Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In 2007, plaintiffs-respondents Jason Rubin and Cira Ross, as cotrustees of the Cira Ross Qualified Domestic Trust (judgment creditors) obtained a civil judgment against defendant-appellant David Ross (judgment debtor). In 2009, Ross filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In April 2019, following an order denying judgment debtor a discharge in bankruptcy, judgment creditors filed for renewal of their judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 683.120 and 683.130. Ross moved to vacate the judgment on the ground that judgment creditors failed to seek renewal within the 10-year time period proscribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that judgment creditor’s renewal was timely because title 11 United States Code section 108(c) provided for an extension of time within which to seek renewal. Ross appealed, arguing that judgment creditors were not precluded from seeking renewal by his bankruptcy proceeding and, therefore, section 108(c) 2 did not apply to provide an extension of time to seek renewal of their judgment. The Court of Appeal agreed that judgment creditors were not barred from seeking statutory renewal of their judgment during the pendency of judgment debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding, but concluded that the extension provided for in section 108(c) applied regardless. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Rubin v. Ross" on Justia Law

K.S. appealed a district court order approving the sale of S.M.H.’s interest in real property and striking from the court record an affidavit filed by K.S. K.S. argued the court erred by determining that a document K.S. claimed transferred a majority of S.M.H.’s interest in the real property to K.S. failed to meet the statutory requirements for a valid conveyance under N.D.C.C. sections 47-10-01 and 47-10-05; the court erred in striking her affidavit from the record; and the court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Lutheran Social Services. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Guardianship and Conservatorship of S.M.H." on Justia Law

Respondent-appellee Billie Dixon moved to dismiss petitioner-appellant John Dixon’s appeal due to mootness and lack of jurisdiction because the appeal was taken without a N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification. This action started in October 2013 when John sought an accounting of the Shirley A. Dixon Revocable Trust, removal of Billie as trustee, court supervised administration of the trust, reimbursement of the trust for unauthorized distributions, and his attorney fees expended in the action. After trial on remand the district court granted John’s request for supervised administration of the trust and denied the remaining requests for relief. On December 11, 2020, Billie filed a Petition for Order Allowing Trustee to Make Final Distribution and Allowing Termination of the Trust. On December 28, 2020, John filed objections to the petition, and on the same day the court granted Billie’s petition. On February 26, 2021, John appealed the district court’s order granting the petition. On April 12, 2021, Billie moved to dismiss the appeal. On April 24, 2021, the district court granted Billie’s motion for stay, ordering “that its Order Allowing Trustee to Make Final Distribution and Allowing Termination of the Trust (Doc. ID# 239), and any attempts to enforce that Order, are hereby stayed, effective March 29, 2021, pending completion of the appeal in this matter filed by Petitioner John W. Dixon.” Thereafter, Billie moved to dismiss this appeal as moot and for lack of N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the latter issue was dispositive: the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal because the trust was court-supervised, and the last order was not final as to all matters relating to the trust. View "Dixon v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in these appeals regarding two brothers' disputes concerning the administration of their deceased mother's estate, holding that the circuit court did not err in removing both brother from their fiduciary roles and replacing them with a disinterested third party.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in removing the brothers as co-executors on the basis that the brothers were, to the detriment of the estate, deadlocked concerning the administration of the estate; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the brothers compensation, legal fees, and costs; and (3) there was no reversible error regarding the presence of a third brother in the courtroom during the trial. View "Galiotos v. Galiotos" on Justia Law

Nora D. was an 82-year-old woman residing in an assisted living facility. She suffered a stroke in April 2016, and she reportedly continued to suffer resulting physical and mental limitations. In 2017 Nora gave her son, Cliff, a general power of attorney. In 2018 Adult Protective Services petitioned for a conservatorship to protect Nora’s finances and property after the office received reports of harm alleging that Cliff had made decisions not in Nora’s best interests. The Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) was appointed as Nora’s conservator in 2018. In September 2019 Nora’s daughter Naomi petitioned for a full guardianship for Nora. Naomi alleged that a guardianship was necessary because Nora was unable to attend to her own physical needs and Cliff was unable to care for Nora. A day later Naomi’s son Kevin petitioned for review of the conservatorship, and sought appointment as Nora’s guardian, which could replace OPA’s conservatorship. The superior court ordered a Nora attend a psychiatric evaluation and answer all questions posed to her by Kevin’s retained expert. But the guardianship statute provided that a respondent may refuse to answer questions during examinations and evaluations. The only exception to that statute applied in an interview to determine whether the respondent has capacity to make informed decisions about care and treatment services. The Alaska Supreme Court granted the Nora’s petition for review to consider the scope of the statute’s protection, and the Supreme Court concluded that Nora could refuse to answer any questions other than those directed at determining her capacity to make personal medical decisions. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the superior court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceeings of Nora D." on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals involved a dispute between Cortney Brooks and her brother Chad Svenby about the administration of the estate of their deceased mother Dorothy Clare. In appeal no. 1190405, Brooks challenged a circuit court order removing the original administrator of the estate. After the circuit court appointed Svenby to be the executor of the estate and granted his motion to enter a final settlement, Brooks filed appeal no. 1191037 contesting that settlement. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded Brooks established the circuit court erred: (1) by removing Colley as the administrator of Clare's estate; and (2) by entering an order approving a final settlement of Clare's estate. Accordingly, the circuit court was directed on remand to vacate those orders and to reinstall Colley as the duly appointed administrator with the will annexed of Clare's estate. View "Brooks v. Svenby" on Justia Law

The Supreme reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court dismissing a will contestant's lawsuit for lack of standing, holding that because the contestant did not rebut the evidence established by the will's proponent the the contestant accepted benefits under the will to which she was not otherwise legally entitled, the trial court properly dismissed the contest.Before his death, Dempsey Johnson executed a will devising his estate through specific bequests and leaving the residuary to his three daughters, including Tia MacNerland. After Johnson died, MacNerland sued the estate's executor seeking to set aside Johnson's will on the grounds that he was unduly influenced when he executed the will. The trial court dismissed the will contest for lack of standing under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the executor failed to demonstrate that MacNerland accepted greater benefits than those to which she was entitled under the will or intestacy laws. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because MacNerland accepted benefits under Johnson's will, the trial court properly dismissed her challenge to the will's validity. View "In re Estate of Johnson" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising out of a suit to impeach a will the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying a plea in bar, holding that if the circuit court erred in denying the plea in bar, any error was harmless.Ten days before the decedent's death, Robert Machen, a lawyer who had befriended the decedent, presented the decedent with copies of a will he had drafted for her signature. The decedent signed the will, which contained a no-contest clause providing that the decedent's family members would get nothing from the estate if they contested the will. All family members except David Williams signed a release form. Williams then brought this suit to impeach the will. Machen filed a plea in bar asserting that Williams lacked standing to sue. The circuit court denied the plea in bar and held that the will and been procured by undue influence and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that any error in denying the plea in bar as to Williams was harmless. View "Machen v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of the Estate of Everett Joseph Hopkins in the Estate's action to declare a warranty deed null and void for failure of delivery, holding that the trial justice did not err or abuse her discretion.The trial justice determined that the warranty deed was void for failure of delivery because Everett did not intend to surrender control of and completely divest himself of title to the property. The trial justice further found that the deed was not accepted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice properly determined that the executed warranty deed was void for failure of delivery and acceptance. View "Estate of Everett Joseph Hopkins v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Ann Langford appealed a trial court judgment in favor of Harriett Broussard regarding the administration of an estate and the sale and division of real property. Mary Walker Taylor died in January 1998 leaving a will that appointed two of her daughters, Ann and Harriett, as coexecutors. The coexecutors petitioned to have the will admitted to probate. The sisters filed a waiver of notice in which they each accepted service of notice of the filing of the petition for the probate of the will and waived further notice of the proceedings. The record reflected no other action was taken in the probate court with respect to the administration of the estate. In October 2017, Harriett petitioned to, among other things, remove the administration of the estate from the probate court to the trial court. In her petition, Harriett sought either the sale for division of certain real property or, if the trial court determined that any of the real property was "heirs property," the partition by sale. The trial court granted Harriett’s request, removing the administration of the estate from the probate court and allowing the sale. Ann responded to Harriett’s petition denying the real property could not be equitably partitioned, and asserted the real property could not be sold or divided. Finding, however, that the trial court did not err with respect to the sale and division of the estate property, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed judgment. View "Langford v. Broussard" on Justia Law