Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Chadwick R. Traylor challenged the testamentary trust of his father, Donald R. Traylor, alleging undue influence by the defendants, who were beneficiaries under the trust. Traylor claimed that the defendants manipulated his father into amending the trust to their benefit. The district court, after a bench trial, denied Traylor’s claims and enforced the trust’s no-contest clause against him.The District Court of Natrona County initially set the case for a jury trial but later struck Traylor’s jury demand as untimely. Traylor argued that the demand was timely because not all defendants had answered, but the court disagreed, ruling that the time for serving the demand began when Traylor answered the defendants’ counterclaims. The court also denied Traylor’s subsequent motion for reconsideration and his request for a jury trial under W.R.C.P. 39(b), finding no extraordinary circumstances to justify such relief.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Supreme Court held that Traylor waived his right to a jury trial by failing to timely serve his demand. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Traylor’s Rule 39(b) request for a jury trial. Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that the district court applied the correct burden of proof, requiring Traylor to prove undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that Traylor failed to meet this burden.The Supreme Court also upheld the district court’s enforcement of the no-contest clause against Traylor, interpreting the trust’s language to include him as a beneficiary subject to the clause. Finally, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of costs to the defendants, noting that Traylor did not provide an adequate record for review. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Traylor v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed a lower court's decision, finding that David Spurlock's lawsuit to remove the Wyoming Trust Company as the trustee of the C.E. Spurlock Revocable Trust did not trigger the trust's no-contest clause, which would have resulted in his disinheritance. The court determined that while the trust's no-contest clause expressed a desire to avoid litigation, it did not prohibit all litigation. The court noted that other provisions in the trust specifically authorized a beneficiary to bring certain forms of litigation, and that Spurlock's action was not a challenge to the trust or an attempt to impair the trust's function or operations. The court found that the lawsuit was intended to enforce the trust's provisions related to accountings and instructions for dividing assets and did not seek damages from trust assets or seek to change or delay the asset distribution. Therefore, Spurlock's lawsuit did not violate the no-contest clause. The case was remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Spurlock on the trustee's counterclaim. View "Spurlock v. Wyoming Trust Company" on Justia Law

In Wyoming, Darrell R. Turcato and Robbin D. Wilkins (Appellants) and Jan Frady and Larry Turcato (Petitioners) were beneficiaries of two trusts created by their parents. The Appellants sought to appeal the district court's decision that a warranty deed executed by the Trusts transferring property to them was invalid due to a defective acknowledgment. The property in question was a house, which was held 50% by the JT Trust and 50% by the VT Trust. The mother, Virginia Turcato, decided to transfer the house to the Appellants in recognition of their assistance. However, her signature was notarized outside her presence. After her death, the Petitioners sought a declaration that the transfer was invalid due to the defective acknowledgment. The district court determined that the Petitioners, as beneficiaries of the trusts, had an interest in the property when the deed was executed and therefore declared the warranty deed void against them.The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision. The Court held that a defective acknowledgment does not render a warranty deed void ab initio under Wyoming law. It found that when the parties signed the Warranty Deed, title immediately passed to Appellants, and that title was valid against all but certain parties. The Court also held that the Petitioners did not have an interest in the property at the time of the transfer and therefore had no standing to challenge the Warranty Deed. The Court concluded that the Warranty Deed is valid between the Trusts and the Appellants, and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal. View "Turcato v. Frady" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision to grant Mrs. Tokowitz the right to a spousal election against her late husband's will. The late Mr. Tokowitz had left his estate to a revocable trust and made no provision for Mrs. Tokowitz in his will. The court held that Mrs. Tokowitz was not deprived of her spousal election right simply because her husband's property was transferred to his trust through a pour-over will. The court reasoned that property transferred by a pour-over will is part of the decedent's probate estate until the will is probated. Only after probate does it pass in accordance with section 2-6-103 to the trust to be distributed by the trust terms. The court also found that Mr. Tokowitz was domiciled in Wyoming at the time of his death, as evidenced by his will, making Mrs. Tokowitz eligible for the spousal election under Wyoming law. The court declined to rule on Mrs. Tokowitz's rights as a beneficiary under the trust, stating that issues relating to the trust were outside of its jurisdiction. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Tokowitz v. Tokowi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Shelby Hughes and her law firm, Barney & Graham, LLC, (collectively, Defendants) in the underlying legal malpractice lawsuit, holding that the district court did not err.Michael and Charlene Schlegel were in the process of divorcing when Michael died intestate. Because Charlene inherited portions of Michael's estate that she would not have had the divorce been finalized before Michael died Taran Schlegal, Michael's son, sued Defendants for legal malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding that no duty was owed to Taran where there was no evidence that Taran was an intended beneficiary of Defendants' services. View "Schlegel v. Barney & Graham, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of Jacqueline Moncur and Rosemary Kinniburgh, co-trustees of the J. Kent Kinniburgh Revocable Trust, in this lawsuit brought by Janel Kinniburgh, one of the beneficiaries of the Trust, holding that the district court did not err.Janel, one of the trustees of the Trust, brought this action against her sisters, alleging that they breached certain fiduciary duties. The district court ruled in favor of the Trustees on most claims, concluding that the Trustees breached their duties of loyalty and impartiality but finding that Janel failed prove damages resulting from that breach. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) erred when it found that the Trustees did not breach their duty to inform and report, but Janel failed to show that the Trust sustained damages; (2) did not err in concluding that the Trustees did not breach their duties of impartiality or prudent administration; and (3) did not err in deciding not to award attorney fees, monetary damages, or remove the Trustees. View "Kinniburgh v. Moncur" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed in part and reversed in part the orders of the probate court and district court in these probate and partition matters, holding that remand was required.Dwight and Betty Lyman, as Trustees of their living trust (Lyman Trust), owned a parcel of property as tenants in common with George Fisher and another parcel in common with George's deceased parents. George sold his parents' interests in the two parcels to the Childs Trust. Lyman Trust filed a petition in the district court seeking to partition the parcels and filed a motion in the probate court seeking to set aside the sale. The probate court denied the motion, and the district court dismissed the partition petition without prejudice for failure to join Childs Trust as a required party. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed Lyman Trust's appeal of the probate court's actions, holding that Lyman Trust lacked standing in the Fisher probate action; and (2) reversed the district court's judgment dismissing Lyman Trust's partition action, holding that the court erred by dismissing the action rather than ordering the joinder of Childs Trust, and dismissal was not harmless. View "Lyman v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting partial summary judgment to the Estate of Gale Iverson (the Estate) on its real property claims against Cherie Davidson-Eaton (Eaton), Mr. Iverson's caregiver, and ordering Eaton to, among other things, provide the Estate with an accounting, holding that there was no error.The Estate filed an action for an accounting and sought to recover property it alleged Eaton unlawfully transferred to herself. In response, Eaton filed a creditor's claim against the Estate, alleging that she had a right to compensation for services she rendered to Mr. Iverson while he was living. The district court consolidated the lawsuits, granted partial summary judgment to the Estate on its real property claims, denied Eaton's claims, found the Estate was entitled to lost rents and profits, and ordered Eaton to provide the Estate with an accounting. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law. View "Davidson-Eaton v. Iversen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the probate court denying the motion for an order to show cause filed by Cynthia Soames, the personal representative of her brother's estate, against Dick Gifford, the estate's previous personal representative, holding that the probate court did not err.In her motion, Soames argued that certain items went missing from the estate while Gifford was personal representative and requesting that Gifford account for those items. The probate court denied the motion after a hearing, thus declining to hold Gifford in contempt, finding that Gifford's testimony was credible and that Soames did not meet her burden of proving that Gifford took and failed to return the items. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err when it determined that Gifford's testimony was credible. View "Soares v. Gifford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to Michael McDill on his request that the district court confirm that his brother, Thomas McDill, was excluded as a beneficiary under their deceased mother's trust and dismissing Thomas's counterclaims, holding that there was no error.Michael, as a trustee of the trust, filed a petition for instructions asking the district court to confirm that Thomas was disinherited from taking under the trust because he violated the trust's no-contest provision. In response, Thomas asserted various counterclaims and requested that Michael be removed as trustee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Michael, dismissed Thomas's counterclaims, and denied Thomas's motion to amend. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the district court's judgment. View "McDill v. McDill" on Justia Law