Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against PNC Bank and PNC Investments for mishandling an investment account that belonged to plaintiff and her deceased mother. The district court sua sponte ordered briefing on the probate exception to federal diversity jurisdiction, concluded that plaintiff was "attempting to circumvent the normal probate process by bringing an individual claim against PNC Bank," and dismissed the case. The district court also held that plaintiff had no standing to sue.The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that neither the probate exception nor standing doctrine divests the district court of jurisdiction over this lawsuit. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the case under the probate exception because it can adjudicate her claims for damages against PNC without probating her mother's will, administering the estate, or disposing of the estate's property. The court also concluded that plaintiff is the real party in interest and has standing to bring her claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Fisher v. PNC Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court determining that Shawn Zutavern and his son, Russell Zutavern, were not beneficiaries of a trust created by Shawn's father, William Zutavern, and lacked standing to assert an action against the trusts's trustee, holding that the district court erred in relying upon Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-3855(d) to conclude that the trustee exclusively owed duties to Wm. Zutavern Cattle Co. (WZCC).Shawn and Russell petitioned the district court for removal of Meredith Zutavern, William's surviving spouse, as trustee of the William R. Zutavern Revocable Trust. Shawn and Russell then moved to enjoin Meredith's potential sale of the family ranch, managed by WZCC. The district court dismissed the petition and motion for temporary injunction, finding that Shawn and Russell lacked standing because they were not named beneficiaries under the trust. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) Shawn and Russell were beneficiaries and had standing; and (2) the district court's interpretation of section 30-3855(d) was erroneous. View "In re William R. Zutavern Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Montana Supreme Court: 1. Under Montana law, for a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308 (2021), may a plaintiff in a survival action recover the reasonable value of medical care and related services when the costs of such care or services are written-off under the provider's charitable care program? 2. For a claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-308 (2021), does a charitable care write-off qualify as a collateral source within the meaning of section 27-1-307? If so, does a charitable care write-off qualify for the "gifts or gratuitous contributions" exception under section 27-1-307(1)(c)? View "Gibson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of plaintiff's motion to further amend the judgment entered against Raleigh Souther and Get Flipped, Inc. by adding defendant as a judgment debtor.The court concluded that adding defendant as a judgment debtor is neither unnecessary nor unfair; the order was not barred by claim or issue preclusion; and the record adequately supports the trial court's order. In this case, the Estate presented evidence that Moofly Productions was inadequately capitalized since all of its assets were being controlled by defendant and, as a corollary, that the entity and defendant had commingled funds. Furthermore, other facts considered in alter ego cases, an arguable lack of adherence to corporate formalities and business registration laws, also supported the trial court's determination. Most importantly, as established by the fraudulent conveyance judgment when considered together with the additional information concerning defendant's control of the Moofly Productions' bank accounts, failing to formally recognize defendant as a judgment debtor would produce an inequitable result, effectively preventing the Estate from enforcing the judgment it had obtained against Get Flipped, precisely the corrupt goal defendant sought to achieve. The court noted that the issue of control is not significant under the circumstances here. In any event, a judgment debtor may be added if the equities overwhelmingly favor the amendment and it is necessary to prevent an injustice, even if all the formal elements generally necessary to establish alter ego liability are not present. Finally, the court concluded that the amendment is not barred by laches. View "Corrales Favila v. Pasquarella" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals involved the Frederick Tildon Skelton, Jr., Family Trust ("the trust") and its primary asset, shares of stock in South Haven Corporation ("South Haven"). In appeal no. 1190700, Frederick Tildon Skelton IV and Brian Rutledge Skelton challenged the May 4, 2020 probate court judgment terminating the trust. In appeal no. 1190917, those same parties challenged the July 17, 2020 circuit court judgment dismissing their claims relating to the administration of the trust and their derivative claims asserted on behalf of South Haven. After Mrs. Skelton died, Brian Lee, who was serving as South Haven's president at the time, became the successor trustee of the trust. However, Brian Lee died in July 2016, before fully discharging his duties as trustee by dividing the trust property and making a final distribution of the trust corpus to the remainder beneficiaries of the trust. Brian Lee's widow, Evangela Taylor Skelton ("Angel"), was appointed as the personal representative of Brian Lee's estate. After Brian Lee's death, there was no acting trustee, but it was undisputed that the remainder beneficiaries of the trust were: Brian Lee's estate, Joshua, the nephews, and Loree (referred to collectively as "the beneficiaries"). In September 2016, Loree, individually and on behalf of South Haven, commenced an action in the circuit court against Angel, individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Brian Lee's estate ("the circuit-court action"). In that action, Loree alleged that Brian Lee, while an officer, director, and shareholder of South Haven, and Angel had misappropriated South Haven's assets for their personal benefit to the detriment of the other shareholders or putative shareholders of the corporation. The nephews filed a motion to intervene in the circuit-court action to assert claims on behalf of South Haven against Loree and Angel; the nephews asserted that both Brian and Loree misappropriated South Haven's assets for their personal benefit to the detriment of the other shareholders or putative shareholders of the corporation. Following mediation, Loree, Joshua, and Angel, individually and as personal representative of Brian Lee's estate, reached a proposed settlement. The nephews opposed that settlement, however; thus, it was never finalized. In November 2017, the nephews, as beneficiaries of the trust, filed a petition in the probate-court action, asserting various claims and counterclaims and seeking affirmative relief relating to the administration of the trust. The Alabama Supreme Court found the probate court was justified in terminating the trust and the circuit court was the appropriate venue to litigate all remaining claims, including the nephews' trust claims. View "Skelton v. Skelton" on Justia Law

Employer-appointed trustees filed a complaint in the district court seeking the appointment of an impartial umpire to resolve a deadlock on a motion, pursuant to Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, brought by one of the employer-appointed trustees. The district court dismissed the complaint and declined to appoint an umpire.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that, based on the entirety of the Trust Agreement, the delegation proposed by the employer trustees' motion is beyond the trustees' authority to implement. The court explained that because the proposed delegation and amendment to the Trust Agreement are beyond the trustees' authority to implement, the deadlocked motion is not a matter arising in connection with the administration of the plan or a matter within the trustees' jurisdiction. Therefore, the Trust Agreement does not authorize the appointment of a neutral umpire to resolve the deadlocked motion. Furthermore, because the court found that adopting the employer trustees' proposed motion would require amending the Trust Agreement, the court also necessarily concluded that the deadlocked motion does not concern trust fund "administration" under section 302(c)(5). Accordingly, the deadlocked motion is not a matter of trust "administration" under either the Trust Agreement or section 302(c)(5), and thus the district court did not err in declining to appoint an umpire. View "Gillick v. Elliott" on Justia Law

A series of appeals arose from a will-contest dispute between siblings. After their mother died, William C. Harper and Alice Lynn Harper Taylor disagreed about which version of their mother's will governed the disposition of her assets. After a purported transfer of the will contests from probate court to circuit court, the siblings submitted their dispute to a jury, which returned a verdict for Alice Lynn. William appealed and Alice Lynn cross-appealed. Because jurisdiction never properly vested in the circuit court, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed these appeals. View "Harper-Taylor. v. Harper." on Justia Law

In this lawsuit to set aside a will the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court for Plaintiffs on their undue influence claim and dismissing their tortious interference with inheritance claim, holding that there was no error.Shortly after the decedent died, Plaintiffs brought this action seeking to set aside the decedent's will. Their petition alleged several causes of action against Defendants, including undue influence and tortious interference with inheritance. The district court dismissed the tortious interference with inheritance claim. Later, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on the undue influence claim. Both sides appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs needed to prove Defendants' knowledge of Plaintiffs' expectancy of an inheritance from the decedent; and (2) the district court did not admit improper hearsay evidence, and Plaintiffs' lawyer did not make prejudicial statements during closing argument. View "Buboltz v. Birusingh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the probate court finding that an $875,000 charitable bequest to a nursing home facility lapsed and ordering the funds to be distributed to the residuary of the estate, holding that the bequest did not lapse.In the decedent's will, the decedent bequeathed the sum of $875,000 to Hamilton Manor, a nursing home facility in Aurora, Nebraska, owned by Hamilton County and operated through the Hamilton Manor Board of Trustees. Plaintiff, as personal representative, asked that the court find the charitable bequest had failed and order the proceeds to be administered as part of the residue of the estate. The court found that the bequest to Hamilton Manor had lapsed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the probate court erred in finding that the gift to Hamilton Manor had lapsed. View "In re Estate of Akerson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' motion to intervene in this wrongful death action, holding that heirs of the decedent cannot intervene in a wrongful death action brought by the wrongful death representative.Carrie Linn died after undergoing elective surgery. Carrie's niece, Kallista Mills, was appointed Carrie's wrongful death representative. Mills brought this wrongful death action against Charles Linn, Carrie's husband, alleging that he had negligently caused Carrie's death. One year later, Mills signed a release releasing Charles from all causes asserted against him. Mills and Charles then filed a stipulated motion to dismiss the wrongful death action with prejudice. After the execution of the release but before the filing of the stipulated motion to dismiss, Appellants - Carrie's daughters - filed a motion to intervene in the wrongful death action. Because Appellants did not timely serve counsel the motion, the court dismissed the action with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that beneficiaries, unless appointed as the wrongful death representative, are precluded from intervening in wrongful death actions. View "Archer v. Mills" on Justia Law