Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This interlocutory appeal arose from a 2010 civil suit filed by Carol Clement against Russell Puckett. After Puckett’s death in 2014, Clement substituted the Estate of Russell Puckett (the “Estate”) as the defendant in the suit and served the Estate. The Estate moved to dismiss the suit due to failure to timely serve process under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The Estate argued that the statute of limitations had expired before Clement perfected service. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Estate appealed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Because the trial court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the Estate. View "Estate of Russell Puckett v. Clement" on Justia Law

This case involved the issue of whether and to what extent superior courts have authority to intervene in the administration of nonintervention estates. Todd Rathbone was named personal representative of his mother's estate in her nonintervention will. Glen Rathbone, Todd's' brother and beneficiary of the will, took issue with Todd's administration of the estate and filed a petition requesting an accountancy under RCW 11.68.110. He then filed an action under chapter 11.96A RCW, the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), requesting the trial court construe the will in his favor. The trial court held it had the authority to construe the will under RCW 11.68.070 and, in the alternative, TEDRA itself gave the trial court authority to construe the will. The court ruled in favor of Glen's construction of the will and overrode the interpretation of Todd. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the trial court had authority to construe the will but on the separate basis that Glen had invoked authority under RCW 11.68.110 when he filed his petition for an accounting. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutory provisions under TEDRA did not give the trial court authority to construe the will in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the authority invoked under the nonintervention statutes, such as RCW 11.68.110 and .070, was limited to resolving issues provided under each statute. View "In re Estate of Rathbone" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court ruling that an option agreement was void and ordering Wayne Snaza, as trustee of the Dennis Snaza Family Trust, to distribute the net income and residue of the principle of the trust to the beneficiaries upon completion of its term.Wayne gave notice of his intent to exercise his rights under the option agreement to purchase the real property held by the Trust. The circuit court concluded that the option agreement was void because it could not survive the contemporaneous execution of deeds to the same real property, and even if the option agreement was valid, Wayne waived his rights when the real property was transferred to the Trust. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Wayne presented no evidence to rebut the presumption that the property was already conveyed before the option agreement became effective, the circuit court did not err in finding the option agreement invalid; and (2) the circuit court did not violate Wayne’s due-process rights or abuse its discretion by ordering Wayne to distribute the Trust at the conclusion of its term and in accordance with the Trust instrument. View "In re Dennis Snaza Family Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court compelling Defendant to return real property transferred to him by his late father and the jury verdict requiring Defendant to pay general and punitive damages to his father’s estate but reversed the court’s order requiring Defendant to pay the Estate’s attorney fees.In this case involving the consolidation of both probate and civil actions, the Estate of the decedent argued that Defendant exercised undue influence over the decedent and that Defendant converted the decedent’s property and violated his confidential relationship with the decedent in doing so. The Estate also sought punitive damages for Defendant’s alleged fraudulent behavior. The jury returned a verdict awarding the Estate general and punitive damages. The circuit court then ordered the real property previously transferred to Defendant returned to the Estate. The circuit court also awarded the estate attorney fees. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) possessed subject matter jurisdiction and authority to adjudicate disposition of contrast property; (2) did not err by not granting Defendant summary judgment or by consolidating the probate and civil case; (3) properly denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial; and (4) did not have statutory authority to assess attorney fees against Defendant. View "Estate of Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux" on Justia Law

In 2002 a Greyhound bus struck and killed Claudia. Her daughter, Cristina, age seven, witnessed the accident. In 2016 Cristina settled claims against Greyhound and other potentially responsible persons for $5 million. Klein, Cristina’s stepfather, believes that Cristina allocated too much of the settlement to herself as damages for emotional distress and not enough to him. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that Cristina conspired with state judges, law firms, Greyhound, and others, to exclude him from financial benefits. Klein sued as the purported administrator of Claudia’s estate although he had not been appointed as administrator. Klein and Cristina became co-administrators, but Klein was soon removed by a state judge. Defendants asked the federal judge to dismiss the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which only the U.S. Supreme Court may review the civil state court judgments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal on the merits. Collateral litigation in federal court is blocked by principles of preclusion and by Rooker's holding that errors committed in state litigation cannot be treated as federal constitutional torts. The court noted that the “long and tangled history" of the case was caused by Klein’s (or his lawyer’s) "inability or unwillingness to litigate as statutes and rules require.” They had neither briefed the proper issue on appeal nor attached the judgment, as required. “They are not entitled to divert the time of federal judges” and will be penalized for any further attempts. View "Xydakis v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

In 2002 a Greyhound bus struck and killed Claudia. Her daughter, Cristina, age seven, witnessed the accident. In 2016 Cristina settled claims against Greyhound and other potentially responsible persons for $5 million. Klein, Cristina’s stepfather, believes that Cristina allocated too much of the settlement to herself as damages for emotional distress and not enough to him. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that Cristina conspired with state judges, law firms, Greyhound, and others, to exclude him from financial benefits. Klein sued as the purported administrator of Claudia’s estate although he had not been appointed as administrator. Klein and Cristina became co-administrators, but Klein was soon removed by a state judge. Defendants asked the federal judge to dismiss the suit as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which only the U.S. Supreme Court may review the civil state court judgments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal on the merits. Collateral litigation in federal court is blocked by principles of preclusion and by Rooker's holding that errors committed in state litigation cannot be treated as federal constitutional torts. The court noted that the “long and tangled history" of the case was caused by Klein’s (or his lawyer’s) "inability or unwillingness to litigate as statutes and rules require.” They had neither briefed the proper issue on appeal nor attached the judgment, as required. “They are not entitled to divert the time of federal judges” and will be penalized for any further attempts. View "Xydakis v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

Glenvin Albrecht ("Glenvin") appealed, and Mark Albrecht ("Mark"), the personal representative of the estate ("the Estate") of Sharleen Albrecht ("Sharleen"), cross-appealed orders in an informal probate denying Glenvin's claims against the Estate. Glenvin argued that the district court's decision to deny Glenvin a recovery of jointly held marital assets transferred by Sharleen to the parties' son, Mark, should be reversed because, prior to Sharleen's death, she transferred the assets in violation of restraining provisions in a pending divorce proceeding. Glenvin further contended the district court abused its discretion in denying Glenvin's request for a recovery under principles of equity and its finding that Sharleen had not engaged in economic misconduct during prior divorce proceedings was clearly erroneous. The Estate argued that the district court improperly extended the time to commence an action against the Estate and erred as a matter of law in determining that Glenvin held the status of a surviving spouse with regard to the Estate. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order holding that Glenvin was a surviving spouse, denying Glenvin's request for contempt, the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for equitable relief and the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for relief from Sharleen's economic waste. View "Estate of Albrecht" on Justia Law

Glenvin Albrecht ("Glenvin") appealed, and Mark Albrecht ("Mark"), the personal representative of the estate ("the Estate") of Sharleen Albrecht ("Sharleen"), cross-appealed orders in an informal probate denying Glenvin's claims against the Estate. Glenvin argued that the district court's decision to deny Glenvin a recovery of jointly held marital assets transferred by Sharleen to the parties' son, Mark, should be reversed because, prior to Sharleen's death, she transferred the assets in violation of restraining provisions in a pending divorce proceeding. Glenvin further contended the district court abused its discretion in denying Glenvin's request for a recovery under principles of equity and its finding that Sharleen had not engaged in economic misconduct during prior divorce proceedings was clearly erroneous. The Estate argued that the district court improperly extended the time to commence an action against the Estate and erred as a matter of law in determining that Glenvin held the status of a surviving spouse with regard to the Estate. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order holding that Glenvin was a surviving spouse, denying Glenvin's request for contempt, the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for equitable relief and the district court's order denying Glenvin's request for relief from Sharleen's economic waste. View "Estate of Albrecht" on Justia Law

Richard and Kathryn are the beneficiaries of their parents’ multi‐million dollar trust, which is administered by Richard, Kathryn, and a corporate trustee. When their father died, the two fell into “irreconcilable” disputes. Kathryn hired Oxford to advise her. The trust paid Oxford’s fees. Oxford advised Kathryn to create one trust for Kathryn and her children, and another for Richard and his. Richard agreed. They moved the trust's situs from Indiana to South Dakota. Ultimately, they could not agree on the terms. When Kathryn refused to sign Richard’s proposed agreement, he unsuccessfully petitioned a South Dakota state court to order the trust's division. Richard alleges that he suffered financial losses and that his sister refused to sign the agreement because she received negligent advice from Oxford. Richard sued Oxford on behalf of the trust, asserting his capacity as a beneficiary and a co‐trustee. The complaint identified Kathryn as an “involuntary plaintiff.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Richard lacks capacity to bring suit on behalf of the trust under either Illinois or South Dakota law, which prohibits a trust beneficiary from suing a third party on behalf of a trust (absent special circumstances that were not alleged). State law and the trust agreement require a majority of trustees to consent to such a suit; that consent was missing. View "Doermer v. Oxford Financial Group, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeking to prevent the sale of land held in Allen F. Willey’s revocable trust. The district court determined that Plaintiffs - the grandchildren of Mr. Willey - were no longer beneficiaries of the trust as a result of their father’s 2014 lawsuit against Mr. Willey and his wife. The Supreme Court held (1) the 2014 suit constituted a “challenge” to the trust even though the suit was filed during Mr. Willey’s lifetime; and (2) the in terrorem clause in Mr. Willey’s trust did not violate public policy. View "EGW v. First Federal Savings Bank of Sheridan, Wyoming" on Justia Law