Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America (“Allianz”) in Plaintiff’s capacity as a trustee of the Zupnick Family Trust 2008A (“Trust”). Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that an Allianz life insurance policy (“Zupnick Policy”), which Plaintiff contends is owned by the Trust, remains in effect. The district court concluded that the Trust was not the actual owner of the Zupnick Policy under New York law because any assignment of the policy to the Trust failed to comply with the Zupnick Policy’s provision that assignment would be effective upon Allianz’s receipt of written notice of the assignment. The district court held that the Trust lacked contractual standing to sue on the Zupnick Policy, and granted Allianz’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that failure to comply with the provisions of a life insurance policy requiring written notice of assignment cannot, under New York law, render an assignment ineffective.   The Second Circuit certified the question to the Court of Appeals because the argument turns on a question of state law for which no controlling decision of the New York Court of Appeals exists. The court certified the following question: Where a life insurance policy provides that “assignment will be effective upon Notice” in writing to the insurer, does the failure to provide such written notice void the assignment so that the purported assignee does not have contractual standing to bring a claim under the Policy? View "Brettler v. Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Judith ("Judy") Scherber was an intestate heir of ("Decedent") Loch David Crane, who died in 2018 while living in San Diego County. Judy’s petition was based on her relationship with Charles Bloodgood (Charles). In 1951, Charles and his wife Frances Bloodgood (Frances) took two-year-old Judy into their home after she was abandoned by her birth parents, and for the duration of their lifetimes, held Judy out as their own child while domiciled in Indiana. Applying California law to undisputed facts jointly submitted by the parties, the probate court found Judy was the presumed natural child of Charles under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA); that Shannon Wehsener (Shannon), a first cousin of Decedent who had opposed Judy’s petition, had failed to proffer any facts to rebut that presumption; and that Judy therefore was Decedent’s heir through Charles, based on Charles openly holding her out as his own child during his lifetime. Shannon argued the probate court erred in applying California law to determine the existence of a natural parental relationship between Charles and Judy. Shannon argued the court instead should have applied Indiana law, where that relationship was effectuated. And unlike California, Indiana law did not recognize the existence of a natural parent and child relationship for purposes of determining heirship when a parent openly holds out a child as that parent’s own. Shannon further argued that even if California law applied and Charles was the presumed natural parent of Judy, that presumption was rebutted purely on the basis of public policy. Exercising independent review, the California Court of Appeal concluded California law applied in determining parentage between Judy and Charles for purposes of intestate succession. Based on the undisputed facts, the Court further concluded clear and convincing evidence supported the probate court’s finding that Charles was the presumed natural parent of Judy under the UPA; that Shannon did not meet her burden to produce clear and convincing evidence to rebut that presumption; and that the presumption could not be rebutted purely on the grounds of public policy. View "Wehsener v. Jernigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Tonya Edwards and Jennifer Edwards failed to state a claim for contribution or indemnity and denying the Edwardses' claim for subrogation, holding that there was no error.The Edwardses, as assignees of Douglas County, brought complaints against the estate of Kenneth Clark seeking to recover expenses that County incurred in defending and settling lawsuits the Edwardses brought against it for allegedly responding negligently to acts of assault and battery committed by Clark. The district court concluded that the County was immune under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act from claims arising out of battery, and therefore, the County did not have a common liability with Clark's estate. The court thus denied the claims for contribution or indemnity and for subrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the Edwardses' complaint. View "Edwards v. Estate of Clark" on Justia Law

The court appointed a guardian ad litem for two minor trust beneficiaries. A few years later, but before the beneficiaries reached 18, they sought the removal of the guardian ad litem. The guardian responded by filing a motion to disqualify the beneficiaries' attorney, which the trial court granted. The beneficiaries appealed.By the time the case reached the Second Appellate District, the beneficiaries had reached the age of majority. Thus, The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court's order disqualifying the counsel of two trust beneficiaries, finding that the issue was moot. The court explained that there is no longer statutory authority permitting the appointment of a guardian ad litem because the beneficiaries are no longer minors. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

In these appeals relating several statutes and issues regarding the administration of a discretionary trust the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.1207(1)(b)(5) does not provide a beneficiary whose only distribution in a trust is discretionary with a right to an accounting and that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.180 does not provide a district court with an independent basis on which to order an accounting.At issue on appeal was what disclosures must be made by the trustees to the beneficiaries in the administration of the trust. The district court concluded that the beneficiaries were not entitled to an accounting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nevada's trust statutes did not require the trustees to provide the beneficiaries with an accounting because the beneficiaries' sole distribution interests were discretionary; and (2) because the beneficiaries constituted "present" and "vested" beneficiaries, they were entitled to request and receive copies of certain trust instruments, may inspect the books of account and records of financial transactions and may receive an annual tax return, inventory, and accounting under the terms of the trust. View "In re Trust Agreement, 23 Partners Trust I" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Industrial Commission dismissing Shannon Stocks's claim for death benefits, holding that Stocks - the decedent's alleged, cohabitating fiancee - lacked a legally-recognized relationship and thus could not file a claim for death benefits.The decedent in this case died from injuries sustained in an industrial accident at Defendant. Plaintiffs - the decedent's daughter, son, estranged wife, and Stocks - all filed claims for death benefits under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. The Commission dismissed Stocks's claim for benefits, and a consent order was entered dividing the decedent's death benefits equally among the remaining plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not file a claim for death benefits because she lacked a legal relationship with the decedent sufficient to qualify as a dependent under N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-39. View "West v. Hoyle's Tire & Axle, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the district court concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.Plaintiff filed the underlying petition requesting that the district court assume jurisdiction over the trust at issue, remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee. The trustee sought dismissal of the petition based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction and granted a petition to distribute the trust property on Plaintiff's behalf. The court then held the trustee in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee. View "In re Trust of Burgauer" on Justia Law

This action was brought by plaintiff Nancy Holm, administratrix of the estate of her husband, Christopher Friedauer, who died in 2015 after falling at his workplace, Holmdel Nurseries, LLC. As a longtime employee of the family-owned business, Christopher had been covered by workers’ compensation insurance, but he was no longer covered after he became a member of the LLC in 2012. Plaintiff claimed that defendant Daniel Purdy, who served as the insurance broker for Holmdel Nurseries from 2002 to 2015, failed to provide to the LLC the notice mandated by N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, and that Christopher was unaware that he no longer had workers’ compensation coverage in his new role as an LLC member. She alleged that as a result of defendant’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, Friedauer’s dependents were deprived of a workers’ compensation death benefit to which they would have been entitled under N.J.S.A. 34:15-13 had he been covered by workers’ compensation insurance at the time of his death. Defendant asserted that Friedauer’s father, Robert Friedauer, the LLC’s managing member for insurance issues, instructed defendant in 2002 that Holmdel Nurseries did not want to purchase workers’ compensation coverage for its LLC members because of the cost of that coverage. At the close of a jury trial, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 4:37-2(b) and his motion for judgment at trial pursuant to Rule 4:40-1. Informed by the New Jersey Legislature’s expression of public policy in N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, the New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that defendant had a duty to advise the LLC members, at the time of the workers’ compensation policy’s purchase or renewal, that an LLC member actively performing services on the LLC’s behalf was eligible for workers’ compensation coverage, but that the LLC must elect to purchase such coverage in order to obtain it. Consistent with N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, however, the Supreme Court held that defendant could not be held liable for breach of that duty unless the damages alleged were caused by defendant’s willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court’s assessment of the evidence presented by plaintiff on the question of proximate cause. Accordingly, the Court concurred that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to dismiss and his motion for judgment at trial, and affirmed as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment. The case was thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Holm v. Purdy" on Justia Law

The decedent Willie Clyde Burns married Silver Ruth Cooper in 1959. The couple lived in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana and had three children. A divorce petition was filed in 1966 in Arkansas, captioned “Sybia Ruth Burns vs. W. C. Burns.” A final judgment of divorce was rendered on August 26, 1966 by the Arkansas court. Willie filed a divorce petition in Claiborne Parish in 1967, and the petition was served on Silver, captioned “W.C. Burns (Col.) vs. Sylvia Ruth Burns.” There was no judgment of final divorce rendered in this case. Silver went on to marry Welcome Boyd in 1968. Willie went on to marry Annie Bradley in 1970. Annie testified at trial that at the start of their marriage she and Willie had no assets and that anything Willie owned at the time of his death was acquired during their marriage. The couple was married for 45 years and had two children. Willie died intestate in 2015. Annie petitioned to open Willie’s succession and appoint an administratrix. Silver filed a Petition in Intervention in which she sought to be named Willie’s surviving spouse as she was never lawfully divorced from him. In support of her position, Silver provided a report by a forensic document examiner who concluded that the signatures on the documents of both divorce proceedings did not belong to Silver. She also testified that she never went by the names Sybia or Sylvia. The trial court granted the petition to intervene, declared the Arkansas divorce invalid, and recognized Silver as the legal wife of Willie at the time of his death. In addition, the trial court found that Annie was a good faith putative spouse based on Annie’s testimony that Willie told her he was divorced. The trial court then said that the estate would be divided according to the formula in Prince v. Hopson, 89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956), allocating one-fourth of the community to the legal spouse, one-fourth to the putative spouse, and the decedent’s one half to his heirs. The Lousiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's division of the community, finding that as a good faith putative spouse, Annie had an undivided one-half interest in the community. Willie’s five children were to divide equally his undivided one-half interest in the community, subject to Annie’s usufruct. View "Succession of Willie Clyde Burns" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on remand declaring that Lynn and Lisa Schock satisfied the conditions of Bonnie J. Pease's handwritten holographic will, holding that the circuit court did not err.After the Supreme Court held that the will in this case appointed the Schocks as the personal representatives and gave them Bonnie's entire estate subject to conditions, the circuit court, on remand, declared that the Schocks satisfied the will's conditions and approved the proposed final distribution of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the Schocks satisfied the conditions. View "In re Estate of Hubert" on Justia Law