Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the district court admitting a testator's will and codicil to probate after the limitation period for petitioning a will for probate had passed, holding that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was warranted under the unique circumstances in this case.The testator deposited his original will and a codicil with the probate court as permitted by statute. After the testator's death, his heirs tried to locate the will, but the clerk of court informed the heirs that the will was not in the custody of the court. Eventually, the testator's daughter filed an intestate proceeding. After the limitation period for petitioning a will for probate had passed, the clerk of court located the will and codicil. The testator's stepdaughter filed a separate petition to probate the will. The district court consolidated the probate proceedings and admitted the will to probate. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will in the authorized custody of the district court but not found until after the statute of limitations had expired should be admitted to probate. View "In re Estate of Oroke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the county court construing Joan Jane Barger's will, holding that the court did not err.In this contest between family members over the decedent's will, the Supreme Court held that the county court did not err by (1) considering extrinsic evidence after failing to determine whether the will was ambiguous; (2) finding that Joan's intent was to distribute her property designated as property held by a trust even though the trust had been terminated; (3) determining the trust was terminated prior to Joan's death; and (4) finding that certain children were not prohibited from taking under article V of the will due to an earlier will contest. View "In re Estate of Barger" on Justia Law

In this dispute over what percentage of shares in a company the three children (Children) of Peter Knop (Father) owned the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ruling that despite Father's intention to make gifts of certified stock to the children, the gifts were never effectually made under Virginia law and that the children were not entitled to relief under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.The family company in this case owned 1,000 acres of land. The shares in the company were owned by Father and Children. The trial court concluded that although Father stated his intention to make gifts of stock to Children for estate planning purposes, those gifts were never effectually made because they were never delivered to Children in the manner required by law. The trial court further denied Children relief under equitable estoppel principles. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the shares were never delivered to Children, the gifts were not completed; and (2) the record supported the trial court's conclusion that Children were not entitled to relief on their equitable estoppel claim. View "Knop v. Knop" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury assessing estate tax and penalties against a Maryland estate that included the value of a particular type of marital trust created in Michigan, holding that the value of the marital trust was subject to Maryland estate tax and that the tax court properly waived the late-filing penalty.The trust at issue consisted of qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) that was reported on the decedent's federal estate tax return but was omitted from the estate's Maryland estate tax return. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Comptroller lacked the authority to tax the trust assets as part of the Maryland estate and that, because no tax was authorized, no penalty could be charged against the estate. The Court of Appeals held (1) upon the death of the decedent's surviving spouse, the QTIP trust assets were deemed to be transferred upon her death, and the transfer of such property at death was subject to the Maryland estate tax; and (2) the tax court properly waived the late-filing penalty because the personal representative sufficiently demonstrated reasonable cause. View "Comptroller v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Northport in a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff, Mark, as the representative of the estate of his deceased father. Another son, Matt, signed the admission agreement, which included an arbitration agreement, at the residential rehabilitation center owned by Northport. Northport sought to compel arbitration and the district court granted the motion. Mark appealed, asserting that the district court misused the third-party beneficiary theory when no underlying agreement was present between the Poseys and Northport.Arkansas courts have repeatedly declined to find that individuals like Matt—relatives without power-of-attorney or other legal authority who admit a family member to a nursing home—possess valid authority to bind their relatives to arbitration under a third-party beneficiary theory. In this case, because Matt was undisputedly not his father's legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, he lacked the capacity to sign the contract as his father's representative. Accordingly, the court reversed the order compelling arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC v. Posey" on Justia Law

Brianna McLaen appealed an order granting Tyson Hall’s petition for an elective share of the Estate of Kandi Ann Hall. McLaen argued the district court erred by determining Tyson Hall could claim an elective share of Kandi Hall’s intestate estate and by deciding a warranty deed for certain real property was void. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded a surviving spouse may claim an elective share of an intestate estate under N.D.C.C. 30.1-05-01, but the court erred in determining ownership of the real property. The matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a complaint and petition for release of confidential criminal justice information (CCJI), holding that the court did not err in denying the petition for release of CCJI without conducting an in camera review.Appellant, in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of John Michael Crites, sought release of an investigative file regarding Crites's murder. The district court denied the petition without conducting an in camera review, determining that Mont. Code Ann. 44-5-303 does not allow for the release of CCJI if the prosecutor determines dissemination would jeopardize an active investigation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's interest in the CCJI contained in Crites's investigative file must yield to the State's police power to conduct investigations, which included the protection of CCJI in the active investigation into Crites's murder. View "Crites v. Lewis & Clark Co." on Justia Law

In this family dispute concerning an inheritance from the mother of two sets of sisters the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court ruling that May Harris and Jody Mattena committed a variety of torts in relation to the inheritance and finding them liable for compensatory and punitive damages, holding that the trial court did not err in its rulings during the course of the proceeding.Specifically, the Court held (1) the Liability Reform Act's provision for apportionment of damages, Utah Code 78B-5-818(4)(a), is mandatory only upon a request by a party, and therefore, in absence of a request for apportionment, a trial court acts within its discretion in falling back on the default of joint and several liability; and (2) the provision in Utah Code 78B-8-201(2) providing that evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made does not mandate bifurcation of a punitive damages trial in a case in which no party sought to introduce evidence of wealth or financial condition, and the introduction of such evidence is not required as a prerequisite to the availability of a punitive damages award. View "Biesele v. Mattena" on Justia Law

In this dispute among siblings regarding amendments to an inter vivos trust and gifts of interest in a family limited partnership established by Augusta Hathaway the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court and vacated the grant of a new trial as to Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim, holding that the order granting a new trial was unnecessary.A jury found that Hathaway lacked the testamentary capacity to amend her trust and that Defendant Marion Louttit, Hathaway's daughter, had unduly influenced Hathaway, thereby causing Hathaway to execute challenged amendments and gifts. The jury further found that Louttit breached her fiduciary duty as trustee. After the jury's verdict, the trial justice granted Louttit's motion for new trial and judgment as a matter of law as to the fiduciary duty verdict because Plaintiff Wenda Branson, Hathaway's daughter, had failed to prove damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects, holding (1) Branson's claims were not barred by the equitable doctrine of laches; (2) Louttit's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for new trial on the issue of undue influence was properly denied; and (3) the grant of a new trial on the issue of fiduciary duty is vacated as superfluous. View "Branson v. Louttit" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the county court denying the petition to remove a trustee filed by certain trust beneficiaries, holding that the beneficiaries failed to prove that the trustee's removal was not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.The trust beneficiaires in this case filed a petition to modify the trust to remove Elkhorn Valley Bank & Trust as trustee and approve Jennifer Lea Wilson as successor trustee. The county court issued a written order denying the petition to remove the Bank as trustee, determining that removal would be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that removal was inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and therefore, the county court did not err in denying the beneficiaries' motion. View "In re Trust Created by Fenske" on Justia Law