Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Charlotte Harbin appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Glenn Estess, Jr., as personal representative of the estate of Lecil V. Thomas; Richard Thomas; and Roger Thomas. Lecil and Tommie Thomas were married and had three children, one of whom predeceased them. They had two surviving sons, Richard and Roger. Lecil executed a will in 1995, and executed a codicil to that will in 2003. Tommie died in 2005. Lecil executed a second codicil to his will in 2008. According to Harbin, she and Lecil started dating after Tommie's death. She also asserted that they lived together off and on until September 2009, when, she says, they started living together as husband and wife. Lecil died in 2013. On May 30, 2013, Estess filed a petition for probate of Lecil's will, listing Harbin as Lecil's "putative common-law wife." The probate court admitted the will to probate and granted Estess letters testamentary. In 2014, Harbin filed a petition seeking an omitted spouse's share of Lecil's estate, asserting she was Lecil's common-law wife at the time of his death and that she had become Lecil's common-law wife after he had executed the will that had been admitted to probate. Estess filed an objection to Harbin's petition, and later, after the matter was removed to circuit court, Estess filed a renewed objection to Harbin's petition seeking a share as an omitted spouse. Richard and Roger Thomas intervened, seeking a judgment to declare Harbin was not Lecil's common-law wife at the time of his death, thus not making her an omitted spouse entitled to a share of Lecil's estate. The circuit found Harbin's claim time barred; she appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the statute controlling Harbin's omitted spouse's share of the estate, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harbin v. Estess" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a conservation restriction imposed in 2013 on a property owned by the Frank Sawyer Revocable Trust restarted the 12-year statute of limitations of the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, so that NE 32nd Street, LLC, as agent for the trust, can sue to extinguish a spoilage easement granted to the federal government in 1938. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint and held that the statute of limitations barred a challenge to the 80 year old easement and the 2013 permit did not change the terms of that easement to the detriment of the trust. View "NE 32nd Street, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

A man asserted in a probate proceeding that he was the decedent’s son and requested a paternity determination. The personal representative opposed the request, arguing that a paternity determination could not be made in a probate proceeding and that this particular paternity determination was barred by a statute of limitations. The superior court agreed that probate proceedings were not appropriate for paternity determinations and rejected the man’s request, but it did not rule on the statute of limitations issue. The court later determined that the man was not an interested person to the probate proceeding and barred him from further participation. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court disagreed a probate hearing was not appropriate for a paternity determination, and a request for one during a probate proceeding was not barred by any statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court reversed the probate court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate of Seward" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court admitting a will to probate, holding that the trial court properly admitted testimony to refute the claim that the will was fraudulent and did not err in declining to adopt a novel and more rigorous standard for admitting a will to probate.On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in considering testimony to establish the testamentary nature of the document proffered for probate and erred in failing to require the proponent of the will to authenticate all three pages of the document. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the trial court properly considered the challenged testimony to establish that the first two unsigned pages of the will were entirely consistent with the testator’s stated testamentary intentions and to refuse the assertion that they were not part of his original will; and (2) the will was properly authenticated. View "Canody v. Hamblin" on Justia Law

Johnston Land Company, LLC, appeals from an order denying its petition to invalidate an alleged lien filed by attorney Sara Sorenson in the form of an affidavit regarding property in Grand Forks County, North Dakota. A dispute over excessive attorney fees led to this case. John Widdel, Jr., represented the trustees of the Donald G. Amundson Trust. In 2013 beneficiaries of the estate petitioned for court determination of attorney fees. The district court ordered Widdell to refund $95,000.00 in attorney fees. During litigation over the fees, Widdel's family's limited liability partnership, Bell Fire LLP, transferred property to a revocable living trust in the name of his wife. In a deposition related to the debt Widdel testified he had essentially no assets, lived rent-free in an apartment owned by the Widdel trust, and drove a car owned by his wife. The Widdel trust sought to sell the property at issue to Johnston, which had offices on the property. Beneficiaries of the Amundson trust filed suit in 2017 regarding other allegedly fraudulent transfers by Widdel to avoid paying the judgment. Ohnstad Twichell, P.C., and Sorenson represented the beneficiaries of Amundson's estate. The district court concluded Sorenson's affidavit was not a nonconsensual common-law lien under N.D.C.C. 35-01-02 because it "does not claim an interest in the subject property; it is merely a statement to the world, akin to a lis pendens, that the referenced property may be pursued to satisfy the Judgment." The district court did not rule on Johnston's additional issues, writing, "In the instant action, this Court has only been asked to make a determination whether the Affidavit of Sara K. Sorenson is a nonconsensual common-law lien, which it has done." The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed as to the affidavit's nature, reversed as to remaining issues and remanded for additional proceedings. View "Johnston Land Company, LLC v. Sorenson" on Justia Law

In this matter concerning the administration of the Henry B. Wilson, Jr., Revocable Trust Dated June 27, 2002 the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the order of the county court to have removed the cotrustees of the subtrust of Lou Ann Goding, Henry’s daughter.Lou Ann filed this suit alleging mismanagement of Henry’s trust. The county court, after a trial, removed the cotrustees of Henry’s trust. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no error in need of correction, interpreting the county court’s order to have removed the cotrustees of Lou Ann’s subtrust. Although the Supreme Court’s reasoning differed from that of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals erred in interpreting the county court’s order to have removed the cotrustees of the subtrusts; but (2) because the Court of Appeals did not remove the cotrustees of Lou Ann’s subtrust de novo, instead finding no error in need of correction, this Court’s ultimate conclusion that the county court did not err is the same. View "In re Henry B. Wilson, Jr., Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing the claims brought by a trust’s grantors and beneficiaries for constructive trusts against other parties who had dealt with the trustee, holding that the claims failed either for lack of proof or because of Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-38,101.The district court dismissed the case after finding that the defendants were all entitled to protection under 30-38,101, which protects third parties dealing in good faith with a trustee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the claims for a constructive trust against the defendants in this case. View "Junker v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Decedent and objector were married for 32 years. Petitioners are decedent’s sons from a prior relationship. In 1993, decedent and objector secured a joint term life insurance policy, naming objector as the primary beneficiary, with petitioners as contingent beneficiaries. In 2013, decedent executed a will. A 2014 final judgment dissolved decedent’s marriage to objector, awarding decedent full ownership of the Policy. In 2016, decedent executed a handwritten codicil, stating that he did not want objector “inheriting anything from [him] under any circumstances by beneficiary designation or otherwise.” At the time of his death, objector remained as the primary beneficiary of the Policy. Petitioners sought to be designated as the rightful beneficiaries of the Policy under Probate Code sections 50401 and 9611. The probate court ordered payment to the petitioners. The court of appeal reversed. The jurisdiction of the probate court may not be invoked where the only relevant alleged assets of the estate are alleged to be the proceeds of a life insurance policy, the beneficiary of which is not the estate. View "Estate of Post" on Justia Law

There is no cause of action in Texas for intentional interference with an inheritance.Richard Archer and Richard’s six children (the Archers) brought this action against Ted Anderson’s estate for intentional interference with their inheritance, alleging that Anderson influenced Jack Archer to disinherit them. The jury found in favor of the Archers. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court has never recognized tortious interference with inheritance as a cause of action in Texas and deferred to the Supreme Court to decide whether to do so. The court then reversed and rendered judgment for Anderson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tort of interference with inheritance is not recognized in Texas. View "Archer v. Anderson" on Justia Law

There is no cause of action in Texas for intentional interference with an inheritance.Richard Archer and Richard’s six children (the Archers) brought this action against Ted Anderson’s estate for intentional interference with their inheritance, alleging that Anderson influenced Jack Archer to disinherit them. The jury found in favor of the Archers. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the Supreme Court has never recognized tortious interference with inheritance as a cause of action in Texas and deferred to the Supreme Court to decide whether to do so. The court then reversed and rendered judgment for Anderson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tort of interference with inheritance is not recognized in Texas. View "Archer v. Anderson" on Justia Law