Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s declaratory judgment claim challenging a codicil to Patricia Ann Britain’s will, holding that Appellant’s challenges to the codicil could not be brought through a declaratory judgment action.Appellant, the personal representative of Patricia’s estate, brought this action alleging that Patricia was not competent to execute the codicil at issue because she did not have the capacity to execute the codicil or acted under undue influence. The district court dismissed the declaratory judgment action, concluding that the personal representative of an estate was not entitled to maintain a declaratory judgment action to challenge a will codicil on the grounds that the testator lacked capacity and/or was unduly influenced. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed the action because a will contest is the exclusive method of testing the validity of a will when there are questions about the testator’s competence or questions about undue influence. View "Britain v. Britain" on Justia Law

Appellants, adult children of Decedent, who died in 2010 of mesothelioma allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos in brakes he purchased from Pep Boys, an automotive parts retailer, brought claims for wrongful death, strict liability, and negligence. The trial court rejected appellants’ wrongful death claims as untimely and a claim for punitive damages. The court awarded $213,052 as economic damages but found that amount was entirely offset by settlements with other parties. The court of appeal reversed in part, agreeing that the trial court erred in failing to award damages for the costs of providing home health services to Decedent and his wife and erred in awarding Pep Boys expert fees under section 998. The court rejected claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Pep Boys to amend its answer to correct a previously-asserted statute of limitations defense; erred in granting Pep Boys’ motion for judgment under section 631.8; and erred in applying offsets to the award of economic damages based on prior settlements without allocating between estate claims and wrongful death claims. Damages recoverable in a survival action brought by a decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest are limited to damages that the decedent incurred before death and do not include “ ‘lost years’ damages” that would have been incurred had the decedent survived. View "Williams v. The Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California" on Justia Law

The chancery court examined the principles underlying quantum meruit and found that Vincent Castigliola and David Kiyhet, attorneys for the estate of Dane Eubanks, should have been awarded attorneys’ fees from two minors out of a settlement they, and only they, obtained. After remand from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the chancery court again heard arguments as to whether Castigliola and Kiyhet should be awarded attorneys’ fees from the two minors based on quantum meruit out of the settlement they obtained. The remand required that the chancery court make specific findings of fact. This time, without making any findings of fact and without any contradictory evidence being introduced, the chancery court reversed course and found that the factors for quantum meruit were not met. Because the chancery court failed to follow remand instructions by failing to make findings of fact, and, because no contradictory evidence was adduced suggesting the factors for quantum meruit were suddenly not met, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a further determination of attorneys’ fees. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dane Richard Eubanks, Deceased" on Justia Law

Brian Cole was killed in a motor vehicle accident in 2001. Brian Cole’s Estate had a court-approved contingency fee contract with Eugene Tullos, and only Eugene Tullos, to represent the Estate in wrongful death litigation. The Ferrell Group claimed this contract rendered it an interested party entitled to notice of the Estate’s final accounting under Mississippi Code Section 91-7-295. The trial court found that the Ferrell Group was not an interested party pursuant to the notice statute. Because the Ferrell Group did not probate a claim or have a contract with the Estate, or otherwise show a direct pecuniary interest in the Estate, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Brian K. Cole, Deceased" on Justia Law

Petitioner-appellant Christine Davidson was the court-appointed conservator of the person and estate of Lorraine Presha from 2009 to 2015. Presha died in March 2015. In June 2015, Davidson filed a combined petition for: (1) approval of the sixth and final accounting, and (2) conservator’s fees. Davidson sought conservator’s fees in the amount of $12,621.60. The probate court ordered conservator’s fees in the amount of $7,000. Davidson contended on appeal that the trial court erred by: (1) examining Davidson’s billing practices; (2) utilizing its finding that Davidson’s billing practices were improper when ruling upon Davidson’s petition for compensation; (3) vitiating the finality of prior cases for which Davidson served as the conservator; and (4) not utilizing the enumerated factors when ruling on her petition for compensation. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Conservatorship of Presha" on Justia Law

After trial, the probate court approved, subject to a $93,036.75 surcharge, the first and final account and report of trustee (First Report), filed by Melodie Scott, trustee of The A’Yana McDonald Special Needs Trust (the trust). The Beneficiary, through court-appointed counsel, objected to the First Report and to the petition for settlement and termination of the trust, alleging the trustee failed to file court-mandated reports, had no supporting records for fees paid to the trustee, and that the money was not spent solely for her benefit. Beneficiary requested that Trustee be surcharged $259,309.38 for missing interest payments and for improper disbursements. The court found the beneficiary proved the trustee expended various funds without sufficient care or justification, and without reference to the text or purpose of the trust; "and once that money is gone, of course legal damages result.” The trustee raised three issues on appeal: (1) the probate court did not apply the correct legal standard (without specifying what was incorrect); (2) the trustee asserted substantial evidence does not support the finding of breach; and (3) the trustee contended the probate court erred by denying compensation for Trustee’s services. The Court of Appeal found that "given Trustee’s mismanagement of the trust estate, failure to make the required court filings, and continued service when she lacked a license, the probate court could reasonably conclude that Trustee was not entitled to compensation because any compensation for the service rendered would be inequitable due to Trustee’s multiple failures in administering the trust." The total amount of the surcharge was modified to $92,036.75. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Scott v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Cortese is the daughter of Francesca, and the stepdaughter of Robert. Attorney Sherwood handled their legal matters under Robert’s direction. Cortese alleges Robert promised her that, upon his death, “he would treat her equally as his other children.” Sherwood drafted Francesca’s will and represented Robert as executor during the administration of Francesca’s estate after Francesca’s 1997 death. Robert was worth $2 billion; Francesca’s estate was valued at $2 million. Robert became the trustee and life beneficiary of Francesca’s trust. Cortese and her sister were remainder beneficiaries. “Relying on Robert’s promises and [Sherwood]’s representations, [Cortese] did not challenge Robert’s acts as executor.” In 2008, “in reliance on promises,” by Sherwood and Robert, Cortese “reluctantly agreed to terminate the Trust … without the advice of counsel.” Cortese alleges the termination favored Robert, causing Cortese and her sister to bear unnecessary capital gains tax. After Robert’s 2016 death, Cortese was not a beneficiary of Robert’s estate. Cortese alleged breach of fiduciary duty against Sherwood and Topham, as co-trustees of Robert’s trust; third-party liability for breach of trust against Sherwood; and return of trust property against both. The court dismissed the second claim against Sherwood, apparently for failure to comply with Civil Code 1714.10: A party must establish a reasonable probability of prevailing before pursuing a “cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his ... client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.” The court of appeal agreed. Cortese alleged Sherwood conspired with Robert and induced her to forego challenges to Robert’s actions--conduct arising from the compromise of a dispute. No statutory exceptions apply. View "Cortese v. Sherwood" on Justia Law

Philadelphia police officers shot and killed Purnell, who died intestate. Purnell’s minor daughter is the sole beneficiary of the estate. Murray, Purnell’s mother, hired an attorney and obtained letters of administration to act on behalf of her son’s estate. Murray filed a lawsuit on behalf of the estate alleging excessive force against the city and the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment but allowed her claims against the officers to proceed to a jury trial. The officers' defense was that they had used deadly force in self-defense. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the officers. Murray filed a pro se notice of appeal. The Third Circuit ordered the pro bono appointment of amicus curiae to address whether Murray may proceed pro se on behalf of Purnell’s estate. Under 28 U.S.C. 1654, “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel” in the federal courts. Although an individual may represent herself pro se, a non-attorney may not represent other parties in federal court. The Third Circuit then dismissed Murray’s appeal: a non-attorney who is not a beneficiary of the estate may not conduct a case pro se on behalf of the estate. View "Murray v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

A log truck driven by Royce Sullivan collided with the rear of an automobile being driven by Harry Schroeder, who had just pulled his car onto a highway in Lowndes County, Mississippi. Harry died as a result of the accident, and his wife, Helen (a passenger in her husband’s car) suffered severe injuries, permanent disability, and diminished capacity. Helen, individually, and as one of Harry’s wrongful-death beneficiaries, sued Sullivan in federal court, alleging that Sullivan’s negligence had caused Harry’s death and her permanent disability. Sullivan moved for summary judgment at the close of discovery, arguing that the uncontradicted evidence established Harry’s negligence as the sole cause of the accident. In denying summary judgment, the federal judge stated that the evidence created a jury question as to Sullivan’s fault, and that “plaintiffs do not appear to dispute Harry Schroeder’s potential contributory negligence.” The parties settled and agreed to a release of claims, and the district court dismissed the case. Following the settlement agreement, release, and subsequent dismissal of the action against Sullivan, Helen filed suit against Harry in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, alleging Harry negligently had failed to yield the right of way and pulled in front of Sullivan’s log truck at an extremely slow rate of speed, causing the accident which resulted in Helen’s permanent disability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Harry and found that Helen was judicially estopped from bringing a claim against Harry. Helen appealed that order. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the release agreement between Helen and Sullivan because Harry was not a signatory to it. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law

Kenneth M. (Matazo) and Kazu Tagami were grantors of the Trust. Matazo and Kazu had three children: Kenneth K., Barbara, and Charles. A family dispute arose when the settlors suspected the prior trustee, who was Barbara's son, of embezzling funds from the Trust. Matazo and Kazu removed the prior trustee and appointed professional fiduciary Claudia Powell as trustee. Attorney Nancy Ewin drafted the restatement of the Trust; Powell hired attorney Kent Thompson to represent her in her fiduciary capacity as trustee of the Trust. A physician certified in March 2012 that Kazu was unable to make her own financial and medical decisions due to medical issues. Matazo died in August 2012. Kazu died almost three years later, in June 2015. Charles challenged two probate orders: (1) settling, allowing and approving the third and final predeath account and report of trustee (Third Account) and finding Charles objected to the Third Account without reasonable cause and in bad faith, which justified an award of costs and fees pursuant to Probate Code section 17211 (a); and (2) an award of attorney fees pursuant to Probate Code 17211 requiring Charles to pay these fees from his share of the Tagami Living Trust or personally if his share was inadequate. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Charles' contentions in both appeals and affirmed the Probate Court's orders. View "Powell v. Tagami" on Justia Law