Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The issue in this appeal concerned a dispute among stepsiblings over the remnant of their parents’ estates, which consisted of approximately 26 acres of real property in Canyon County, Idaho. Alva and Thelma Garrett married in 1976, creating a blended family consisting of Alva’s four children and Thelma’s three children. They later executed reciprocal wills which, upon the death of the first spouse, left all of their property to the survivor. They also signed a contract in which they agreed that upon the death of the surviving spouse, the survivor’s remaining property would be divided among the seven children in equal shares. When Alva died, Thelma created a living trust and conveyed certain real property into the name of the trust. Upon Thelma’s death, the real property in trust was distributed to Thelma’s daughter, Cynthia Swartz, and her husband, James Swartz. Thelma’s estate was never probated. Several years later, Alva’s Children sued the Swartzes, the trust, and “the Estate of Thelma V. Garrett”, alleging that Thelma had breached the terms of the will contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Swartzes, holding that Thelma’s conveyance of the real property to the trust did not breach the contract. The district court also awarded the Swartzes attorney fees. Alva’s Children timely appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court found that Alva's children's claim was precluded by state law: "Although the merits of this case center on whether Thelma breached the Will Contract, we do not reach the merits of the breach of contract claim on appeal because we conclude that this case was brought in violation of Idaho Code section 15-3-104. Thus, we can affirm the district court’s decision on alternate grounds." View "Martin v. Garrett Living Trust" on Justia Law

This case was one of many "disagreements" about the control of the multi-million-dollar estate of Thomas Tedesco. Plaintiff-respondent Laura White was one of Thomas’s three biological daughters and a cotrustee of his living trust. Defendant-appellant Debra Wear (aka Debbie Basara Wear) was one of Thomas’s stepdaughters. In 2013, Thomas suffered serious health issues, which resulted in significant cognitive impairment, leaving him susceptible to being unduly influenced by anyone close to him. Gloria Tedesco, Thomas’s second wife, began denying White and her sisters access to their father, causing him to believe that they were stealing from him. Wear assisted Gloria, her mother, in unduly influencing Thomas via contacting, or facilitating access to, attorneys in order to change Thomas’s estate plan to disinherit his biological family in favor of Gloria and her family. In 2015, a permanent conservator of Thomas’s estate was appointed. Despite the existence of the conservatorship, Wear continued to assist Gloria in taking actions to unduly influence Thomas to change his 30-plus-year estate plan. Consequently, upon White’s petition, the superior court issued an elder abuse restraining order (EARO), restraining Wear for three years from, among other things, financially abusing Thomas, contacting him (either directly or indirectly), facilitating any change to his estate plan, coming within 100 yards of him, and possessing any guns, other firearms, and ammunition. Wear contended the EARO was void because: (1) the judge was disqualified; and (2) he violated due process by substantially amending the allegations in the petition and prohibiting her from possessing firearms and ammunition. She further claimed the petition failed to state a cause of action for elder financial abuse. The Court of Appeal agreed the court erred in including a firearms and ammunition restriction in the EARO and directed the trial court to strike it. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "White v. Wear" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a technical defect in personal service on a ward does not drive the probate court of subject-matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the ward where the ward is personally served and participates in the proceedings through counsel without objection.Petitioner, the daughter of Mauricette and James Fairley, asked the Supreme Court to void all orders entered in a guardianship proceeding in which Mauricette acted as James's guardian for the final three years of his life. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that personal service on her father by a private process server was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the probate court because Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code requires a proposed ward to personally be served by a sheriff, constable, or other elected officeholder. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that any deficiency with respect to the method of personal service rose to the level of a violation of due process. View "In re Guardianship of Fairley" on Justia Law

The co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 alleging that defendant misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. The litigants settled and the guardian ad litem for defendant's minor children entered into an agreement with the co-trustees and certain trust beneficiaries, but not defendant (the first GAL agreement). Defendant and the children subsequently challenge the trial court's orders (1) enforcing the oral settlement agreement; (2) granting the GAL's petition to approve the second GAL agreement; (3) appointing the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem in certain probate cases; and (4) denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders and concluded that defendant failed to establish procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court rejected the argument that the GAL lacked capacity to make a contract in Jacqueline's name. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that defendant is precluded from repudiating the agreement because her objection is inconsistent with the children's interests. Furthermore, the court rejected the children's contention that they disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their repudiations of the agreements. Finally, the court concluded that there was no conflict of interest and thus no error in denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as guardian ad litem. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

Mary and Sal were married and had a daughter. Sal also had children from prior marriages. In 2006, Mary and Sal created a trust; each amendment to that trust was notarized. In 2017, they revoked the trust and created a new trust, which provided that upon Sal’s death, the property “shall be distributed equally among” his children. The trust mandates that “[a]ny amendment, revocation, or termination . . . shall be made by written instrument signed, with signature acknowledged by a notary public, by the trustor(s) making the revocation, amendment, or termination, and delivered to the trustee.” Mary alleged that in 2020, Sal executed a “First Amendment,” striking the provision that distributed the property amongst the children; it is not notarized. Sal died the next day.The probate court deemed the alleged amendment “null and void,” concluding it was invalid under Probate Code section 154021 because the trust mandated that any amendment be acknowledged by a notary public. The court of appeal affirmed. When a trust specifies a method of amendment — regardless of whether the method of amendment is exclusive or permissive, and regardless of whether the trust provides for identical or different methods of amendment and revocation — section 15402 provides no basis for validating an amendment that was not executed in compliance with that method. View "Balistreri v. Balistreri" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting attorney fees in this guardianship case where the guardian requested the protected person's estate to pay attorney fees, holding that the award was proper and that the court acted within its discretion in setting the amount of the award.The fees at issue stemmed from a period in 2019 when Donna Simmons and Robyn Friedman served as temporary co-guardians for their mother, Kathleen June Jones. The district court formally discharged Donna and Robyn upon the appointment of Kimberly Jones as general guardian. Donna and Robyn sought attorney fees payable from Jones's estate. The district court granted the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the award was proper because the district court applied the relevant Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.344 factors and reasonably found that Donna and Robyn's complex temporary guardianship warranted compensation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of fees to award. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court declaring that the Estate of Nannie Wethington had no dower right pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 392.020 in $38,500 withdrawn from the bank account of her husband, James Wethington, by their son, Kerry Wethington, two days prior to James' death, holding that the lower courts failed to apply controlling precedent.In Kentucky, a widow has an absolute estate to one-half of the personalty of her deceased widow's estate. In this instant case, the circuit court found that James made a valid inter vivos gift to Kerry and that Nannie had no dower right to the $38,500 withdrawn from James's bank account. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the gift of $38,500 was presumptively fraudulent, and the evidence conclusively proved the presumption. The Court remanded the case with instructions that Nannie's estate be distributed the amount of the gift which would satisfy her fifty percent statutory share. View "Simpson v. Wethington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the probate court appointing the decedent's mother as personal representative, ordering that letters of personal representative be issued to her, and issuing such letters even though the mother had not yet accepted the appointment, holding that the court's issuance of letters was an unauthorized action.More than three years following the decedent's death, the estate was opened for the purpose of serving a lawsuit against the decedent. The court appointed the mother as personal representative for the purpose of receiving service of the civil action and, that same day, issued letters of personal representative to the mother even though the mother had not accepted the appointment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issuance of letters of personal representative was an unauthorized action without the appointee's qualification. View "In re Estate of Severson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that this dispute concerning the disposition of assets once held by the uncle of the parties in this case belonged in a state court, not in a federal court, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiff Sandra Lerner and her cousin, Defendant Stephen Colman, were both citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Plaintiff attempted to plead claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c), and appended state law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court concluded that the complaint did not adequately state a cause of action under RICO and then dismissed the state law claims without prejudice to their being refiled in state court. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the RICO claim failed because Plaintiff did not allege a pattern of racketeering activity. View "Lerner v. Colman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the trial court's determination that Susan D. Elia could not create an irrevocable trust on her own behalf while she was under a voluntary conservatorship, holding that there was no error.In 2011, the probate court granted Elia's application for voluntary representation by Renee Seblatnigg as the conservator of Elia's estate. Elia subsequently created an irrevocable trust and arranged for the transfer of assets to it. In 2014, Margaret Day, acting in her capacity as coconservator of Elia's estate, brought this action seeking a judgment that the trust was void ab initio because Seblatnigg, acting in her capacity as Elia's conservator, did not create and fund the trust with the approval of the probate court under R.I. Gen. Stat. 45a-655. The trial court granted summary judgment for Day, and the appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly determined that Elia lacked the legal authority to establish the irrevocable trust and, consequently, that the trust was void ab initio. View "Day v. Seblatnigg" on Justia Law