Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The parents of Elliott Williams created their individual wills and joint trust after Elliott died. A wrongful death lawsuit was filed on Elliott's behalf, and the Williamses were statutory beneficiaries to proceeds from the lawsuit. Before they received any such proceeds, they attempted to transfer them into their trust for estate planning purposes. Both parents subsequently died before the proceeds were determined or distributed. The petitioner, the personal representative of Elliott's mother's estate, then sought to have Elliott's mother's share judicially determined to belong in the trust. The trial court determined they belonged in the trust. The personal representative of the father's estate appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. In an issue of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered whether proceeds from a wrongful death case could be transferred into a trust before they are obtained by the trust settlor. The Court held that they can, and if they were, they belonged in the trust. View "Hamilton v. Welsh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court issuing an order awarding the Estate of Thomas Ronan the insurance proceeds of a house that was destroyed by fire, holding that the district court did not err.When Janet Le Ora Ronan died, she left a holographic will specifically devising her interest in a farm to Thomas "with him having preference to keeping the house [and] farmstead...." After the district court adopted a stipulated settlement agreement (SSA) setting forth the terms as to how to distribute the estate the house was destroyed in a fire. Thomas later died. Appellants had previously insured the house with Janet's estate as the insurance beneficiary, and the insurance company issued $169,089 for the house and $15,250 for personal property destroyed in the fire. The district court relied on the doctrine of equitable conversion to award Thomas's estate the insurance money. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in distributing the insurance proceeds according to Montana residuary law or the SSA; and (2) did not err by relying on the doctrine of equitable conversion to distribute the insurance proceeds in furtherance of Janet's intent in specifically devising the house to Thomas. View "In re Estate of Ronan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's motion to intervene in a suit involving her husband's estate, holding that Appellant had a direct and legal interest in the litigation sufficient to support intervention under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-238.Appellant was appointed to serve as personal representative of her deceased husband's estate. In that capacity, Appellant filed suit against the estate of her husband's brother. Thereafter, a special administrator was appointed to administer the estate of Appellant's husband, and the administrator advanced this litigation. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to intervene in this suit in her individual capacity. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant had a direct and legal interest in the litigation and was entitled to intervene. View "Harchelroad v. Harchelroad" on Justia Law

After Nick Martino (Decedent) died intestate, his stepson from a previous marriage, Nick Zambito, petitioned to be deemed an heir. Decedent’s biological children, Tracey Martino and Joseph Martino (together, Objectors), objected. After a bench trial, the probate court determined that Decedent was Zambito’s “natural parent” under Probate Code sections 6540 and 6453, which defined the “natural parent” and child relationship for purposes of intestate succession. The Court of Appeal concluded Zambito had standing to claim natural parentage heirship even though he was not the Decedent’s biological child. The Court further concluded that Probate Code section 6454, which provided a pathway for intestate succession by stepchildren and foster children, did not operate to foreclose other available statutory methods for a stepchild to establish a right to intestate succession. In the absence of any challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support the probate court’s factual findings under this theory, the Court concluded that Objectors failed to demonstrate any reversible error. View "Estate of Martino" on Justia Law

Noble Prestige Limited lent Paul Thomas Horn $500,000 to pursue litigation against a telecommunications company. While the litigation was pending, a conservatorship over Horn’s assets was commenced in a probate court in Denver, Colorado (the “Denver Probate Court”). The case was settled, and the proceeds were placed in the conservatorship estate, subject to Galle’s management and the ultimate custody and control of the Denver Probate Court. Noble ultimately obtained arbitral awards that required Horn to pay Noble the debt owed under the loan agreement and Galle to pay Noble costs associated with the arbitration. Noble moved to confirm the awards and sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting Galle, Horn, and Galle’s law firm. Galle and GLG (together, “Respondents”) opposed Noble’s request and moved to dismiss the action. The district court granted Noble’s request, entering what it termed a “temporary restraining order” that prohibited Galle from dissipating or transferring $10,000,000 “notwithstanding any order(s) entered by the [Denver] Probate Court.” The district court also entered an order granting Respondents’ motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part. Respondents appealed both orders.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Respondents’ appeal to the extent it challenged the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss, vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case. The court explained that Noble’s petition fails to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the district court and, therefore, the issuance of a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 was improper. Further, the court explained that district court lacked the power to issue an order freezing the AT&T settlement funds pending judgment. View "Noble Prestige Limited v. Craig Thomas Galle, et al" on Justia Law

The parents, now deceased, established the Trust. Their daughter is the trustee. There are four other children. The Trust is a 70 percent shareholder of the Company. Each sibling owns an equal share of the remaining 30 percent. A Company shareholder agreement provides that any shareholder owning more than 50 percent of the company can take various actions in their “sole discretion,” including borrowing, lending, and transferring assets. The Trust's balance, after expenses and specific distributions, shall be distributed equally to five sub-trusts benefiting the five siblings. Among the Trust’s liabilities are outstanding loans made by the Company. Two siblings filed a petition to instruct the trustee, to take specified actions, including directing the Company to borrow substantial sums of money to pay estate taxes owed by the Trust. The Company responded to the Petition.The court held that because the Company was neither a trustee nor a beneficiary, it lacked standing to participate in proceedings on the Petition. The court of appeal remanded, finding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that Probate Code section 1043(a), authorizes “interested persons” to respond or object at or before a hearing in a trust proceeding. The probate court must make the discretionary determination of whether the Company is an interested person. View "Colvis v. Binswanger" on Justia Law

Boesch and Hudson were unmarried partners. The 1994 Boesch Trust was funded with his 50 percent interest in each of the subject properties. The Hudson Trust was funded with Hudson’s 50 percent interest in each of those properties. Boesch died in 1995. Hudson died in 2019. Mulvihill is the successor trustee of both Trusts. The Museum is the sole residuary beneficiary of the Boesch Trust.Mulvihill filed a Probate Code section 17200 petition, seeking instructions due to “a potential conflict in administering the trust,” alleging the Museum requested that the acquisition indebtedness on the subject properties be paid off and that the Boesch Trust make an in-kind distribution of its interests to the Museum so that the Museum may, as a tax-exempt organization, sell the interests without suffering certain tax consequences. The Hudson Trust beneficiaries, which do not face the same tax consequences, prefer that the trusts sell the properties undivided and distribute the proceeds.The probate court instructed Mulvihill to sell the properties and distribute the proceeds. The court of appeal reversed, noting a trust provision granting the trustee “sole discretion” to distribute the trust property in cash or in kind. Because Mulvihill never purported to exercise that discretion, the court remanded with directions that, barring any conflict of interest matters that may arise, Mulvihill be instructed to exercise his discretion to grant or deny the Museum’s request for an in-kind distribution of the trust’s property interests. View "Stadel Art Museum v. Mulvihill" on Justia Law

Appellant is the only child of the late J.B. Appellant opposed respondent Olan Mills II’s petition to probate a 2001 will that effectively denied Appellant any share of his father’s estate. The court approved the petition and admitted the will to probate. Appellant appealed. He contends Mills filed his petition beyond the period allowed by Probate Code section 8226, subdivision (c).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Appellant’s liberal interpretation of the phrase “has received notice” is also inconsistent with the statute’s plain language. The Legislature could have drafted subdivision (c) to apply to those will proponents who receive notice of some post-hearing event, such as issuance of a probate order or letters of administration. It did not. The court explained that limiting the application of section 8226, subdivision (c) to those who receive notice under section 8110 will not, as Appellant argues, hinder the prompt administration of estates. View "Bailey v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Shelby Hughes and her law firm, Barney & Graham, LLC, (collectively, Defendants) in the underlying legal malpractice lawsuit, holding that the district court did not err.Michael and Charlene Schlegel were in the process of divorcing when Michael died intestate. Because Charlene inherited portions of Michael's estate that she would not have had the divorce been finalized before Michael died Taran Schlegal, Michael's son, sued Defendants for legal malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that no duty was owed to Taran where there was no evidence that Taran was an intended beneficiary of Defendants' services. View "Schlegel v. Barney & Graham, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court concluding that enforcement of in terrorem, or no-contest, clauses in the decedent's will and trust agreement against Defendant would violate public policy, holding that the appellate court did not err.Plaintiff was the son and Defendant was the daughter of Mae Salce, the settlor of the trust agreement in this case. Both the trust agreement and the will contained an in terrorem clause providing that if a beneficiary takes certain actions she forfeits her rights as a beneficiary under the instruments. The appellate court concluded that enforcement of the clauses against Defendant, a beneficiary, would violate public policy when Defendant challenged certain aspects of the performance of a fiduciary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant's actions were based in good faith, enforcement of the in terrorem clauses would violate the public policy embodied in statutes requiring probate courts to supervise fiduciaries. View "Salce v. Cardello" on Justia Law