Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The decedent, Buddy Chester, wrote a holographic will leaving everything to his grandson, Brandon Strouder Chester. The will neglected to mention the decedent's son, Steven Chester and daughter, Lisa Martin. The son requested that the trial court determine that he was a pretermitted heir under the will. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the face of the holographic will showed intent to omit the son as a beneficiary, and that the omission was not accidental. The son appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that the testator's son was a pretermitted heir under his father's holographic will. "Testators have the freedom to dispose of their estate as they wish. Nevertheless, even in the case of a holographic will, which requires less formalities and no particular form, a testator must comply with the law regarding pretermitted heirs. The will neglected to list either of his two children or acknowledge their existence, thus rendering them pretermitted heirs. There are no ambiguities on the face of the will. Therefore, extrinsic evidence may not be used to determine the testator's intent concerning why he neglected to mention his children." View "In the Matter of the Estate of Chester" on Justia Law

Kay died in 2016 at age 90. In a trust instrument she executed months earlier, she named St. Jude Children’s Hospital the sole beneficiary of her estate, which was worth approximately $2 million. She disinherited her surviving son and her two granddaughters, who filed a petition contesting the validity of the trust instrument on the ground that Kay had a mental disorder with symptoms including delusions or hallucinations that allegedly caused Kay to devise her property in a way she would not otherwise have done. (Probate Code 6100.5(a)(2)).The court found that the granddaughters failed to carry their burden of proving that Kay was suffering from a delusion at the time she executed the trust. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court erred in wrongly selecting a single false belief Kay had about her granddaughters—i.e., that they “wanted her out of the way in order to get her money”—and then wrongly determining it was not a delusion, while the court should have found that Kay’s multiple false beliefs about her granddaughters all constituted delusions negating Kay’s testamentary capacity. There was substantial evidence that Kay did not have “a mental health disorder” at the time she executed the trust. View "Eyford v. Nord" on Justia Law

In a case involving an alleged multi-billion-dollar conspiracy to defraud the Venezuelan state-owned oil company known as PDVSA, the Trust filed suit alleging that it had authority to do so as an assignee of PDVSA pursuant to a trust agreement which, through a choice-of-law clause, is governed by New York law. The district court adopted in part the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissed the action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing. The district court determined that the Trust did not properly authenticate the trust agreement and, even if the trust agreement were authenticated and admissible, it was void as champertous under New York law.The Eleventh Circuit assumed without deciding that the Trust made out a prima facie case of authenticity for the trust agreement at the Rule 12(b)(1) proceedings and that the district court erred by ruling that the trust agreement was inadmissible. The court concluded that, based on its review of the record, the district court may have erred procedurally in definitively resolving the question of champerty at the Rule 12(b)(1) stage because that question likely implicated the merits of the Trust's claims. However, the court concluded that the Trust does not make this procedural argument on appeal and therefore has abandoned any procedural obligations to the champerty ruling. On the merits, the court applied the champerty bar to the trust agreement under New York law in light of Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 65 N.E.3d 1253, 1255 (N.Y. 2016), and concluded that the Trust's primary purpose in acquiring PDVSA's claims was to bring this action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "PDVSA US Litigation Trust v. Lukoil Pan Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the Estate of Michael F. Cassiere, on Plaintiff's claim for distribution of assets held in the Carmen D. Neumann Revocable Trust and on Defendant Joseph Cassiere's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty, holding that distribution of the trust was proper.Plaintiff brought this action seeking distribution of the trust's assets and termination of the trust. Defendant filed a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on both Plaintiff's claim and Defendant's counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no evidence in the record to support the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty; and (2) distribution of the trust was proper. View "Estate of Michael F. Cassiere v. Cassiere" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of respondents' request for attorney fees under Probate Code section 2640.1, holding that attorney fees are not available where, as here, the matter is resolved without a conservator's appointment. In this case, respondents filed a conservatorship proceeding on their mother's behalf and the case settled before a conservator was appointed. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting respondents' request. View "Brokken v. Brokken" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's wrongful death lawsuit against Union Pacific Railroad Company under the Federal Employes' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, et seq. (FELA), holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend her petition out of time.Plaintiff brought this action in her purported capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her husband (Decedent). In its motion to dismiss, Union Pacific argued that, prior to filing suit, Plaintiff was not appointed the personal representative of Decedent's estate, as required under 45 U.S.C 51. The circuit court granted Plaintiff thirty days to obtain the appointment and amend her petition. Plaintiff, however, was not appointed the personal representative of Decedent's estate until after the deadline. The circuit court dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to further extend the deadline for Plaintiff to file an amended petition out of time. View "Holmes v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Daughter Deborah George appealed the civil division’s determination that her father, decedent Theodore George, was the sole owner of a vehicle at the time of his death and that the vehicle was properly included in his estate. Decedent purchased the vehicle at issue, a 1979 Cadillac Eldorado, in 1992. The Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) issued a Certificate of Title to decedent in 1994 in his name only. The copy of the title in the record contained no assignment of ownership to daughter. In 2006, decedent submitted a Vermont Registration, Tax, and Title Application to the DMV. Decedent’s name was listed in the space provided for the owner, and daughter’s name was listed in the adjacent space provided for a co-owner. Next to daughter’s name, a handwritten annotation said, “add co-owner.” The form directed applicants to select rights of survivorship if more than one owner was listed and provides that “if no box is checked joint tenants will be selected.” Decedent made no indication. At the bottom of the form, decedent signed the application; the line for the co-owner’s signature was left blank. No bill of sale accompanied the 2006 Registration Application. The DMV issued registration certificates naming both decedent and daughter for 2012-2013, 2014-2015, and 2017-2018. On appeal of the civil division's determination, daughter argued that decedent’s act in changing the registration to reflect joint ownership effectively transferred an interest in the vehicle to her. Alternatively, she argued that decedent’s act demonstrated his intent to make a gift of joint ownership. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was insufficient evidence that decedent transferred an interest in the vehicle to daughter under either theory and affirmed. View "In re Estate of Theodore George" on Justia Law

Lawrence Taylor appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Charles Hanks in Taylor's will contest. Taylor challenged the will of his father, Billy Lee Hite, alleging, among other things, that Hite had lacked testamentary capacity when he made the will, which did not mention Taylor. Because the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Hite had testamentary capacity, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Hanks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Crag Dyas and Dyas, LLC appealed a circuit court's orders disposing of some of their claims against some of the defendants below. Because those orders did not constitute a valid, final judgment that would support an appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court dismissed this appeal. View "Dyas v. Stringfellow et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the trial court that James Charles St. John must pay attorney fees to the person he defrauded, holding that the circuit court did not err.St. John befriended his neighbor, Ernest Stuart Elsea, II. St. John subsequently persuaded Elsea to transfer his extensive firearm collection to a firearm trust that St. John established and controlled and had Elsea sign a durable power of attorney. St. John then induced Elsea to sign a codicil to his will naming St. John and St. John's partner as beneficiaries. Elsea filed a complaint seeking an accounting and a recovery of the firearms, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and alleging fraud an undue influence. The circuit court rejected counts one and two but ordered St. John to either return the firearms to Elsea or pay Elsea the value of the firearms. The circuit court then ordered St. John to pay attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly awarded fees under Prospect Development Co. v. Bershader, 258 Va. 75 (1999). View "St. John v. Thompson" on Justia Law