Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Terry Carter and Brenda Ciccone appealed a district court judgment in the informal probate of Allan Froemke’s will. Reginald Froemke, the personal representative of Allan Froemke’s Estate, Terry Carter, and Brenda Ciccone were Allan Froemke’s children. Reginald moved the district court to determine heirs, compute the distribution of the Estate’s shares, determine debts owed by heirs to the Estate, allow the personal representative to sell property, and approve the personal representative’s inventory. The court held an evidentiary hearing and issued findings, an order for judgment, and a judgment. Carter and Ciccone argued the district court lacked jurisdiction over a contract for deed involving Carter. They further argued the court erred in: (1) finding Ciccone owed five thousand dollars to Allan Froemke’s Estate; (2) its evidentiary rulings; (3) failing to address several pending issues; and (4) finding against partitioning property. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Estate of Froemke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Jean Voelker's appeal of a judgment of the probate court concluding that a document proffered by Voelker as the last will and testament of Theodore Ackley (the Decedent) was not a valid holographic will, holding that this appeal was an improper interlocutory appeal.Joseph Ackley, the Decedent's son, filed an application for informal probate of the Decedent's last will and testament. Thereafter, Voelker filed a petition for formal probate and submitted the petition of a purported copy of the Decedent's holographic will. The probate court granted Ackley's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that the document was not a valid holographic will. The court, however, did not render a decision on Voelker's counter-motion for judgment as a matter of law arguing that the document she submitted was valid as a holographic will. Voelker appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal brought from the probate court's interlocutory order, holding that the order was not a final judgment, and therefore, the appeal must be dismissed. View "Estate of Theodore C. Ackley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated a portion of the summary judgment entered by the superior court in this action related to the estate of Patricia Spofford, the mother of Michael Zani and Peter Zani, holding that the Zanis' claim for declaratory judgment was not properly before the superior court.The Zanis brought this lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that Spofford lacked testamentary capacity when she executed her will and claiming that Kathryn Read committed fraud when she swore that Spofford had testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution. The superior court entered partial summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order in part, holding (1) the claim for declaratory judgment was within the probate court's exclusive jurisdiction and was not properly before the superior court; and (2) the Zanis failed to establish a prima case for at least one element of their fraud claim. View "Zani v. Zani" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the probate and family court dismissing a petition for formal probate seeking appointment as personal representative, holding that the position of voluntary personal representative charged with administering a small estate pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 3-1201 constitutes a "prior appointment" within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190B, 3-108's exception to the three-year limit.Petitioner, the voluntary personal representative of the decedent's estate pursuant to section 3-1201, filed a petition for formal probate seeking an appointment as personal representative under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 120B, 3-402. After receiving briefing on the issue of whether the position of voluntary personal representative under section 3-1201 constitutes a prior appointment under section 3-108 such that a subsequent formal petition for appointment under section 3-402 could be filed more than three years after the decedent's death, a probate and family court judge dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that Petitioner's petition for formal appointment was timely. View "In re Estate of Slavin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her brother, the executor of their father's estate, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The district court held that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“RICO Amendment”), which provides that “no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of [RICO].” 18 U.S.C.1964(c).The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiff's claims were not barred by the RICO Amendment because the fraud she alleged was not related to the “purchase or sale of securities.” The alleged frauds committed by her brother "only incidentally involved securities, unlike a securities broker who sells client securities in breach of his duty to execute securities transactions in the best interests of the client." View "D'Addario v. D'Addario" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals in this interpleader action reversing the judgment of the probate court denying a motion for the probate judge's recusal in this interpleader action, holding that the probate judge's denial of the recusal motion was appropriate in this case.Before his election to the bench, the probate judge at issue served as an expert witness in an earlier case involving one of the defendants. Based on expert opinions the judge expressed in the prior case that defendant moved for the judge's recusal. The probate court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the probate judge's judgment denying the recusal motion, holding that a person of ordinary prudence in the probate judge's position would not find a reasonable basis for questioning his rationality. View "Adams v. Dunavant" on Justia Law

The putative intervenors, the Robert T. Keeler Foundation (the Foundation) and Peter Mithoefer, the fiduciary for the Estate of Robert T. Keeler (the Estate), appealed circuit court orders which: (1) denied their motion to intervene in proceedings brought under the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) by petitioner, the Trustees of Dartmouth College (Dartmouth), and assented to by respondent, the New Hampshire Director of Charitable Trusts (DCT), to modify the restrictions governing an institutional fund created by a charitable gift pursuant to the last will and testament of Robert T. Keeler; and (2) granted Dartmouth’s assented-to application to modify. On appeal, the putative intervenors argued they had “special interest” standing pursuant to In re Trust of Eddy, 172 N.H. 266, 274-75 (2019), and that granting the assented-to application was error. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the putative intervenors’ motion to intervene for lack of standing and, therefore, necessarily also affirmed the decision to grant the assented-to application. View "In re Robert T. Keeler Maintenance Fund for the Hanover Country Club at Dartmouth College" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court ruling that an alternative residuary clause in a will devising half of the testator's estate to his heirs-at-law and the other half to his wife's heirs-at-law failed as a matter of law, holding that the devise failed as a matter of law.The testator's will in this case named his wife, if she survived him, as the primary beneficiary of the residue of his estate with an alternate residuary clause devising one-half of the estate to his wife's "heirs-at-law." The couple's marriage was later dissolved, after which the testator died without having revised his will. When Appellant, the personal representative of the testator's estate, petitioned for formal probate of the will he identified only the testator's siblings as heirs and devisees. Respondents, the wife's parents, claimed that they were wrongfully omitted as devisees in the petition. The district court ruled that any purported devise to Respondents failed as a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a gift to a spouse's heirs, none of whom are identified by name, fails if the marriage dissolves after execution of the will. View "In re Tomczik" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the court of appeals, but on different grounds, determining that two amendments to the grantor's trust were validly executed and that the district court had properly reformed the trust, holding that the district court properly struck the part of the second trust amendment that was ambiguous and unenforceable.The Grantor in this case validly executed the trust, which was properly witnessed and notarized, and then executed two amendments that significantly increased the amount that Respondent would inherit. After the Grantor died, Appellant moved to invalidate the amendments. The district court granted the motion in part and struck a portion of the second trust amendment due to ambiguity but upheld the remaining terms of the amendment, including the increased amount inherited by Respondent. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the amendments were validly executed and properly reformed under Minn. Stat. 501C.0415. The Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds, holding (1) the second trust amendment was validly executed; and (2) the district court properly upheld the portions of the second trust amendment governing asset distribution. View "In re Trust of Moreland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Key Bank National Association's complaint for foreclosure because the debtor or the debtor's estate was a necessary party and was not participating in the action, holding that neither the debtor nor the debtor's estate was a necessary party to the action.The debtor borrowed money from KeyBank and executed a promissory note for the loan. After the debtor died intestate the property at issue passed by operation of law to the debtor's wife as a surviving joint tenant. After the note went into default the wife conveyed the property to a third party. Thereafter, embank filed a complaint for foreclosure of the property against the debtor's wife and estate, as well as third party. The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice, holding that either the debtor or his estate must be named as a necessary party to the foreclosure action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal, holding that because a foreclosure does not include a claim for a deficiency judgment and is therefore solely in rem in nature any mortgagor or successor in interest is a necessary party but a deceased debtor is not. View "KeyBank National Ass'n v. Keniston" on Justia Law