Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A party receiving notice who fails to participate in court-ordered mediation is bound by the result. Plaintiff, the trustee of decedent's trust, petitioned the probate court to determine the trust beneficiaries. After the probate court ordered the matter to mediation, the potential beneficiaries received notice of the mediation, but some did not participate. The participating parties subsequently reached a settlement that excluded the nonparticipating parties as beneficiaries, and the probate court approved the settlement. In this appeal, the nonparticipating parties challenged the probate court's approval of the settlement.The Court of Appeal held that, by failing to participate in the mediation, the Pacific parties waived their right to an evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, the Pacific parties were not entitled to a determination of factual issues, such as the decedent's intent, and cannot raise such issues for the first time on appeal. The court rejected the Pacific parties' contention that the trustee failed in his duty to deal impartially with all beneficiaries where the Pacific parties' failure to participate was not the fault of the trustee. The court also rejected the Pacific parties' contention that the trustee breached fiduciary duties and failed to keep them reasonably informed. Finally, the court concluded that there was no extrinsic fraud, and that the probate court should decide the issue of attorney fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment order. View "Breslin v. Breslin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified as modified the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court denying Maria Molloy's motion to intervene in Pamela Spera's proceeding seeking enforcement of a divorce decree that dissolved her marriage to Rodney Miller, holding that Molloy had a right to intervene as to the valuation of Miller's retirement accounts.In the enforcement proceeding, Spera sought to have the retirement accounts she and Miller each held divided according to the terms of the divorce decree. Before Miller passed away, he named his four daughters - including K.M.M., the child he had with Molloy - as beneficiaries on his retirement accounts. Molloy sought to intervene in Spera's enforcement proceeding as a matter of right to assert K.M.M.'s interest in Miller's retirement accounts. The district court denied intervention. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the four requirements under Minn. R. Civ. P. 24.01 for intervention were met. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that Molloy's right to intervene was limited specifically to the valuation of Miller's retirement accounts. View "Miller v. Molloy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that the executor of the Estate of Thelma J. Taylor converted estate property and ordering the executor to repay double the converted property's value, as provided by Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-1704, holding that the statute's plain language does not limit its application.The court of appeals upheld the conversion finding but held that section 59-1704 did not apply because the property was taken before the executor was appointed to administer the estate. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on the issue subject to review, holding (1) nothing in section 59-1704 limits its application only to circumstances when the decedent's funds are taken by a court-appointed estate fiduciary after probate proceedings begin; and (2) the district court properly assessed the double penalty against the executor under the plain language of the statute. View "In re Estate of Taylor" on Justia Law

In this estate settlement action, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the county court's dismissal of Matthew Larson's objection to a proposed schedule of distribution, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to address Matthew's assigned errors.Cindy Svoboda, in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Blain Larson, filed a petition for complete settlement of the estate asking the county court to enter an order approving her final accounting and directing that she distribute assets of the estate in accordance with a proposed schedule of distribution. Matthew, Blain's son, objected to the proposed schedule of distribution, alleging that the schedule of distribution failed properly to apportion inheritance taxes. The county court dismissed the objection. Matthew appealed, assigning that the county court erred in dismissing his objection. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Matthew did not appeal from a final order, and therefore, this Court lacked jurisdiction. View "In re Estate of Larson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the county court disallowing a claim filed by the Nebraska Department of Revenue for unpaid lifetime Nebraska income taxes and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that the county court failed to impose the burden of proof regarding diligent investigation and inquiry on the personal representative of the decedent's estate.The Department filed a claim with Miranda Loder, the personal representative of the decedent's estate, seeking individual income taxes for the three years preceding the decedent's death. Miranda disallowed the claim, claiming that it was untimely. The Department filed a petition with the county court for allowance of the claim, arguing that because it did not receive notice in compliance with Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-520.02 and 30-2483 it retained the right to file a claim within three years of the decedent's death under Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2485(a)(2). At issue was whether the Department qualified as a known creditor, to whom Miranda was required to mail notice. The county court sustained Miranda's disallowance. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the court's decision did not conform to the law because the court did not examine whether Miranda established that the Department's potential claim was not ascertainable by reasonably diligent inquiry. View "In re Estate of Loder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint regarding the distribution of Dr. Lloyd Griffith's estate, holding that Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the claims asserted.Dr. Griffith was survived by his three adult children - two daughters (collectively, Plaintiffs) and a son, Charles - and his second wife, Mary Cate. Charles, acting as the personal representative of Dr. Griffith's estate, requested to probate his father's 2010 will after initially probating a 2008 will. The circuit court ordered that the 2010 be entered into probate. In 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint listing Mary Cate and Charles as defendants, alleging, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty, waste of the estate, constructive fraud, and conversion. The circuit court dismissed the claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' factual allegations were insufficient to establish standing. View "Platt v. Griffith" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christopher Dow appealed a probate court decision finding he was not a pretermitted heir under his mother’s, Marie G. Dow’s, will. He argued the probate division erred in failing to apply New Hampshire’s pretermitted heir statute to her will, and that, under New Hampshire law, he was a pretermitted heir and, thus, entitled to his intestate share of his mother’s estate. Respondent Leslie Dow, the testator’s ex-daughter-in-law and primary beneficiary of her will, countered that the probate division properly applied Massachusetts’ pretermitted heir statute to the will in accordance with the will’s provision that “[the] estate is to be administered and enforced according to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.” Following oral argument before a 3JX panel, the case was submitted to the full court for decision. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the probate division’s decision to apply the Massachusetts pretermitted heir statute in determining whether the petitioner was a pretermitted heir under the will, and reversed the probate division’s conclusion that the petitioner was not a pretermitted heir. The Supreme Court held that petitioner was a pretermitted heir under New Hampshire law, as properly applied, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Marie G. Dow" on Justia Law

Bernard and Sheila created the Family Trust and transferred their home to themselves as trustees. The trust became irrevocable upon the death of the surviving spouse, when the estate would be distributed to Sheila’s 13 children, including Bohnett. Sheila died in 2003. Bernard died in 2008. The property was rented out. The rent was deposited into the trust’s bank account. In 2012, the trustee filed a successful Claim for Reassessment Exclusion for Transfer Between Parent and Child (Proposition 58 claim), listing Sheila and Bernard as transferors, her children as transferees, and the date of Bernard’s death as the date of transfer.In 2013, the property was transferred by the trustee to Bohnett. A Preliminary Change of Ownership Report listed the trust as the seller/transferor, stated that the purchase was a transfer between parent(s) and child(ren), and listed the sale price as $1,030,000. The trustee distributed the money in equal shares to the 13 siblings. A second Proposition 58 claim listed Sheila and Bernard as transferors and Bohnett as transferee, leaving blank the date of transfer.The county found that there was a 12/13 change in ownership and reassessed the property from $157,731 to $962,873 for 2012/2013, and $963,114 for 2013/2014. Bohnett filed unsuccessful Applications for Changed Assessment. The court of appeal affirmed in favor of the County. The purchase by one beneficiary from his siblings and co-beneficiaries was not a parent-child transfer exempt from reassessment for property tax purposes. View "Bohnett v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of judgment as matter of law in favor of Defendant, individually and as trustee of The Gilbert F. Roy, Jr. Residence Trust - 2005, holding that the trial justice did not err.Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Defendant was holding property in a constructive trust for their benefit and asked the superior court to order Defendant to convey a co-tenancy interest to them. Plaintiffs requested monetary damages and asserted claims of promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not misapply the law of constructive trusts to the facts; (2) there was no error in the trial justice's finding that Plaintiffs failed to establish a valid promissory estoppel claim; and (3) the trial justice did not err in her analysis of Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. View "Sousa v. Roy" on Justia Law

Kenneth Rogers appealed a chancery court order granting authority to the executor of the Estate of Costas E. Pavlou (the estate) to disburse funds to the estate’s attorneys. The chancellor found that Rogers lacked standing to challenge the disbursement because he had not probated a claim against the estate. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found it had jurisdiction over the appeal, but Rogers did not designate the documents on which he based his appellate challenge to the chancellor's decision. Because the Supreme Court was unable to review Rogers' arguments due to his not having designated relevant portions of the record, the chancery court order was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Costas E. Pavlou" on Justia Law