Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The district court did not err in denying a motion for relief from a formal testacy order under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b) filed by Appellant, the decedent’s wife. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in determining that Rule 60(b) did not apply in this case and that, rather, Appellant’s motion for relief from the formal testacy order must be considered under Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-317; (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to modify a formal testacy order under section 72-3-317(4); (3) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s request for imposition of a constructive trust; and (4) the personal representative was entitled to attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 72-12-206. View "In re Estate of Erickson" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute among the children of decedent Dorothy Rita Beam concerning the distribution of her estate. Decedent’s daughter, Dorothy Marian Meadows (“Marian”), filed a petition to probate Decedent’s 2014 will and codicil, and Marian’s siblings, John Beam, Jr., Margaret Beam, and Jayne Heggen (collectively, “Caveators”), filed a caveat alleging that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will and codicil. After a trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Caveators, finding that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity and awarding attorney’s fees to Caveators. Marian appealed, arguing, among other things, the evidence did not support a finding that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "Meadows v. Beam" on Justia Law

Douglas Ghee, as personal representative of the estate of Billy Fleming, deceased, appealed a circuit court order dismissing his wrongful-death claim against USAble Mutual Insurance Company d/b/a Blue Advantage Administrators of Arkansas ("Blue Advantage"). The Alabama Supreme Court dismissed this appeal as being from a nonfinal order. View "Ghee v. USAble Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Respondent Arthur Sweatt appealed a circuit court order denying, in relevant part, his motions to reconsider certain orders in his divorce from Patricia Sweatt. He argued the court erred: (1) in denying his motion to abate the divorce; (2) in granting the motion of petitioner Kathleen Paine, administrator of the estate of Patricia Sweatt, to amend by substitution; (3) in distributing the marital property more than six months after the dissolution of the marriage; (4) in finding him, but not Paine, to have been non-compliant with court rules; (5) by denying him due process and equal protection of the law; and (6) in its valuation of the marital real property. Finding no reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "In the Matter of Patricia Sweatt & Arthur Sweatt" on Justia Law

Shannon Evans appealed an order granting Gerald Feldmann ownership of certain property from Leonhard Feldmann's estate. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in finding an inter vivos gift and did not err in finding the proceeds of the standing crop passed with the devise of real property. “The appellate court does not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or substitute its judgment for the trial court's decision merely because it would have reached a different result. Standing crops at the time of death pass with the real estate to which they are attached unless otherwise specified in a will.” View "Estate of Feldmann" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is intended to give trustees broad authority to fulfill their duties as trustee and gives trustees the power to enter into predispute arbitration agreements, so long as doing so is not prohibited under the operative trust instrument.At issue in this interlocutory appeal was whether the signature of the trustee of a trust on an investment/brokerage account agreement that included a provision requiring the arbitration of disputes bound the beneficiary of the trust to the predispute arbitration provision. The Supreme Court held (1) under both the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and the operative trust instrument, the trustee had authority to enter into the arbitration agreement contained within the account agreement; and (2) applying the principle that a third party who seeks the benefit of a contract must also bear its burdens, the trust beneficiary in this case may be bound to arbitrate claims against the investment broker that sought to enforce the account agreement. The court vacated the trial court order compelling arbitration of all claims and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to which, if any, of the claims asserted by the trust beneficiary seek to enforce the account agreement. View "Harvey ex rel. Gladden v. Cumberland Trust & Investment Co." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review was whether an adult foster care provider claiming unjust enrichment may recover the reasonable value of its services from a defendant who, through fraud, obtained a lower rate from the provider for the services. Plaintiff owned two adult foster homes for the elderly. Plaintiff had contracted with the Oregon Department of Human Services to provide services in a home-like setting to patients who qualified for Medicaid. For those patients, the rates charged would be those set by the department. Isabel Pritchard resided and received care in one of plaintiff’s adult foster homes until her death in November 2008. Because Prichard had been approved to receive Medicaid benefits, plaintiff charged Prichard the rate for Medicaid-qualified patients: approximately $2,000 per month, with approximately $1,200 of that being paid by the department. Plaintiff’s Medicaid rates were substantially below the rates paid by plaintiff’s “private pay” patients. Prichard’s application for Medicaid benefits, as with her other affairs, was handled by her son, Richard Gardner. Gardner had for years been transferring Prichard’s assets, mostly to himself (or using those funds for his personal benefit). Gardner’s misconduct was discovered by another of Prichard’s children: defendant Karen Nichols-Shields, who was appointed the personal representative for Prichard’s estate. In 2009, defendant contacted the police and reported her brother for theft. Ultimately, Gardner pleaded guilty to three counts of criminal mistreatment in the first degree. Gardner’s sentence included an obligation to pay a compensatory fine to Prichard’s estate, to which he complied. After defendant, in her capacity as personal representative, denied plaintiff Larisa’s Home Care, LLC’s claim against Prichard’s estate, plaintiff filed this action, essentially asserting Prichard had been qualified for Medicaid through fraud and that Prichard should have been charged as a private pay patient. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that, generally, a defendant who obtains discounted services as a result of fraud is unjustly enriched to the extent of the reasonable value of the services. The Court therefore reversed the contrary holding by the Court of Appeals. Because the fraud here occurred in the context of a person being certified as eligible for Medicaid benefits, however, the Court remanded for the Court of Appeals to consider whether certain provisions of Medicaid law may specifically prohibit plaintiff from recovering in this action. View "Larisa's Home Care, LLC v. Nichols-Shields" on Justia Law

The trust that was intended to establish a charitable foundation. When Shine became trustee, its value was about $40 million. The conservator of the incompetent trustor sought an accounting, which revealed a significant loss in value and that Shine had not funded the foundation. The Attorney General sought Shine’s removal and surcharge based on his mismanagement, Gov. Code 12598. An interim substitute trustee was appointed. Shine successfully sought advanced fees from the trust for defense of the petition, subject to repayment if he was ultimately found not entitled to indemnification. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the probate court applied an incorrect legal standard in focusing on the “inequity of forcing the former trustees to fund their own defense against the unlimited resources of the Attorney General’s office” but did not expressly weigh the balance of relative harms to Shine, the People, and the charitable beneficiaries of the Trust. A mere imbalance in resources is not, alone, a proper equitable consideration supporting an award of interim fees; the court must consider whether Shine will be unduly prejudiced by having to bear his own attorney fees until resolution of the petition and whether the charitable beneficiaries would be unduly prejudiced if the fees were advanced and not repaid. View "Harris & Becerra v. Shine" on Justia Law

Tracy J. Swearingen appealed from an order denying her petition to enforce a no contest clause and disinherit Jose Francisco Aviles as a trust beneficiary of the Margaret B. Chappell (Peggy) Living Trust. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the petition to disinherit Aviles, and dismissed the purported appeal from the order removing Swearingen as trustee pending trial because it was not a final appealable order. The court held that the no contest clause in the Second Amendment to the will, which was to be strictly construed, did not trump Probate Code section 21310, subdivision (e)(2). Therefore, the Third Amendment to the will did not incorporate by reference the no contest clause in the Second Amendment. In this case, the court could not say that Peggy unequivocally expressed her intent to apply the no contest clause to petitions contesting trust amendments that were the product of fraud or undue influence. View "Aviles v. Swearingen" on Justia Law

In this will contest, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the unsuccessful will contestant’s motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof at the close of his case.The contestant’s motion at issue sought to broaden the contestant’s undue influence claim to include all of the testator’s prior wills and codicils. The Supreme Court held that the last-minute amendment would have broadened the issues and the proof. In addition, this issue fell within precedent upholding denials of motions to amend under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.457 when the motion is based on facts the movant knew or should have known before trial. As to the contestant’s other issue asking the Supreme Court to overturn a ruling on burden of proof that was incorporated within a pretrial order denying summary judgment, this issue was not preserved for review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re Estate of Margaret E. Workman" on Justia Law