Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The United Effort Plan Trust, a charitable trust, was established by members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS church). Following allegations of trustee mismanagement, the district court removed these trustees, reformed the Trust according to secular principles, and appointed a special fiduciary to manage the Trust subject to the court's supervisory jurisdiction. The special fiduciary later sought court approval for the sale of Trust property with alleged religious significance. Members and bishops of the FLDS church (Appellants) sought to intervene in the administration proceedings, asserting that their ecclesiastical interests in the Trust entitled them to intervene. The district court denied intervention. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining (1) Appellants lacked a statutory right to intervene under Utah. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1); and (2) Appellants lacked a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation to intervene under rule 24(a)(2). View "In re United Effort Plan Trust" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court answered a question of Utah law certified to it by the U.S. district court. The question was, "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah intestacy law?" In this case, after she gave birth, the wife of the donor applied for social security benefits based on the donor's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied the benefits, finding that the wife had not shown the child was the donor's "child" as defined by the Social Security Act. The wife subsequently filed a petition for adjudication of paternity, and the district court adjudicated the donor to be the father of the child. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the state law question to the Supreme Court. The Court held that an agreement leaving preserved frozen semen to the deceased donor's wife does not, without more, confer on the donor the status of a parent for purposes of social security benefits. View "Burns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court answered a question of Utah law certified to it by the U.S. district court. The question was, "Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of his death sufficient to constitute 'consent in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child conceived by artificial means after the donor's death under Utah intestacy law?" In this case, after she gave birth, the wife of the donor applied for social security benefits based on the donor's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied the benefits, finding that the wife had not shown the child was the donor's "child" as defined by the Social Security Act. The wife subsequently filed a petition for adjudication of paternity, and the district court adjudicated the donor to be the father of the child. On appeal, the U.S. district court certified the state law question to the Supreme Court. The Court held that an agreement leaving preserved frozen semen to the deceased donor's wife does not, without more, confer on the donor the status of a parent for purposes of social security benefits. View "Burns v. Astrue" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court was asked to answer a certified question about whether the Court's discretionary review of a petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches grounds is a decision on the merits when it is accompanied by a written opinion, such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred. The question stemmed from litigation surrounding a probate court's reformation and administration of a charitable religious trust. An association of members of the church and beneficiaries of the trust (the FLDSA) filed a complaint in federal court. Later, the FLDSA filed an extraordinary writ petition in state court asserting claims substantially similar to those in the federal case. The federal court stayed its proceedings. The Utah Supreme Court held that the FLDSA's claims were barred on laches grounds and dismissed the petition. When the federal case reached the court of appeals, the court certified to the Supreme Court its question about Utah preclusion law. The Court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that a decision like the one reached in state court was a decision "on the merits" for res judicata purposes and would preclude a subsequent action on the same claims between the same parties. View "Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Horne" on Justia Law

After Michael G. Kampros's death, Mark Green and Sophie Gibson became trustees of the Michael G. Kampros Family Trust. Willow Rapela, Kampros's daughter and the successor trustee, requested removal of Green and Gibson pursuant to section 75-7-706(2)(d) of the Utah Trust Code. The district court granted her request with respect to Gibson but declined to remove Green. The district court held that Green had more experience and better qualifications than Rapela to manage the Trust's assets. As a result the district court concluded that Green's removal would not serve the best interests of the Trust's beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly concluded that removal of Green did not serve the beneficiaries' best interests; (2) the district court correctly held that Green's personal interests the LLCs in which the Trust also owned interests did not constitute an impermissible conflict of interest because Kampros knew about Green's interests at the time he appointed Green trustee; and (3) the district court permissibly compared Green's and Rapela's experience and qualifications when evaluating whether removal would serve the beneficiaries' best interests. View "Rapela v. Green" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from the probate court's order requiring the State to make an interim payment of the Special Fiduciary's fees incurred in administering the United Effort Plan Trust. The State argued that the probate court abused its discretion and acted contrary to Utah law. The State also challenged the probate court's denial of its motions for reconsideration, extension of time, and contribution. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that the probate court did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to Utah law when it found that justice and equity required the State to make an interim payment to the Special Fiduciary; (2) affirmed the court's grant of the Special Fiduciary's motion for fees; and (3) affirmed the court's denial of the State's other motions. View "Shurtleff v. In re United Effort Plan Trust" on Justia Law

Ira B. Warne executed a partial revocation of and amendment to the Ira B. Warne family protection trust, the purpose of which was to terminate the interest of one of Ira's sons, Thomas Warne, who had been designated as a beneficiary in the original trust instrument. On summary judgment, the district court (1) invalidated the partial revocation based on the Supreme Court's holding in Bans v. Means; and (2) held that Thomas was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate pursuant to the distribution provisions of Ira's will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the partial revocation complied with Utah Code 75-7-605, which statutorily overruled the holding in Banks; and (2) the distribution of Ira's personal property was governed by the terms of the trust, rather than by Ira's will, and therefore the district court erred in awarding Thomas one-half of that property. Remanded for consideration of whether Ira's partial revocation was a product of undue influence. View "Warne v. Warne" on Justia Law

Ira Warne executed a partial revocation of and amendment to the Ira Warne Family Protection Trust, the purpose of which was to terminate the interest of one of Ira's sons, Tom Warne, who had been designated as a beneficiary in the original trust instrument. On summary judgment, the district court (1) invalidated the partial revocation based on the Supreme Court's holding in Banks v. Means, and (2) held that Tom was entitled to one-half of the personal property of Ira's estate pursuant to the distribution provisions of Ira's will. The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, holding (1) the partial revocation complied with Utah Code Ann. 75-7-605, which statutorily overruled the Court's holding in Banks; and (2) the distribution of Ira's personal property was governed by the terms of the Trust, rather than by Ira's will, and therefore, Tom was not entitled to one-half of that property. Remanded.

Shortly before she passed away, Darlene Patterson executed an amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust, which removed Darlene's son, Ronald Patterson, as a beneficiary. After Darlene died, Ronald filed a lawsuit against the Trust and Darlene's estate, seeking a declaration that the amendment was void because it violated the terms of the Trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ronald, ruling that the amendment was invalid because it attempted to completely divest Ron of his interest in the Trust without revoking the Trust based on its interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Banks v. Means. The trustee, Randy Patterson, appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Amendment was valid under a provision of the Utah Uniform Trust Code, which statutorily overruled the Court's holding in Banks.

David Pyper hired attorney Justin Bond to represent him in a probate matter. Bond's law firm subsequently sued Pyper to obtain payment of the attorney fees. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the law firm for $10,577. To satisfy the judgment, Bond filed a lien against a house owned by Pyper that was worth approximately $125,000. Bond was the only bidder at the sheriff's sale auctioning Pyper's home and purchased Pyper's home for $329. Pyper later communicated his desire to redeem his property to Dale Dorius, another attorney at the firm, but was unable to speak to Bond after several attempts. After the redemption period expired, the deed to Pyper's home was transferred to Bond. Pyper subsequently filed a petition seeking to set aside the sheriff's sale of his property. The district court set aside the sheriff's sale. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals did not err in (1) concluding that gross inadequacy of price together with slight circumstances of unfairness may justify setting aside a sheriff's sale and (2) affirming the district court's conclusion that Bond and Dorius's conduct created, at least, slight circumstances of unfairness.