Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Robert Segrest, Jr. appealed the dismissal of his petition to contest the validity of the will of Robert C. Segrest. In his will, Robert bequeathed to his wife, Patricia Segrest, a defeasible life estate in his real property. That bequest was defeasible because Robert provided that should Patricia leave the property for a period of more than 6 months the real property would pass to his son, John Paul Segrest. Robert also left certain personal property, but no real property, to his son, Robert, Jr. Robert died on November 24, 2018. On March 7, 2019, the probate court admitted Robert's will to probate and granted letters testamentary to Patricia, the personal representative. On April 26, 2019, Robert, Jr. filed his "Notice of Intent to file Will Contest." Robert, Jr., maintained that the will was invalid because, he said, at the time Robert executed the will Robert was the subject of "much undue influence" by Patricia and lacked testamentary capacity as a result of his failing health and strong medications. The dispositive question in this appeal was whether the circuit court obtained jurisdiction over the will contest. Robert, Jr., after Robert's will had been admitted to probate and letters testamentary had been issued but before a final settlement of the estate was reached, moved the circuit court for the removal of the administration of Robert's estate from the probate court to the circuit court, and he subsequently filed a petition to contest the will in the circuit court case addressing the administration of Robert's estate. The Alabama Supreme Court found no error in removal of the administration of the estate from the probate to the circuit court. Therefore, the pendency of Robert's estate in circuit court, in conjunction with the filing of the will contest in the case administering Robert's estate, invoked the circuit court's jurisdiction to determine the validity of Robert's will. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Segrest" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a district court’s alleged failure to follow the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Frizzell v. DeYoung, 415 P.3d 341 (2018) ("Frizzell I") after remand. In Frizzell I, the Supreme Court held that an agreement entered into pursuant to the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA”), Idaho Code sections 15-8-101, et seq., by Donald Frizzell and Edwin and Darlene DeYoung was only enforceable to the extent that it settled past claims. As a result, the provisions that purported to exculpate Edwin from liability for future negligence or breaches of fiduciary duty after the agreement was executed were deemed void as against public policy. In this appeal, Frizzell argued that after the case was remanded, the district court failed to follow the law of the case by erroneously allowing the DeYoungs to introduce evidence, testimony, and argument concerning conduct that occurred before the agreement was executed. Frizzell also claimed the district court abused its discretion in awarding the DeYoungs attorney fees without considering the factors in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Frizzell v. DeYoung" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a creditor of a settlor may bring a claim against a settlor of a trust so long as the settlor's interest in the trust is not solely discretionary and there is not a spendthrift provision precluding payment of the claim and that where a trust provides broad discretion to its trustees, the trustees may approve a creditor's claim against the trust.At issue was whether a creditor may satisfy its claim against the settlor's trust where the trust does not specifically provide for payment of the claim but the trustees approve the payment. The district court ordered frozen trust funds be released to pay the creditor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) both parties had standing to maintain this action, and the appeal is not moot; (2) the trust allowed for payment of the creditor's fees; (3) the creditor satisfied the procedural requirements to file a creditor's claim; and (4) the trustees had broad discretion to approve the creditor's claim. View "In re Christian Family Trust" on Justia Law

After decedent Charles Fulks died, his wife, petitioner-appellee Dorothy Fulks, filed the probate of his estate in the District Court of Nowata County, Oklahoma. An heir at law-appellant, the decedent's daughter, Tammy McPherson, objected to the probate in Nowata County. She argued that: (1) the decedent died in Osage County, and all of the decedent's real and personal property was located in Osage County; (2) pursuant to 58 O.S. 2011 section 5, the proper venue for the probate was solely in Osage County, Oklahoma; and (3) the case should have been transferred pursuant to the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens. The trial court determined that Nowata County was also a proper venue, and it denied the daughter's request to transfer the cause to Osage County. The daughter appealed, and after review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held venue was proper in Osage County. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Fulks" on Justia Law

Tomeka McElroy and Marlon McElroy (collectively, "the contestants") appealed a judgment entered in favor of Tracy McElroy, as the personal representative of the estate of Clifton McElroy, Jr. Clifton McElroy dies in 2010, leaving a will purportedly executed by him on October 15, 2008. On April 14, 2010, Tracy petitioned the probate court to admit the will to probate, averring that the will was self-proving in accordance with the requirements of section 43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975. On that same day, the probate court admitted the will to probate and issued letters testamentary to Tracy. On September 16, 2010, the contestants filed a will contest in the probate court challenging the validity of the will. They specifically alleged that Clifton's signature on the will was forged and that, therefore, the will was not properly executed. After discovery delays, multiple continuances, and a failed summary-judgment motion filed by the contestants, the circuit court conducted a three-day bench trial on the will contest. After hearing the evidence, the circuit court entered a judgment finding that, although the will did not meet the requirements of a self-proving will under section 43-8-132, it was properly executed and witnessed and was, therefore, valid under section 43-8- 131, Ala. Code 1975. The contestants appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed their appeal because the administration of the estate had not been properly removed from the probate court; thus, the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the estate administration or the will contest. After the Supreme Court dismissed the contestants' appeal, the probate court ordered a new trial to determine the validity of the will. After considering the testimony, which, again, included testimony in the transcript from the circuit-court bench trial, the probate court entered a judgment declaring that the will was valid and ordering that it be admitted to probate. The contestants appealed again. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court determined the will was properly executed pursuant to section 43-8-131 and it was properly proved pursuant to 43-8-167. View "McElroy v. McElroy, as personal representative of the Estate of Clifton McElroy, Jr." on Justia Law

Gail Howard, Bruce Lindvig, and Milton Lindvig, personally and as Successor Personal Representative to the Estate of Ralph H. Lindvig, (together “the estate of Ralph Lindvig”) appealed a judgment entered in consolidated formal probate proceedings. In 2007, due to financial concerns related to paying for Ralph's care, his wife Dorothy Lindvig, acting as Ralph's attorney in fact, sold portions of Ralph's interests in the land he received from his parents to Milton Lindvig, Ralph's brother. The transfers were made by two warranty deeds, each of which severed the minerals and reserved them to Ralph and Dorothy as joint tenants. In May of 2007, Dorothy, again acting as Ralph's attorney in fact, conveyed the Wattam land to herself by warranty deed. When Ralph died, Dorothy was the personal representative of his estate. After her death in 2009, she was replaced by Milton. Dorothy died intestate, survived by a brother and her sister, Patricia Jellum, who was the personal representative of Dorothy's estate. The estate of Ralph Lindvig filed a petition in Dorothy's probate proceedings to set aside the intestate distribution of the minerals she severed and the Wattam land she conveyed to herself. The estate argued the transfers were beyond Dorothy's authority because they diminished the size of his estate and were not approved by a court, all in contravention of the power of attorney’s gifting provisions. The parties stipulated to consolidating the two probates as formal administrations. The probate court determined Dorothy did not breach her fiduciary duties by engaging in improper self-dealing. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the probate court's judgment. View "Estate of Lindvig" on Justia Law

Donald Moore, Scott Moore, and the Glenn W. Moore & Sons partnership appealed an amended judgment ordering the partnership to pay $140,206 to Delbert Moore’s step-children, Charles Minard, Candice Eberhart, and Terry Minard. Before his death, Delbert Moore was a partner with his brother Donald Moore and nephew Scott Moore in the Glenn W. Moore & Sons partnership, a ranching business. Delbert Moore’s will directed that a majority of his real property be sold within six months of his death and the proceeds be distributed to his three step-children, Charles Minard, Candice Eberhart, Terry Minard, and his nephew Scott Moore. His will also devised his one-third interest in the partnership to his three step- children. Delbert Moore’s real property sold in May 2015. The partnership and Delbert Moore’s estate each hired an accountant to prepare an accounting of the partnership’s profits and losses; the Estate’s one-third share of the partnership’s profits was $140,206. The partnership argues the district court erred in adopting the Estate’s accounting of the partnership’s profits and losses. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Moore" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the probate of Eric Milo Hirning’s will, and concerned a magistrate court’s authority to conduct formal probate proceedings and approve an estate’s final accounting and distribution. Three beneficiaries of the will, appellants Cindy Louise Uzzle, John E. White, and Jody Hirning, challenged the procedural grounds of the district court’s decision on appeal, the propriety of a magistrate court’s order approving the estate’s final accounting and proposed distribution, and the district court’s award of attorney’s fees. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court found no reversible error except that neither party should have been awarded costs or attorney's fees. View "Uzzle v. Estate of Hirning" on Justia Law

When Louis Rabin died, he left everything to his widow, Claudine. She was also named as the personal representative to manage his estate in probate. Louis’s former wife, Suyue Rabin, made a claim against the estate based on a couple of promissory notes. These notes totaled $200,000 and were made payable to Suyue upon Louis’s death, and were executed while Louis was married to Claudine. Claudine didn’t know the notes existed until Suyue made the claim. Claudine asked Louis’s longtime attorney, Mark Freirich, for all of Louis’s legal files, most of which had nothing to do with the notes. He refused, citing confidentiality concerns. She then subpoenaed the files. When Freirich refused, a lawsuit was filed, reaching the Colorado Supreme Court. After review, the Court held: (1) Colorado’s Probate Code did not grant a personal representative a general right to take possession of all of a decedent’s legal files as “property” of the estate; (2) a decedent’s lawyer was ordinarily prohibited from disclosing a decedent’s legal files, even to the personal representative; but (3) a decedent’s lawyer could provide the personal representative with otherwise privileged or confidential documents if such disclosure was necessary to settle the decedent’s estate. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's order quashing the subpoena. That portion of the appellate court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Freirich v. Rabin" on Justia Law

Joel Finstrom, James Finstrom and Annette Hauser appeal from orders and a judgment denying their claims related to Ruth Finstrom’s estate. Ruth and Carl Finstrom had seven children: James, Daniel , Joel, Annette Hauser, Janice Schulz, Mark, and Rebecca Lusk. In the late 1980s, Carl and Daniel Finstrom began farming together. According to trial testimony, Daniel made oral agreements with his parents to acquire three quarters of real property. In 2011 Daniel believed he had fulfilled the agreements, but Carl requested an additional $240,000 for the property. In August 2011, Ruth and Carl executed identical wills. The wills devised one-third of a quarter section of property to Joel, stating he had paid one-third of the price for the property. The quarter devised to Joel was one of the quarters Daniel believed he purchased. Carl died in November 2011. In December 2012, Ruth executed a contract for deed conveying the three quarters of real property to Daniel and Teresa Finstrom for $240,000. Ruth executed a new will in July 2015, devising the residue of her estate to her seven children in equal shares. In July 2016, Ruth conveyed additional real property to her daughter Janice Schulz. Ruth died in December 2016. In December 2016, the district court admitted Ruth Finstrom’s 2015 will to informal probate and appointed James personal representative. In March 2017, Joel filed a claim against the estate, asserting the estate owed him $200,000 for the value of an interest he owned in Ruth's real property. Joel also claimed the estate owed him $2,000 per month for providing Ruth in-home health care from May 1, 2015, to April 21, 2016. In May 2017, Mark petitioned for the removal of James as personal representative. In September 2017, James, individually and as personal representative, sued Schulz and Daniel and Teresa Finstrom seeking to invalidate the real property conveyances Ruth made to them. James Finstrom argued Ruth was unduly influenced in conveying the property. Schulz and Daniel and Teresa Finstrom denied the claims and counterclaimed, arguing James breached his fiduciary duties to the estate. James resigned as personal representative and Heartland Trust Company was appointed as successor personal representative. On March 12, 2019, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for judgment, ruling Ruth's 2015 will was valid and revoked her 2011 will. The court denied Joel's claim he had an interest in Ruth's real property, and upheld Ruth's conveyances to Schulz and Daniel and Teresa Finstrom. The court found Ruth did not lack mental capacity to make the conveyances. The court also found Daniel and Teresa Finstrom did not have a confidential relationship with Ruth, and Ruth was not unduly influenced. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Joel, James and Annette's claims against the estate. View "Estate of Finstrom" on Justia Law