Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Respondent Tommie Rae Brown sought to establish she was the survivor of the late entertainer James Brown, who died in 2006. An issue arose in the context of Respondent's claims for an elective or omitted spouse's share of Brown's estate. There was uncertainty as to Respondent's marital status because she did not obtain an annulment of her first recorded marriage until after her marriage ceremony to Brown. In January 2004, Brown filed an action to annul his marriage to Respondent, indicating the parties had recently separated. Brown alleged he was entitled to an annulment because Respondent never divorced her first husband, so their purported marriage was void ab initio. Brown asked that Respondent "be required to permanently vacate the marital residence" and noted the parties had executed a prenuptial agreement that resolved all matters regarding equitable division, alimony, and attorney's fees. Respondent's omitted spouse claims were transferred to the circuit court, which granted her motion for partial summary judgment, and denied a similar motion by the Limited Special Administrator and Trustee (LSA). The circuit court found that as a matter of law, Respondent was Brown's surviving spouse. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari review of claims made by several of Brown's children, and after such review, concluded Respondent was not Brown's surviving spouse. Consequently, the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court was reversed, and the matter remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. The circuit court was directed upon remand to promptly proceed with the probate of Brown's estate in accordance with his estate plan. View "Brown v. Sojourner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this will contest, holding that a claim alleging that the decedent's will resulted from tortious interference by a beneficiary must be joined with a timely will contest and otherwise is barred.Mother and Father died within one day of each other, and their 2014 mirror wills were probated. Plaintiff decided to forgo a timely contest to Mother's will but then later brought a suit for tortious interference against a Beneficiary of the will, arguing that the Beneficiary exercised improper and undue influence over Mother. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common law and principles of claim preclusion do not permit a tortious interference with inheritance claim alleging an improperly obtained will to go forward outside normal probate deadlines and proceedings; and (2) Plaintiff's tortious interference claim was a de facto substitute for a will contest based on undue influence and was thus barred because it was not brought in conjunction with a timely will contest. View "Youngblut v. Youngblut" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that Plaintiffs' claim seeking contract damages was barred by the limitations period set forth in Iowa Code 614.17A, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.John and Dessie Rottinghaus filed a claim in the Estate of Sandra Franken, alleging that the Estate sold certain real estate in violation of their right of first refusal to purchase the real estate. The executor disallowed the claim and moved for summary judgment, claiming that section 614.17A barred the Rottinghauses' claim. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute of limitations precluded the Rottinghauses' claim for damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 614.17A applies only to actions seeking to recover or establish an interest in or claim to real estate filed against the holder of the record title; and (2) neither the merger doctrine, the statute of frauds, the indirect effect of section 614.17A, nor the statute of limitations in section 614.1(5) barred the Rottinghauses' damages action. View "In re Estate of Franken" on Justia Law

William Nelson appealed a district court judgment denying his claims relating to a quitclaim deed executed by his mother Elsie Haykel before her death. Elsie Haykel executed estate planning documents and a quitclaim deed conveying a remainder interest in a Bismarck condominium to her children, Steven Nelson, Gail Nelson-Hom, and William Nelson. Haykel died in 2014. In January 2016, Steven and Gail sued William seeking a partition and sale of the condominium. William counterclaimed, alleging the 2011 quitclaim deed was invalid because Haykel lacked mental capacity and was unduly influenced. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Steven and Gail, but the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding William Nelson raised genuine issues of material fact on his claims of lack of capacity and undue influence. After a two-day trial in July and August 2019, the district court entered a judgment concluding the quitclaim deed was valid because Haykel did not lack mental capacity to execute the deed and was not unduly influenced. The judgment also awarded Steven and Gail attorney’s fees and costs, granted Steven authority to sell the condominium, and denied William's discovery claims and his motion to stay the proceedings to reopen Haykel’s probate. William raised twenty-one issues on appeal. The Supreme Court determined William did not seek a stay of the judgment before the condominium was sold. In addition, he did not claim his appeal involved great public interest. Therefore, the Court concluded the issues in the appeal relating to the sale of the condominium were moot, and dismissed that part of William Nelson’s appeal. Finding no other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Nelson, et al. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court reforming an inter vivos trust created and funded by Jill Petrie St. Clair, holding that the district court's findings of fact were supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the district court properly applied the law.The district court reformed the trust at issue in order for the trust to express Jill's true intentions, which were not expressed in the original trust instrument due to a scrivener's error. Jill and the trustee asked the Supreme Court to affirm the district court's rulings to satisfy the requirements of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in reforming the trust because reformation was necessary for the trust to be consistent with Jill's original intent and to correct the error of the scrivener. View "In re St. Clair Trust Reformation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment summarily dismissing Petitioners' request that the court declare an original trust and its first amendment valid, holding that the circuit court erred.After the settlor of the trust died, Petitioners filed a petition requesting judicial supervision of the trust under S.D. Codified Laws 21-22-9. Petitioners further requested a declaration of the validity of the original trust and its first amendment, arguing that subsequent amendments were invalid. The circuit court granted a successor trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that a challenge to the validity of a trust cannot be asserted in a petition for judicial supervision but could only be commenced via service of summons within one year after the settlor's death. The circuit court granted the successor trustee's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a circuit court may consider the validity of a trust in a petition for judicial supervision, and therefore, Petitioners' petition, which included a request that the circuit court determine the validity of the trust amendments, property commenced a judicial proceeding; and (2) the trust challenge was timely because Petitioners filed their petition within the one-year timeframe after the settlor's death. View "In re Carver Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

Fred Sande, the personal representative of the Estate of Geraldine Sande, appealed a judgment distributing the estate. Geraldine Sande and her son, Philip Sande, owned Sande Music Company, a partnership. Geraldine owned 55 percent of the partnership and Philip owned the remaining 45 percent. In March 2010, Geraldine and Philip sold the company for $800,000, of which $600,000 was paid shortly after the sale and the remaining amount was to be paid in installments. Philip executed a promissory note in the amount of $55,000 in favor of Geraldine. Philip died on August 17, 2014, and his wife, Paulette Sande, was appointed the personal representative of his estate. Fred filed an inventory and appraisement of Geraldine's estate, which included real property, Geraldine's share of Sande Music sale proceeds, the $55,000 promissory note from Philip, and other assets. Philip objected to the inventory and appraisement, demanded an accounting of Geraldine's Estate, and requested the immediate return of any Estate assets. Philip alleged the Estate’s real property was undervalued, Fred removed assets from the real property, Fred conveyed real property to himself, and deprived Philip of his interest in the property, and alleged Fred failed to pay rent for use of the Estate's property while conducting business there. Philip also claimed that the value of the promissory note did not reflect payments that had been made and that there were no assets from the sale of Sande Music at the time of Geraldine's death. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the evidence supported the district court’s findings, the court’s finding that Fred breached his fiduciary duty was not clearly erroneous, and the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fred's request for personal representative’s fees and attorney’s fees. View "Estate of Sande" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition sought by Petitioners challenging a district court order compelling the production of allegedly privileged documents in a trust dispute with a beneficiary, holding that the documents were undiscoverable and that this Court expressly declines to recognize the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in Nevada.Petitioners, former trustees, challenged a district court order compelling a group of documents containing a former trustee's notes related to a phone call with counsel and a second group of documents containing the former trustee's notes taken during a meeting with other trustees, counsel, the opposing party, and an independent appraiser. The Supreme Court held that the district court acted in excess of jurisdiction in compelling the partial production of the disputed documents because (1) the first group of documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) the second group of documents were protected by the work-product doctrine. View "Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court interpreting certain provisions of the will of Sandra Larsen's late husband and determining that Sandra did not have a life estate in the decedent's property, holding that the circuit court did not err.The decedent's will divided his estate between Sandra, his children, Pamela and Kirk, and his grandchildren. Pamela and Kirk filed a complaint for declaratory judgment requesting the circuit court to construe the terms of the decedent's will and determine the extent of Sandra's interest in the decedent's house and farm. The circuit court determined that Sandra did not have a life estate in the property, noting that Sandra's rights to the property were subject to be terminated when she was no longer physically or mentally able to reside in the home. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decedent's will did not gave Sandra a life estate in the property; (2) Pamela and Kirk had concurrent rights to access and use the property; and (3) parol evidence was necessary to interpret the scope of Sandra's rights. View "Larsen v. Stack" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that an obstructive act committed before the accrual of a cause of action tolls the statute of limitations under Va. Code 8.01-229(D) regardless of whether the cause of action has accrued at the time of the obstructive act.After Nelson Mackey left a law firm, the remaining partners - Griffith Dodson, Richard Pence, and Richard Viar - formed another partnership. Pence, Dodson, and Viar subsequently passed away. Mackey told Michael Quinn, who helped Joyce Viar with tax matters regarding Richard's estate, that certain stock that the former partnership owned had no financial interest to Mrs. Viar. Therefore, the estate did not attempt to collect the stock. Mackey subsequently sold the stock. When the three estates learned of the stock's existence and Mackey's actions, they sued Mackey alleging conversion of the stock. The trial court concluded that Mackey converted the stock, that section 8.01-229(D) tolled the limitations period, and that the tolling applied to all of the estates. The Supreme Court held (1) Mackey's representation to Quinn was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as to Mrs. Via; but (2) because Mackey demonstrated no obstructive intent as to the Dodson or Pence estates, section 8.01-229(D) did not toll the limitations period for their claims. View "Mackey v. McDannald" on Justia Law