Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This case centered on a dispute over the administration of a family trust and the interpretation of trust documents. After a bench trial, the court decided in favor of plaintiff Adam Blumberg, the step-grandson of defendant Gloria Minthorne. Gloria was ordered by the court to file an accounting and quitclaim certain property to Adam. Gloria appealed. She quitclaimed that property to her daughter and failed to file the accounting. Adam moved to dismiss the appeal, citing the disentitlement doctrine. The Court of Appeal agreed with Adam that this was one of the rare cases where applying this doctrine was appropriate due to Gloria’s flagrant violation of the court’s orders. The appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Blumberg v. Minthorne" on Justia Law

Eric Williams, the second cousin of Betty Reynolds, sued attorney Kenneth Nelson and his wife, Sandra Nelson. Kenneth had been retained by Reynolds to advise her in achieving her estate planning objectives. Williams claimed that the Nelsons violated their fiduciary duties to Reynolds by unduly influencing Reynolds to give Sandra joint ownership of - or to designate Sandra as the “payable on death” (POD) beneficiary on - most of Reynolds’ assets. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Nelsons, concluding that Williams lacked standing to bring these claims because he had no right to any of the assets at issue and therefore suffered no harm from the Nelsons’ alleged undue influence over Reynolds . The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Williams’ claims with respect to claims relating to certain accounts; but (2) vacated the dismissal of Williams’ claims pertaining to the accounts for which there was no valid joint ownership or POD designation in effect at the time the Nelsons allegedly unduly influenced Reynolds to give Sandra her interests, holding that Williams had standing to challenge Sandra’s ownership of, and the Nelsons’ conduct, concerning these accounts. View "Williams v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the proper interpretation of a will executed by Hodge King that appeared to leave certain real property to his wife, Hattie in fee simple, but that also appeared to leave this same property to Mr. King’s son and his son’s children upon Mrs. King’s death. After Mrs. King died, the executors of her estate became involved in a legal dispute with Mr. King’s grandchildren regarding whether Mrs. King’s estate owned the property in question in fee simple or whether Mr. King’s grandchildren held any legal interest in the property. The trial court ruled in favor of Mrs. King’s estate and assessed attorney fees against Mr. King’s grandchildren, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed: because the plain language of Mr. King’s will indicated that he intended to grant Mrs. King a life estate in his property with the remainder to be given to his son and grandchildren, the trial court erred in concluding that Mrs. King’s estate acquired Mr. King’s interest as a tenant in common in the four tracts of land in fee simple. Because the trial court erred by ruling in favor of Mrs. King's estate rather than the grandchildren, the trial court also erred in its award of attorney. View "Thompson v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

Diane Z. Kirsch assigned her limited interest in the Lee Graham Shopping Center Limited Partnership to the Diane Z. Kirsch Family Trust where the interest was to pass to the Cullen Trust. The Partnership filed suit after Kirsch died, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Partnership Agreement forbids the transfer of the interest to the Cullen Trust. The district court granted summary judgment to the Partnership on all claims. The court affirmed, concluding that the probate exception does not preclude federal court jurisdiction in this case and the case was properly before the district court, and that the Agreement prohibits the transfer of the interest to the Cullen Trust, which benefits a non-family member. The court found that the Agreement unambiguously prohibits gift transfers of interests to non-family members. View "Lee Graham Shopping Ctr. v. Estate of Kirsch" on Justia Law

Vickie Warrant filed a personal injury suit against Defendants seeking damages due to her exposure to asbestos, which she claimed caused her mesothelioma. After receiving a jury verdict in her favor in the personal injury lawsuit, Warren died. Thereafter, Micah Riggs, the personal representative of Warren’s estate, filed a wrongful death and survival suit on behalf of Warren’s children that arose out of the same injury and was against the same defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful death claim, asserting that Warren’s personal injury trial and judgment precluded the wrongful death motion. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a prior personal injury suit does not bar a related wrongful death claim brought by the decedent’s heirs or personal representative. View "Riggs v. Georgia-Pacific LLC" on Justia Law

Sister and Brother were co-trustees of a family Trust established by the siblings' parents. Before their mother died, she entered into a contract for deed with Brother for the sale of 480 acres of trust farmland. After the mother died, the siblings stipulated for court supervision of the Trust. Within the Trust action, Sister sued Brother and his wife for undue influence on his contract for deed with their mother. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Brother, concluding that Sister’s claim of undue influence was barred by the statute of limitations and that any oral agreement associated with the contract for deed was barred by the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sister did not timely bring her claim for undue influence, the circuit court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) because Sister sought to enforce her asserted interest in the sale of real estate, the circuit court correctly ruled that any oral agreement regarding the real estate was barred by the statute of frauds. View "In re Matheny Family Trust" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Duvall died, having been predeceased by her son, Dennis Kelly, only weeks earlier. Respondents, Duvall’s surviving sons, filed a petition for construction of Duvall’s will, asserting that the will left the assets of Duvall’s estate to her living children only. The orphans’ court ruled in favor of Respondents. Petitioner, Kelly’s heir, appealed. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner was permitted to inherit, as (1) the will does not express an intent to create a survivorship requirement as a condition precedent to inheritance; and (2) Duvall did not express an intent to negate Maryland’s anti-lapse statute, and therefore, the anti-lapse statute protected the devise from lapse. View "Kelly v. Duvall" on Justia Law

In 1920, the Beckton Ranch Trust (BRT) was formed by members of the Forbes family to hold parcels of land in Sheridan County, Wyoming and their appurtenant water and ditch rights for the benefit of their descendants. In 2007, Waldo Forbes (Spike) resigned as trustee after a dispute with his siblings. Later that year, the remaining trustees - Spike’s brother, Cam, and his sisters, Julia, Sarah, and Edith - began a series of land and water transactions. Spike subsequently sought the removal of the trustees. The district court (1) concluded that Cam and Julia had breached their duty of loyalty and should be removed as BRT trustees; and (2) made no finding as to Sarah and Edith, and therefore, they continued as BRT trustees.The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Cam and Julia breached their duty of loyalty, but because the evidence did not demonstrate that they acted dishonestly or with want of capacity, or that any serious harm had been done, the breaches did not warrant their removal as trustees; and (2) the district court correctly decided not to remove Sarah and Edith. View "Forbes v. Forbes" on Justia Law

Edwin Moreau worked at the W.R. Grace mine from 1963 until 1992. Edwin died of asbestos-related lung cancer in 2009. In 2013, Transportation Insurance, W.R. Grace’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, accepted liability for Edwin’s medical expenses. Both the Libby Medical Plan, an entity established and funded by W.R. Grace to pay the medical care expenses of employees who were injured by asbestos exposure, and W.R. Grace refused to accept reimbursement from Transportation for the medical expenses the Plan had paid on Edwin’s behalf. Cristita Moreau, as personal representative of Edwin’s estate, demanded that the amount of reimbursement declined by the Plan and W.R. Grace should be paid either to Edwin’s Estate or to a charity selected by the Estate. After Transportation refused to pay the money, Moreau filed this petition to the Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) to resolve the dispute. The WCC denied the petition, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because Moreau lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Estate had standing and was entitled to have its petition determined on the merits. Remanded. View "Moreau v. Transp. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kuznar left Poland and moved to the United States, leaving his wife, Emilia, and son Thomas. In the U.S., he married Anna without divorcing Emilia. Anna collected spousal pension benefits after his 1995 death. In 1997, Thomas, now living in the U.S., opened probate in Illinois state court, on his mother’s behalf. The probate court ordered Anna to pay Emilia the amount she had collected from Mitchell’s pension fund. Emilia died before judgment entered; the Appellate Court remanded. In 2011 Thomas opened administration of Emilia’s estate and renewed his motion for summary judgment in the 1997 case, on behalf of Emilia’s estate. Anna filed notice of removal. Thomas filed notice of voluntary dismissal under FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Anna then argued that she had removed the 1997 case, not the 2011 case, and that no dismissal could be valid unless it dismissed the 1997 case entirely. The district judge reasoned that Anna’s submissions indicated that she was attempting to remove a “new action” filed in the 2011 probate case. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal was effective. Thomas was entitled to accept Anna’s “doubtful” characterization of his motion and voluntarily dismiss the supposed “new action” rather than dispute Anna’s shifting characterization of his filings. View "Kuznar v. Kuznar" on Justia Law