Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the amended judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff, as executor of the Estate of Armando Damiani (Mandy) and the Estate of Lillian Estrella, in this action alleging that Defendants had conspired to commit an unlawful conversion of funds in Mandy's investment account, holding that the portion of the amended judgment awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages and prejudgment interest was error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial justice erred by permitting a witness to testify despite knowing that she would invoke her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and the error prejudiced Defendant; and (2) there was no reason to disturb the trial justice's decision on Plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment. View "Estrella v. Janney Montgomery Scott LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that all assets held by the Soad Wattar Revocable Living Trust—including the Wattar family home—were part of the bankruptcy estate of Richard Sharif. Sharif was the son of Soad Wattar, now de‐ ceased. As the sole trustee of the Wattar trust. Sharif’s sisters, Haifa and Ragda Sharifeh, soon launched an effort to keep the trust proceeds out of their brother’s bankruptcy estate. At issue in these appeals are the bankruptcy court’s rulings on three motions: (1) Haifa’s 2015 motion to vacate the court’s decision that all trust assets belonged to the bankruptcy estate; (2) the sisters’ joint 2016 motion for leave to sue the Chapter 7 trustee assigned to Sharif’s bankruptcy for purported due process violations; and (3) Ragda’s motion seeking both reimbursement of money she allegedly spent on the family home and the proceeds from Wattar’s life insurance policy, which the court had found to be an asset of the trust and therefore part of the bankruptcy estate.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that even if Haifa were really the executor, she simply waited too long to assert the estate’s rights. In the bankruptcy and district courts, the trustee raised the equitable defense of laches, which cuts off the right to sue when (1) the plaintiff has inexcusably delayed bringing suit and (2) that delay harmed the defendant. Next, the court held that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the motion did not set forth a prima facie case for a right to relief against the trustee. View "Estate of Soad Wattar v. Horace Fox, Jr." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court to grant summary judgment to the Estate of Rose Beadle in this action seeking to determine title to Beadle's investment accounts, holding that the order was void as a matter of law.Pursuant to a court order, Beadle's temporary guardian and conservator altered Beadle's investment accounts to eliminate Travis and Truman Raguse as her beneficiaries. The court issued its order, however, without a hearing and without notice to the beneficiaries. The circuit court approved a final accounting and terminated the guardian/conservatorship. During the probate of Beadle's estate, the Raguses filed petitions to determine title to Beadle's investment accounts. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate on the Estate's petition to determine title. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the order authorizing the conservator to remove the beneficiaries on Beadle's accounts was entered without notice to the beneficiaries and without hearting, the order was void as a matter of law. View "In re Estate of Beadle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss this tort action brought against an estate, holding that the statute of nonclaim, as opposed to the general three-year statute of limitations, governed Plaintiff's claims and that she timely filed her amended complaint pursuant to the applicable limitation period.Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the special administrator overseeing the estate of the person with whom she was in an automobile accident. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the general three-year statute of limitations in dismissing Plaintiff's amended complaint as untimely rather than applying the applicable limitation period set forth in the statute of nonclaim. View "Marcum v. Hodge" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals in this case involving the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, holding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350 is applicable only in instances in which a party has pled voluntary waste.Under Ky. Rev. Stat. 381.350, a life tenant who commits waste against the corpus of an estate shall "lose the thing wasted and pay treble the amount at which the waste is assessed." At issue was when the statute of limitations began to run in this case, a question that required resolution of the concept of "waste" as it exists in Kentucky law, which required the Supreme Court either to affirmed its longstanding distinction between voluntary and permissive waste or to collapse the two categories into simply "waste." The Supreme Court held (1) long-standing case law continues to be accurate statements of the law of waste as it exists in Kentucky, therefore, section 381.350 continues to apply only to claims of voluntary waste; and (2) the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff in this case stated claims for voluntary waste. View "Ferrill v. Stock Yard Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of Jacqueline Moncur and Rosemary Kinniburgh, co-trustees of the J. Kent Kinniburgh Revocable Trust, in this lawsuit brought by Janel Kinniburgh, one of the beneficiaries of the Trust, holding that the district court did not err.Janel, one of the trustees of the Trust, brought this action against her sisters, alleging that they breached certain fiduciary duties. The district court ruled in favor of the Trustees on most claims, concluding that the Trustees breached their duties of loyalty and impartiality but finding that Janel failed prove damages resulting from that breach. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) erred when it found that the Trustees did not breach their duty to inform and report, but Janel failed to show that the Trust sustained damages; (2) did not err in concluding that the Trustees did not breach their duties of impartiality or prudent administration; and (3) did not err in deciding not to award attorney fees, monetary damages, or remove the Trustees. View "Kinniburgh v. Moncur" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals from the circuit court relating to the administration of the estate of Shirley Martin and of the trusts established by Carl Martin, Sr. and Shirley Martin the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment in favor of Sherree Martin approving the payment of certain federal estate taxes from the Carl Martin Trust, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the order in Case No. 21-0757 and affirmed the order in Case No. 22-0417, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding in Case No. 21-0757 that a preliminary injunction was warranted and that Sherree Martin should have been removed from her former fiduciary roles; and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding in Case No. 22-0417 regarding the payment of federal estate taxes. View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law

In 2006, Redland, acting as a trustee, obtained a reverse mortgage line of credit from FFSF. She owned two parcels. Redland died in 2015. Dupree, an attorney, became the successor trustee. A series of bank failures, corporate acquisitions, and assignments, had occurred in the intervening years. MTC sought to foreclose on both parcels. The Trust, represented by Dupree, filed a complaint, naming FFSF and MTC as defendants (they had been succeeded by other entities), and alleging that the loan was secured only by one parcel. The Trust later added CIT as a defendant. CIT filed a cross-complaint. More than three years after the case was filed, MAM, a successor to CIT and the entity servicing the loan, moved to intervene.The court agreed with MAM that the naming of the Trust as plaintiff meant the action was void and dismissed. MAM argued that Dupree’s subsequent amendment request was tardy and futile because the limitations period had passed. T The court of appeal reversed the denial of leave to amend. The complaint Dupree mistakenly filed in the name of the Trust was presumptively within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Such defects do not typically deprive courts of the power to act. An amended complaint relates back to the original complaint's filing and avoids the bar of the statute of limitations if recovery is sought on the same general facts. View "Dupree v. CIT Bank N.A." on Justia Law

In 2002, the decedent wrote a letter purporting to be a will. No one witnessed the deceased sign the will. In the will, the decedent left certain property to her then-girlfriend. The couple broke up in 2003 and the decedent passed away in 2020, at which point her pastor found the letter. The pastor gave a copy of the letter to the decedent's daughters. The ex-girlfriend sought to probate the letter as the decedent's will.Finding that the letter did not comply with the requirements of a will, the probate court declined to probate the letter as the decedent's will.The Second Appellate District reversed the probate court's order declining to probate the letter as decedent's will, finding that a probate court may consider extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the document’s execution if the intent expressed by the document’s terms is unambiguous. Here, when reviewing the decedent's letter, the Second Appellate District determined that language was sufficient to exhibit her testamentary intent by clear and convincing evidence. View "Estate of Berger" on Justia Law

A trial court disapproved certain disbursements made by the trustee of a special needs trust, and it surcharged the trustee. The trustee appeals, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the wrong standard for determining whether the disbursements were for the trust beneficiary’s special needs and disallowing expenditures as offsets for the surcharges. Because the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong definition of "special needs," the Court of Appeal remanded for the court to exercise its discretion under the proper standard. "In reaching this conclusion, however, we do not mean to be understood as holding that the trust instrument placed no limits on the types of distributions the trustee could make." View "McGee v. State Dept. of Health Care Services" on Justia Law