Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

M&M Realty entered into a contract with the William Mazzoni Trust in 2011 for the purchase of a plot of land in Boynton Beach, Florida. M&M subsequently filed suit seeking specific performance of the land sale contract and damages from the Mazzoni Trust, as well as damages from William Mazzoni, as co-trustee and agent of the Trust, for tortious interference with the land sale contract.The Eleventh Circuit held that M&M failed to make out a prima facie claim for specific performance or for damages for breach of contract because M&M did not provide evidence that it was ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract -- specifically, that it had the necessary funds to make the purchase. The court also held that William Mazzoni, as a co-trustee of the Defendant trust and signatory as its agent on the contract, is not liable for tortious interference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of William Mazzoni and the Mazzoni Trust. View "M & M Realty Partners at Hagen Ranch, LLC v. Mazzoni" on Justia Law

In this matter arising from the district court's distribution of Lanny Lentz's estate among his three daughters the Supreme Court remanded the judgment of the court of appeals holding that it lacked jurisdiction over this appeal because Appellant's posttrial motions did not toll the time for her to appeal, holding that the court of appeals did in fact have jurisdiction over the appeal.Appellant, one of Lentz's daughters, filed a petition to set aside and/or reconsider the final settlement and, simultaneously, an objection to discharge of executrix and petition to disgorge fees for administration paid to the fiduciary. The district court denied the motions. Appellant appealed, claiming that the property values for properties in the final settlement were not supported by substantial competent evidence. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of the appeal on the merits, holding that Appellant's notice of appeal was timely and that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal. View "In re Estate of Lentz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's demurrer to Plaintiffs' suit, holding that "fair market value" on a specified date, without more specificity, was not a sufficiently certain price term to allow a court to compel specific performance of a contract regarding the purchase of real estate.The decedent executed a will wherein she devised property to Plaintiffs, her three daughters. In the same will, the decedent granted her son, Defendant, an option to purchase the property from his sisters. The decedent then executed a codicil to her will revising the purchase price for the option to "an amount equal to the fair market value at the time of my death." In their complaint, Plaintiffs sought specific performance of a contract for the purchase of real estate. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that there was no enforceable contract because the will and codicil did not determine the purchase price and did not provide a method of determining the purchase price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term "fair market value," as set forth in the codicil, did not provide a price for the property, nor did it provide a mode for ascertaining the price with sufficient certainty. View "Wilburn v. Mangano" on Justia Law

The trustees of the Amen Family 1990 Revocable Trust challenge the Assessor's reassessment of property the Trust received from a corporation that the Trust had partially owned. Although there were at least five owners of the stock of the transferor corporation (including the Trust) and the transferee was solely the Trust, the Trust contends that the proportional ownership interest exception applied because it had owned all the voting stock in the corporation.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the Assessor and upholding the reassessment. The Assessor argues that "stock" in Revenue & Taxation Code section 62(a)(2) means exactly what it says—stock—and applies to all classes of stock, including for present purposes both voting and non-voting stock. Under this interpretation, the Assessor was right to reassess the property after the transfer because the proportional ownership interests, as measured by all the stock of the transferor corporation, had changed. Finally, the "Primary Economic Value" test in section 60 also supports that all stock is considered in applying section 62(a)(2). View "Prang v. Amen" on Justia Law

Margaret Stockham, as personal representative of the estate of Herbert Stockham, deceased ("Stockham"), appealed a circuit court judgment denying her motion for reimbursement for costs and attorney fees. The costs and fees at issue in this appeal related to a lawsuit brought by a beneficiary of three trusts that each held preferred and common stock in SVI Corporation, on whose board of directors Stockham served. Judgment was entered in favor of Stockham and other defendants. Stockham filed a motion for reimbursement of fees and expenses for defense of the beneficiary's action against Herbert Stockham. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred indenting Stockham's motion for reimbursement of costs and attorney fees based on the beneficiary's newly-revised argument Herbert had willfully and wantonly committed material breaches of the trusts. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded this case for the circuit court to reconsider Stockham's motion for reimbursement without consideration of the beneficiary's newly raised arguments. View "Stockham v. Ladd" on Justia Law

Robert Segrest, Jr. appealed the dismissal of his petition to contest the validity of the will of Robert C. Segrest. In his will, Robert bequeathed to his wife, Patricia Segrest, a defeasible life estate in his real property. That bequest was defeasible because Robert provided that should Patricia leave the property for a period of more than 6 months the real property would pass to his son, John Paul Segrest. Robert also left certain personal property, but no real property, to his son, Robert, Jr. Robert died on November 24, 2018. On March 7, 2019, the probate court admitted Robert's will to probate and granted letters testamentary to Patricia, the personal representative. On April 26, 2019, Robert, Jr. filed his "Notice of Intent to file Will Contest." Robert, Jr., maintained that the will was invalid because, he said, at the time Robert executed the will Robert was the subject of "much undue influence" by Patricia and lacked testamentary capacity as a result of his failing health and strong medications. The dispositive question in this appeal was whether the circuit court obtained jurisdiction over the will contest. Robert, Jr., after Robert's will had been admitted to probate and letters testamentary had been issued but before a final settlement of the estate was reached, moved the circuit court for the removal of the administration of Robert's estate from the probate court to the circuit court, and he subsequently filed a petition to contest the will in the circuit court case addressing the administration of Robert's estate. The Alabama Supreme Court found no error in removal of the administration of the estate from the probate to the circuit court. Therefore, the pendency of Robert's estate in circuit court, in conjunction with the filing of the will contest in the case administering Robert's estate, invoked the circuit court's jurisdiction to determine the validity of Robert's will. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of Segrest" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a district court’s alleged failure to follow the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Frizzell v. DeYoung, 415 P.3d 341 (2018) ("Frizzell I") after remand. In Frizzell I, the Supreme Court held that an agreement entered into pursuant to the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (“TEDRA”), Idaho Code sections 15-8-101, et seq., by Donald Frizzell and Edwin and Darlene DeYoung was only enforceable to the extent that it settled past claims. As a result, the provisions that purported to exculpate Edwin from liability for future negligence or breaches of fiduciary duty after the agreement was executed were deemed void as against public policy. In this appeal, Frizzell argued that after the case was remanded, the district court failed to follow the law of the case by erroneously allowing the DeYoungs to introduce evidence, testimony, and argument concerning conduct that occurred before the agreement was executed. Frizzell also claimed the district court abused its discretion in awarding the DeYoungs attorney fees without considering the factors in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Frizzell v. DeYoung" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a creditor of a settlor may bring a claim against a settlor of a trust so long as the settlor's interest in the trust is not solely discretionary and there is not a spendthrift provision precluding payment of the claim and that where a trust provides broad discretion to its trustees, the trustees may approve a creditor's claim against the trust.At issue was whether a creditor may satisfy its claim against the settlor's trust where the trust does not specifically provide for payment of the claim but the trustees approve the payment. The district court ordered frozen trust funds be released to pay the creditor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) both parties had standing to maintain this action, and the appeal is not moot; (2) the trust allowed for payment of the creditor's fees; (3) the creditor satisfied the procedural requirements to file a creditor's claim; and (4) the trustees had broad discretion to approve the creditor's claim. View "In re Christian Family Trust" on Justia Law

After decedent Charles Fulks died, his wife, petitioner-appellee Dorothy Fulks, filed the probate of his estate in the District Court of Nowata County, Oklahoma. An heir at law-appellant, the decedent's daughter, Tammy McPherson, objected to the probate in Nowata County. She argued that: (1) the decedent died in Osage County, and all of the decedent's real and personal property was located in Osage County; (2) pursuant to 58 O.S. 2011 section 5, the proper venue for the probate was solely in Osage County, Oklahoma; and (3) the case should have been transferred pursuant to the doctrine of intrastate forum non conveniens. The trial court determined that Nowata County was also a proper venue, and it denied the daughter's request to transfer the cause to Osage County. The daughter appealed, and after review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held venue was proper in Osage County. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Fulks" on Justia Law

Tomeka McElroy and Marlon McElroy (collectively, "the contestants") appealed a judgment entered in favor of Tracy McElroy, as the personal representative of the estate of Clifton McElroy, Jr. Clifton McElroy dies in 2010, leaving a will purportedly executed by him on October 15, 2008. On April 14, 2010, Tracy petitioned the probate court to admit the will to probate, averring that the will was self-proving in accordance with the requirements of section 43-8-132, Ala. Code 1975. On that same day, the probate court admitted the will to probate and issued letters testamentary to Tracy. On September 16, 2010, the contestants filed a will contest in the probate court challenging the validity of the will. They specifically alleged that Clifton's signature on the will was forged and that, therefore, the will was not properly executed. After discovery delays, multiple continuances, and a failed summary-judgment motion filed by the contestants, the circuit court conducted a three-day bench trial on the will contest. After hearing the evidence, the circuit court entered a judgment finding that, although the will did not meet the requirements of a self-proving will under section 43-8-132, it was properly executed and witnessed and was, therefore, valid under section 43-8- 131, Ala. Code 1975. The contestants appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed their appeal because the administration of the estate had not been properly removed from the probate court; thus, the circuit court never obtained subject-matter jurisdiction over the estate administration or the will contest. After the Supreme Court dismissed the contestants' appeal, the probate court ordered a new trial to determine the validity of the will. After considering the testimony, which, again, included testimony in the transcript from the circuit-court bench trial, the probate court entered a judgment declaring that the will was valid and ordering that it be admitted to probate. The contestants appealed again. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court determined the will was properly executed pursuant to section 43-8-131 and it was properly proved pursuant to 43-8-167. View "McElroy v. McElroy, as personal representative of the Estate of Clifton McElroy, Jr." on Justia Law