discretion to accept a certified question addressing the issue. View "Frealy v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Pepper, who suffered from cerebral palsy, owned an extensive collection of Elvis Presley memorabilia as a result of his friendship with Elvis. When he moved into a nursing home in 1978, he told Nancy to “keep it.” Nancy, a nurse and a devoted Elvis fan, had cared for Pepper after the death of his father until he went into the nursing home. Nancy was not compensated for her efforts. Gary died two years later. Nancy maintained the collection until 2009, when it sold for $250,000. The estates of Pepper and his mother sued, alleging that Pepper retained ownership of the collection and that his interest passed to his heirs. A jury found that Pepper had made a conditional gift to Nancy; when he died, Nancy’s ownership was no longer subject to that reversionary interest. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The jurors heard testimony about the care Nancy provided, read notes that Pepper wrote to Nancy, and saw photographs of the two spending time together. Nancy explained how important the Collection was to Pepper. Pepper’s relatives, who lived in California and were not Elvis fans, testified that Gary did not even tell them about the Collection. View "Estate of Pepper v. Whitehead" on Justia Law

Offenesia Yako Bavilla died in 2010. In 1987, Offenesia executed a will that left most of her assets to her children Etta and Steven. In the mid-2000s Offenesia was elderly and "slipping mentally." In November 2005 a doctor wrote that Offenesia's "mental status has declined significantly," that she "has become nearly mute," and that she "appears to hallucinate." The doctor concluded that "[d]ue to her dementia, her condition is quite likely to continue to deteriorate." In February 2006, Offenesia executed a new will, prepared by Alaska Legal Services Corporation. This new will eliminated Etta from any inheritance but still included her brother, Steven. The 2006 will included a statement explicitly "revoking all prior wills and codicils." This appeal stemmed from Etta's attempt to informally probate the 1987 will. Because Offenesia signed a new will in 2006, the superior court did not accept Etta's informal probate of the 1987 will. Etta, acting pro se, attempted to contest the validity of the 2006 will by filing a motion to amend her probate of the 1987 will to include a challenge to the 2006 will. Her motion to amend was denied, as was her motion for recusal of the magistrate judge who recommended denial of that amendment. On appeal, Etta challenged the superior court's denial of her motion to amend her pleadings and the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. After review, the Supreme Court remanded for the superior court to allow Etta to amend her pleadings but affirmed the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. View "In Re Estate of Bavilla" on Justia Law

In 2009, Christopher Wilson was working for the City of Sumiton. Christopher and his supervisor, Michael Carr, had been sent to mow grass on Bryan Road. Tony Henderson, the driver of the City's knuckle-boom truck, radioed Carr and asked him and a work crew to come and flag traffic for him while he was operating the knuckle-boom truck on Sullivan Road, "just over the knob." Carr, Christopher, and the crew went to Sullivan Road. While the knuckle-boom truck was backing up, part of it became stuck. The knuckle-boom was sticking out into the road perpendicular to the road; part of it was in the lane of travel on Sullivan Road for traffic coming from Sumiton. Carr testified that, when he received the call from Henderson, it was a situation that had to be attended to immediately and that he and Christopher did not have time to return to Bryan Road to get Christopher's safety vest. At some point, two of the crew who were near Christopher went to the city truck to get cigarettes and weren't monitoring the traffic. Christopher was standing on the side of the road next to the city truck, and he was "kind of" flagging traffic until the crew got their cigarettes. Frank Lemley had gotten off work that afternoon after working 16.5 hours at the Miller Steam Plant. Lemley testified that, as he topped the rise on Sullivan Road, he saw the knuckle-boom truck in the roadway. He testified that Christopher kept going and threw up both hands, thinking that Christopher said "Stop." He testified that he put on his brakes as soon as he saw Christopher and that he "locked [his] truck down and slid 23 feet." Lemley was not able to stop in time, and his vehicle struck Christopher, who later died of his injuries. Terry Wilson, Christopher's father, filed a wrongful-death action against Lemley. The defendant, Frank Lemley, appealed a trial court order granting Terry's motion for a new trial filed after a jury had returned a verdict in his favor. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the jury was presented with conflicting evidence. "When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Lemley and all reasonable inferences the jury was free to draw are indulged, it is easily perceivable from the record that the jury verdict in favor of Lemley as to the negligence and wantonness claims was supported by the evidence." View "Lemley v. Wilson" on Justia Law