Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Frankie Ware died in 2011, survived by his wife, Carolyn Ware, and their three children, Dana Ware, Angela Ware Mohr, and Richard Ware. Richard was married to Melisa Ware. Carolyn was appointed executor of Frankie’s estate. At the time of his death, Frankie owned 25 percent of four different family corporations. Carolyn owned another 25 percent of each, and Richard owned 50 percent of each. Frankie’s will placed the majority of Frankie’s assets, including his shares in the four family corporations, into two testamentary trusts for which Carolyn, Richard, Angela, and Dana were appointed trustees. The primary beneficiary of both trusts was Carolyn, but one trust allowed potential, limited distributions to Richard, Angela, and Dana. Prolonged litigation between Carolyn and Richard ensued over disagreements regarding how to dispose of Frankie’s shares in the four corporations and how to manage the four corporations. Richard eventually filed for dissolution of the four corporations. The trial court ultimately consolidated the estate case with the corporate dissolution case, and denied Angela and Dana’s motions to join/intervene in both cases. It also appointed a corporate receiver (Derek Henderson) in the dissolution case by agreed order that also authorized dissolution. The chancery court ultimately ordered that the shares be offered for sale to the corporations, and it approved the dissolution and sale of the corporations. Angela and Dana appealed the trial court’s denial of their attempts to join or intervene in the two cases. Carolyn appeals a multitude of issues surrounding the trial court’s decisions regarding the corporations and shares. Richard cross-appealed the trial court’s net asset value determination date and methodology. The Receiver argued the trial court’s judgment should have been affirmed on all issues. In the estate case, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s determination that the estate had to offer the shares to the corporation prior to transferring them to the trusts; the corporations filed their breach of contract claim after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court affirmed the chancery court’s denial of Angela and Dana’s motions to intervene, and it affirmed the chancery court’s decision in the dissolution case. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent that it allowed the corporations to purchase shares from the estate. The cases were remanded to the chancery court for a determination of how to distribute the money from the corporate sales, in which the estate held 25 percent of the corporate shares. View "In The Matter of The Estate of Frankie Don Ware" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a probate court’s order denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Recovery of Property under Probate Code section 850 and sustaining objections thereto by Defendant; denying Plaintiff’s Petition for Letters of Administration; and granting Defendant’s Petition for Probate of Will.   At issue is whether a mediation settlement agreement (“MSA”) that Defendant and his now-deceased wife entered into after separation and in anticipation of the dissolution of their marriage is a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145, which operates as a statutory waiver of certain of Defendant’s rights as a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141, including the right to inherit from his deceased wife and to be appointed as the personal representative of her estate.   The Second Appellate reversed the probate court’s order and held that the MSA did effect a waiver of Defendant’s rights of a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141. The court reasoned that based on its independent review of the MSA and the undisputed record evidence, the written MSA signed by Defendant and his wife, each with the advice of counsel, constituted a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145. Further, the MSA is an enforceable waiver of his rights as a surviving spouse, as Defendant failed to point to any evidence he was not provided with “[a] fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations” of his wife prior to signing the MSA, as required by section 143, subdivision (a). View "Welch v. Welch" on Justia Law

Susan Hoff ("Susan") and Eliot Hoff ("Eliot") were mother and son and the purported beneficiaries under a will executed by Susan Bibb Kidd ("Kidd"), Susan's mother. Probate was initiated in 2011. In 2020, Eliot filed a "Verified Petition for Removal Pursuant to Ala. Code 12-11-41," in which he asserted, among other things, that he was an heir of Kidd and that the estate could be better administered in the circuit court. Although Eliot's signature appeared on his petition, the signature was not notarized or signed under oath. While Eliot's petition was pending, Susan filed her own verified petition for removal that was sworn to under oath and notarized. The circuit court granted Susan's removal petition. Later that same day, however, the circuit court entered an order in which it vacated its previous order granting Susan's removal petition, directed Susan to serve notice of her removal petition to all interested parties, and indicated that it would set the matter for a hearing. After reconsideration was denied, Susan appealed, and the case was transferred to the Alabama Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed when Susan failed to respond to a show-cause order. In 2021, Susan moved the circuit court seeking an order removing the administration of the estate. On October 18, 2021, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Susan's removal petition without prejudice, "[f]or failure to comply with th[e] Court's Orders of November 16, 2020, June 8, 2021 and September 1, 2021." On October 21, 2021, Susan and Eliot each filed a notice of appeal to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals; that court again transferred the appeals to the Supreme Court based on a lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ultimately found that because Eliot (eventually)filed a sworn removal petition that included a statement regarding his standing to bring the removal petition as an heir of Kidd and a statement that, in his opinion, the estate would be better administered in the circuit court, Eliot's removal petition satisfied the requirements of 12-11-41. Accordingly, the circuit court was required to enter an order of removal. The circuit court's order "denying" Eliot's removal petition was reversed. The Supreme Court did not reach Susan's appeal because its decision to grant Eliot's removal petition effectively awarded Susan the relief she sought. View "Hoff v. The Estate of Susan Bibb Kidd" on Justia Law

Dennis Henderson and James Henderson, individually and as co-trustees of the Rose Henderson Peterson Mineral Trust, appealed a district court judgment in which the court determined they paid themselves an unreasonable amount of compensation from the Trust for their duties as trustees. The court ordered the Trustees return a portion of the compensation and that all parties’ attorney fees be paid with Trust funds. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the questions presented in this case were not barred by the law of the case doctrine or res judicata. Furthermore, the Court determined that additional findings were required concerning application of an exculpatory provision in the Trust as well as the issue of whether the doctrine of laches applies. The Court retained jurisdiction but remanded for additional findings. View "Matter of Rose Henderson Peterson Mineral Trust" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Apostoloff appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition to validate a purported amendment to the Omega Trust. He contended the court erred in dismissing his petition by finding the grantor did not substantially comply with the terms of the trust regarding amendments, and that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the grantor intended to amend his trust. Taking all of the facts alleged in the petition as true, and applying them against the applicable law, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the allegations constituted a basis for legal relief. Thus, petitioner has sufficiently pled his case to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the circuit court’s order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re The Omega Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of a beneficiary and ruling that an amendment to an irrevocable trust was invalid, holding that the surviving settlor of an irrevocable trust cannot, with the consent of all of the beneficiaries, modify the dispositive terms of an irrevocable trust without court approval.Donald and Collen Davis established the trust at issue. After Collen died, Donald sought to amend the dispositive terms of the trust. Donald and his four children signed a consent document on different days and then Donald executed an amendment altering the disposition of the trust estate. Katina Little, one of the children, brought this action challenging the validity of the amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for Little, concluding that the amendment to the trust agreement was void for lack of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the consent of Donald and the four beneficiaries was insufficient to modify the trust after Collen's death. View "Little v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the beneficiary of an estate cannot file a separate suit outside probate against the personal representative of the estate for claims arising out of and related to the personal representative's fees for administering the estate.After Roger Rand died testate, attorney Larry Storm informed Security National Bank that it had been nominated as the personal representative of the estate. Plaintiff, a beneficiary of the estate, later received a document entitled "Estate Administration Overview" that included a statement regarding fees for the estate's administration. The document reflected the maximum fees for ordinary services that a personal representative could receive. Plaintiff objected, arguing that Security National deprived the beneficiaries of the opportunity to replace the personal representative with another that required a smaller fee. The probate court reduced the fees to Security National below the requested amounts. Plaintiff then brought this suit against Security National arising from Security National's service as the personal representative of the estate. The district court held that Plaintiff's claims should have been asserted in the probate court or otherwise failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Security National on all claims. View "Rand v. Security National Corp." on Justia Law

Brandy filed a probate petition seeking to be appointed the personal representative of her late husband’s (Scott) estate. The trial court denied her petition based on a premarital agreement that waived Brandy’s interests in her husband’s separate property. The court named his parents as co-administrators of the estate. The court of appeal held Brandy was entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence in support of her argument that she and her late husband mistakenly believed the premarital agreement would apply only in the event of divorce, rather than upon death. On remand, the trial court found that the mistake was a unilateral mistake on Brandy’s part and that she was not entitled to rescission. The court expressly found “there was insufficient evidence that Scott encouraged or fostered Brandy’s mistaken belief.”The court of appeal affirmed. Because Brandy failed to read the agreement and meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. View "Estate of Eskra" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioner, executor of the estate of Virginia Durkin, against Respondent, the judge presiding over the underlying action involving the Durkin estate, holding that Respondent was not entitled to the writ.Petitioner attempted to appeal a prior order appointing a special master commissioner, arguing that Respondent's appointment of the special master commissioner under Ohio Rev. Code 2101.06 disregarded the law of the case established in prior proceedings. After the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order Petitioner brought the instant original action. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the appeal court's mandate was not violated in this case. View "Durkin v. Williams" on Justia Law

Allen Betz and Timothy Betz (“the Betzes”) appealed a district court’s order finding them to be vexatious litigants and requiring them to obtain leave of court prior to filing documents in any new or existing litigation. The Betzes also argued the court erred in issuing a July 16, 2008 order reforming the Emelia Hirsch June 9, 1994, Irrevocable Trust. After review, the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the district court’s deemed denial of Allen Betz’s motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b); (2) vacated that portion of the court’s September 30, 2021 order finding Allen Betz a vexatious litigant, and remanded to the presiding judge for further consideration; (3) dismissed Timothy Betz’s appeal, because denial of leave to file was not appealable. The Court awarded double costs and attorney’s fees of $500 to the Trustees, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust" on Justia Law