Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the district court on summary judgment invalidating a transfer-on-death (TOD) executed by Wife before her death naming Daughter as the designated beneficiary to her interest in a house titled solely in Wife's name and dismissing Daughter's counterclaim for slander of title, holding that the TOD deed was not invalid.Husband, who died during the course of these proceedings, brought this action alleging that he was the rightful owner of the house at issue because, in part, the TOD deed was invalid because "Nebraska deeds conveying an interest in real property held by a married person must be executed by both spouses." Daughter counterclaimed for slander of title. The court sustained Husband's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the TOD deed was void as a matter of law for failing to satisfy Neb. Rev. Stat. 40-104. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) as a matter of law, section 40-104 does not apply to TOD deeds; and (2) the TOD in this case was not void, and Daughter counterclaim was no longer moot. View "Chambers v. Bringenberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her late husband, Grant Tinker, signed a premarital agreement (PMA) that in relevant part governed the ownership and testamentary disposition of their marital home. Respondents, Larry Ginsberg and his law firm, represented plaintiff in connection with the PMA and approved the PMA as to form on her behalf. Non-attorney Sidney Tessler, Tinker's longtime accountant and business manager, negotiated terms and approved the PMA as to form on Tinker's behalf. Plaintiff, the estate, and Tinker's children subsequently litigated plaintiff's and the children's claims, which were ultimately resolved in a global settlement.Plaintiff then filed suit against Ginsberg for legal malpractice in connection with the preparation and execution of the PMA, alleging that the PMA was unenforceable due to Ginsberg’s failure to ensure that Tinker signed a waiver of legal representation. The trial court granted Ginsberg's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Tinker ratified the PMA.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that there is a triable issue of material fact as to the threshold issue of whether Tinker satisfied the requirements of Family Code section 1615 when he executed the PMA. The court explained that, if the factfinder determines that Tinker did not comply with section 1615, and the PMA was therefore not enforceable, the question becomes whether Tinker's subsequent amendments to his estate plan could ratify the PMA and thereby rectify the statutory violation. The court concluded that the trial court erred by concluding that they could and did. The court held that a premarital agreement that is not enforceable under section 1615 is void, not voidable, and accordingly cannot be ratified. Because none of the other grounds asserted in the summary judgment motion support the trial court's ruling, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on plaintiff's malpractice claim. The court denied plaintiff's request for judicial notice as moot. View "Knapp v. Ginsberg" on Justia Law

Tim Dwyer Jr. appeals an amended judgment deciding his claims against Margaret Sell and John Dwyer as co-trustees of the Tim Dwyer Farm Trust. The co-trustees and Jane Dwyer Morgan and Barbara Dwyer Rice, as beneficiaries of the Trust, cross-appealed the amended judgment. The district court concluded the co-trustees had broad discretion to sell Trust property, any sale of Trust property had to be under a contract for deed with no option for prepayment and a reservation of a right to access Trust property for hunting was prohibited. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dwyer v. Sell, et al." on Justia Law

This is appellant's third appeal concerning the conservatorship of the person and estate of his mother, Norma Farrant. The Court of Appeal affirmed the probate court's orders requiring him to pay $63,448.90 for misappropriation of Norma's assets, surcharging in the same amount appellant's share of interpled funds, and imposing sanctions of $121,000 for failing to timely file an accounting of his actions relating to Norma's estate.The court concluded that the probate court did not erroneously order accounting where there was a special relationship between appellant and Norma that warranted the order compelling appellant to account for the pension checks and rental income, and the probate court did not err because there was a fiduciary relationship between appellant and Norma. The court also concluded that appellant forfeited his claim that the probate court's order was based on affidavits and declarations where he did not object to the probate court's consideration of these items. Finally, the court concluded that the probate court properly denied appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing; appellant has not shown prejudice; and appellant's new claims lack merit. View "Friend v. Farrant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from an order of the probate court authorizing the sale of two vehicles owned by Darren and Deidra Rowe after Darren shot and killed both Deidra and himself, holding that there was no appealable order.After Darren killed his wife, Deidra, and himself, Deidra's petitioned the probate court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 2-7-614 for permission to sell the two vehicles the couple owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Absent exceptional circumstances, the vehicles would have gone to Darren upon Deidra's death, but Deidra's administrator argued that equitable principles, Wyoming's felonious death statute, and public policy precluded Darren's estate from receiving the proceeds. The probate court determined that Darren's killing of Deidra severed the joint tenancy by right of survivorship, thereby creating a tenancy in common subject to the probate court's jurisdiction. The court then authorized the sales. Darren's estate appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the probate court's order granting permission to sell the property was not appealable. View "Rowe v. Walker" on Justia Law

The estate of a severely disabled woman sued her in-home care providers for negligence in causing her death. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the providers, ruling that the estate was required to support its negligence claim with expert testimony, and failed to do so. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the estate was not required to present expert testimony to establish a breach of the duty of care because the estate’s theory of fault was one of ordinary negligence that did not turn on the exercise of professional skill or judgment. “The estate’s theory of causation, by contrast, is complex and must be supported by the opinion of a medical expert. But the treating physician’s deposition testimony is sufficient evidence of causation to survive summary judgment.” The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Culliton v. Hope Community Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court declaring that the marriage between Steven Greg Meyer (Greg) and Molly Stacey, deceased, to be null and void and ordering Greg and his son, Mark Meyer, to execute instruments to relinquish certain property interests they obtained from Molly before her death, holding that Greg and Mark's arguments on appeal lacked merit.After Molly was diagnosed with cancer, Molly and Greg married. Just over one week later, Molly died intestate. Molly's adult children filed a declaratory judgment action against Greg and Mark seeking declarations that the property interest changes Molly made in favor of the Meyers and her marriage to Greg were void and invalid. The district court generally found in favor of Molly's children and the special administrator. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Greg and Mark's jurisdictional assignments of error lacked merit; (2) the district court correctly found that Molly lacked the requisite mental capacity and acted under undue influence; and (3) the district court erred in failing to rule that a boat Molly purchased and titled in Mark's name should be regarded as held in a resulting trust by Mark for Molly's benefit. View "Malousek v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The estate of Helene Evans, a deceased Oregon resident, challenged the Oregon Tax Court’s determination that the Department of Revenue lawfully included in Evans’s taxable Oregon estate the principal assets of a Montana trust, of which Evans had been the income beneficiary. Although Evans had a right to receive income generated by those assets during her lifetime and potentially had the right to tap the assets themselves, the estate claimed she had not owned, and did not have control over the assets. Under those circumstances, plaintiff argued, Oregon did not have the kind of connection to the trust assets that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required for a state to impose a tax on a person, property, or transaction. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Oregon’s imposition of its estate tax on the trust assets in this case comported with the requirements of due process. It, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court. View "Estate of Evans v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court dismissing Appellants' creditor claim against the estate of John Calvin, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed the creditor claim.Calvin was the lifetime beneficiary of the Ben W. Calvin Trust, and Appellants - Calvin's children - were the remainder beneficiaries. After Calvin died, Appellants brought a creditor claim against his estate, alleging that Calvin had received disbursements of principal from the Trust in violation of the terms of the Trust. The circuit court dismissed the creditor claim, concluding that the Trust disbursements to Calvin were proper under the terms of the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to show that they had standing to assert a claim against the Estate. View "In re Estate Of Calvin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court reversing the determination of the Massachusetts Office of Medicaid's board of hearings that Plaintiff's home was a countable asset, making her ineligible for Medicaid long-term care benefits, holding that the superior court did not err.While they were both still living, Plaintiff and her husband created an irrevocable trust, the corpus of which included their home. The terms of the trust granted Plaintiff, during her lifetime, a limited power of appointment to appoint all or any portion of the trust principal to a nonprofit or charitable organization over which she had no controlling interest. MassHealth denied Plaintiff's application for long-term care benefits, determining that the home was a countable asset because Plaintiff purportedly could use her limited power of appointment to appoint portions of the home's equity, which was included as part of the trust principal, to the nursing home where Plaintiff lived as payment for her care. The superior court reversed. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the plain terms of the trust neither intended for nor permitted Plaintiff to exercise her limited power of appointment for her benefit, as contemplated by MassHealth. View "Fournier v. Secretary of Executive Office of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law