Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over the estate of Dr. Lester Frank Sumrall, who founded a church that grew into a global evangelical empire, LeSEA, Inc. After his death, his son and grandson, Lester Sumrall, claimed they should have inherited part of his estate, including copyrights to his works and his right of publicity. They alleged that LeSEA, now controlled by other family members, had wrongfully taken ownership of these assets.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court dismissed the claims brought by Lester Sumrall and the Lester Sumrall Family Trust against LeSEA and its affiliates, ruling in favor of LeSEA on all counts. The court found that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to a particular photograph, the "Traveler Photo," taken by Lester Sumrall. The court also dismissed various state law claims for damages under the doctrine of laches, citing inexcusable delay in asserting rights and prejudice to the adverse party.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to the Traveler Photo. The court also upheld the application of laches to the state law claims, noting that laches is equally applicable in suits at law in Indiana. Finally, the court dismissed the claim for LeSEA's alleged use of Dr. Sumrall's right of publicity, as the Trust failed to plead the required half-ownership. View "Sumrall v. LeSEA, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Charles Williamson was injured when he was hit by a car and applied for PIP benefits from the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF), which operates the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP). The MAIPF assigned Williamson’s claim to AAA, but AAA refused to pay. After Williamson's death, his daughters, Porsha Williamson and Lateshea Williamson, continued the lawsuit as co-personal representatives of his estate. The Estate claimed benefits for attendant care that was purported to have been provided after Charles Williamson’s death. AAA moved for summary disposition, arguing that the Estate knowingly presented material misrepresentations in support of its claim for no-fault benefits and was therefore barred from recovering all no-fault benefits.The trial court granted AAA’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Court of Appeals held that statements made during discovery cannot constitute fraudulent insurance acts under the no-fault act. AAA then applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that false statements submitted during discovery, after a lawsuit for recovery has been filed, may be statements offered in support of a claim to the MAIPF or the assigned insurer. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that only prelitigation statements can constitute statements in support of a claim under MCL 500.3173a(4). The court concluded that the Estate’s interrogatory answers, which indicated that the Estate sought no-fault benefits for services rendered after Williamson passed away, were in support of a demand for coverage under the MACP based on bodily injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate Of Williamson v. AAA Of Michigan" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the validity of a will. Robert Harrison Ashworth, the deceased, had four children: Christine, Gwendolyn, Brian, and Kimberly. In 2017, Ashworth, who was in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease, executed a will that divided his estate evenly among his four children and named his son, Brian, as the estate's personal representative. However, in 2022, Ashworth executed a new will that named Christine as the personal representative and included only Christine and Gwendolyn as beneficiaries, excluding Brian and Kimberly from any inheritance. After Ashworth's death, Christine submitted the 2022 will for probate. Brian contested its validity and sought access to medical records from the last eight years of Ashworth's life, arguing that the records would shed light on Ashworth's decision-making capacity at the time he executed his final will. Christine, however, refused to provide any medical records, citing the physician-patient privilege.The trial court ordered Christine to provide the medical records for an in camera review, stating that the court would not release any records unrelated to the mental capacity of the decedent. Christine petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for relief from the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the physician-patient privilege survives the privilege holder's death, but the testamentary exception provides for disclosure of the decedent's privileged medical records if they are required to administer the estate. The court discharged the rule to show cause and lifted the stay on the trial court's in camera review of Ashworth's medical records. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Ashworth" on Justia Law

The case involves the trustees of the Stanley and Sandra Goldberg Trusts, C. Leon Nelson and Marilynn Tetrick, who hired legal counsel to assist them in their duties. The same attorneys later defended them in a lawsuit brought by several beneficiaries of the trusts. The jury found that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties, and the district court entered a judgment against them, most of which was payable to the trusts. The court then removed the trustees and appointed successor trustees. The former trustees, still represented by the same attorneys, asked the court to reduce the amount of the judgment against them. The successor trustees moved to disqualify the former trustees’ attorneys, arguing that a conflict had surfaced under rule 1.9(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The district court agreed and disqualified the attorneys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that an attorney-client relationship does not automatically arise merely because an attorney represents a trustee. In this case, the attorneys represented the former trustees only, not the trusts, which were not named in the suit. Thus, because the attorneys never represented the trusts in the litigation, rule 1.9(a) does not prevent the attorneys from continuing to represent the former trustees. View "In re Estate of Goldberg" on Justia Law

This case involves a conservatorship dispute over Susan Davis Malone. Two attorneys involved in the case filed two motions requesting the trial judge to recuse himself. The first recusal motion was denied and affirmed on appeal. The second recusal motion was also denied. The attorneys then filed a second petition for recusal appeal, arguing that trial court orders entered after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the first recusal appeal, but before the mandate issued, are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Court of Appeals agreed with the attorneys and held that the orders were void. The counterpetitioners and co-conservators then filed an accelerated application for permission to appeal in the Supreme Court of Tennessee.The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted the application and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals in the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court also held that the attorneys waived any other argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. View "In Re Conservatorship of Malone" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a Major Land Use Permit issued to Susan Dietz, individually and as Trustee of G&M Trust (G&M), by Flathead County, Montana. G&M had purchased two adjacent 11.5-acre tracts on the shore of Lake Five and began several remodeling, demolition, and construction projects on both tracts. G&M received notices of multiple violations from both the Department of Environmental Quality and Flathead County, advising that these new structures violated local zoning regulations. G&M then submitted an application proposing new structures for short-term/vacation nightly rentals. The application was initially accepted by the County, who issued a Major Land Use Permit, later voided by the District Court.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, voided the Major Land Use Permit issued to G&M, permanently enjoined all future construction or expansion of use or conversion of G&M’s property to any commercial use without first obtaining legal access and complying with all State and local statutes and regulations, ordered restoration of G&M’s property to its previously unaltered condition, and awarded attorney fees and costs to Friends of Lake Five, Inc. (FLF).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the District Court's decision to void the Major Land Use Permit and its award of attorney fees and grant of permanent injunction. However, it reversed the District Court's requirement that G&M restore the property to its previous unaltered condition outside of the lakeshore zone. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Friends of Lake 5 v. County Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mabel Amos Memorial Fund, a charitable trust established to provide financial assistance to beneficiaries seeking higher education. The plaintiffs, Megan Carmack and Leigh Gulley Manning, individually and on behalf of Carmack's minor children, and Tyra Lindsey, a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, alleged that the trustee and board members of the trust breached their fiduciary duties. They sought to remove the trustee and board members, appoint new ones, and restore the allegedly misappropriated assets of the trust. The Montgomery Circuit Court appointed a special master under Rule 53, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Attorney General Steve Marshall, who was added as a party to the underlying actions, petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order appointing a special master.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Marshall's petitions and ordered the circuit court to vacate its order referring the cases to a special master. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in referring all matters in these cases to a special master. The court noted that the referral of matters to be tried without a jury did not indicate that an "exceptional condition" necessitated the referral, and the referral of the accounting did not indicate that the accounting would prove complicated in some way. Even if the accounting was properly referred to a special master, the referral of an accounting does not justify the referral of all the other matters in the cases. View "Ex parte Marshall" on Justia Law

Nella Ruth Braswell passed away in 2014, leaving behind an estate valued at over $2,000,000, 6 cats, and 13 dogs. In her will, she provided for the care of her animals until their death, with the remaining funds to be given to The Humane Society of the United States. The Jefferson Probate Court accepted her will and appointed Marion Kristen McLeroy as the personal representative of the estate. However, The Humane Society became dissatisfied with McLeroy's management of the estate and had the estate proceeding removed from the probate court to the Jefferson Circuit Court. McLeroy objected to this move, but the circuit court refused to relinquish the case.The Humane Society and McLeroy had a working relationship initially, but it deteriorated over time. The Humane Society requested deeds to all the property Braswell had owned, as well as a formal accounting of both the estate and the Animal Trust. The Humane Society also asked the circuit court to remove McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of the Animal Trust and to order them to reimburse the Animal Trust for any losses caused by their alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that once a probate court begins the final-settlement process for an estate, a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the administration of that estate. Therefore, when the probate court began the final-settlement process for Braswell's estate, the Humane Society's right to remove the proceeding to the circuit court was cut off. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted McLeroy's petition and issued a writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order consolidating the estate proceeding with the Humane Society's other action against McLeroy and her husband and to enter an order remanding the administration of Braswell's estate to the probate court. View "Ex parte McLeroy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the estate of Merle Almer, who passed away in 2016. Almer owned a construction business and a farm, and his will named his daughter, Linda Moe, as the personal representative. The will contained bequests to various individuals, including a life estate in the farm and farming assets to Casey Almer, Merle Almer's grandson. The will also directed the personal representative to use harvested and unharvested grain to pay costs of administration and taxes for the estate. However, at the time of Merle Almer's death, the grain discovered in his grain bins was less than expected, leading to a dispute between the personal representative and Casey Almer.The dispute led to a lawsuit, where the personal representative accused Almer of conversion of grain and other farm assets. Almer counterclaimed with allegations of conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. The counterclaims were dismissed, and a jury found that Almer did not convert property. Almer then filed a petition alleging that the personal representative breached her fiduciary duties. The district court heard testimony and took evidence over five days.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the personal representative did not breach her fiduciary duties while administering the estate. The court also found that the will's abatement provisions were ambiguous due to the will's nonstandard use of the term "specific devise." The court made findings concerning the testator's intent based on testimony from the attorney who prepared the will. The court denied Almer's application for surcharge, granted the personal representative's motion to approve final distribution, and approved approximately $760,000 in attorney’s fees. Almer appealed, challenging the court's interpretation of the will, the court’s findings concerning the personal representative’s conduct during administration, and the court’s approval of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Estate of Almer" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the will of Richard D. Janssen, who had six children: Dean, Sheryl, Debra, Jeff, Larry, and Gary. Richard and his wife Melva owned three parcels of farmland, which they held as tenants-in-common. Over the years, they executed several "mirror image" wills, with the final one in 2014 leaving the farmland to Larry and Gary, $60,000 each to Dean, Jeff, and Debra, and nothing to Sheryl. After Melva's death in 2017, Richard, upset about the terms of his 2014 will, drafted a new will in 2018 with the help of his daughter Sheryl. This will left his one-half interest in each of the farm properties to Debra and Sheryl, and the remainder of his estate would be equally divided between Larry, Gary, Sheryl, and Debra. Richard passed away in June 2018.After Richard's 2018 will was admitted to probate, Dean, Larry, Gary, and Jeff filed a petition for will contest against Sheryl, Debra, and Security National Bank, seeking to set aside Richard’s 2018 will based on lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence exercised by their sisters. The first trial ended in a hung jury. Before the second trial, Gary and Larry sought dismissal of all claims against Debra. The second trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Larry and Gary, concluding that Sheryl had unduly influenced Richard in drafting his 2018 will and that her tortious interference caused actual damages to Larry and Gary in the amount of $480,000.After the verdict, the district court granted Sheryl’s posttrial motion to dismiss for lack of an indispensable party (Debra), ordering a new trial instead of dismissal. Larry and Gary appealed this decision, arguing that Debra's dismissal did not entitle Sheryl to a new trial where section 633.312’s joinder requirement was satisfied.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision, holding that when a party, once joined and actively participating in a will contest, affirmatively agrees to be dismissed from the lawsuit without objection from any other party, section 633.312 has been satisfied and does not prevent their dismissal. The court remanded the case for the district court to address any unresolved issues in the pending posttrial motions and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Janssen v. The Security National Bank of Sioux City" on Justia Law