Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries
Ex parte McLeroy
Nella Ruth Braswell passed away in 2014, leaving behind an estate valued at over $2,000,000, 6 cats, and 13 dogs. In her will, she provided for the care of her animals until their death, with the remaining funds to be given to The Humane Society of the United States. The Jefferson Probate Court accepted her will and appointed Marion Kristen McLeroy as the personal representative of the estate. However, The Humane Society became dissatisfied with McLeroy's management of the estate and had the estate proceeding removed from the probate court to the Jefferson Circuit Court. McLeroy objected to this move, but the circuit court refused to relinquish the case.The Humane Society and McLeroy had a working relationship initially, but it deteriorated over time. The Humane Society requested deeds to all the property Braswell had owned, as well as a formal accounting of both the estate and the Animal Trust. The Humane Society also asked the circuit court to remove McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of the Animal Trust and to order them to reimburse the Animal Trust for any losses caused by their alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that once a probate court begins the final-settlement process for an estate, a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the administration of that estate. Therefore, when the probate court began the final-settlement process for Braswell's estate, the Humane Society's right to remove the proceeding to the circuit court was cut off. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted McLeroy's petition and issued a writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order consolidating the estate proceeding with the Humane Society's other action against McLeroy and her husband and to enter an order remanding the administration of Braswell's estate to the probate court. View "Ex parte McLeroy" on Justia Law
In re Estate of Almer
The case revolves around the estate of Merle Almer, who passed away in 2016. Almer owned a construction business and a farm, and his will named his daughter, Linda Moe, as the personal representative. The will contained bequests to various individuals, including a life estate in the farm and farming assets to Casey Almer, Merle Almer's grandson. The will also directed the personal representative to use harvested and unharvested grain to pay costs of administration and taxes for the estate. However, at the time of Merle Almer's death, the grain discovered in his grain bins was less than expected, leading to a dispute between the personal representative and Casey Almer.The dispute led to a lawsuit, where the personal representative accused Almer of conversion of grain and other farm assets. Almer counterclaimed with allegations of conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. The counterclaims were dismissed, and a jury found that Almer did not convert property. Almer then filed a petition alleging that the personal representative breached her fiduciary duties. The district court heard testimony and took evidence over five days.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the personal representative did not breach her fiduciary duties while administering the estate. The court also found that the will's abatement provisions were ambiguous due to the will's nonstandard use of the term "specific devise." The court made findings concerning the testator's intent based on testimony from the attorney who prepared the will. The court denied Almer's application for surcharge, granted the personal representative's motion to approve final distribution, and approved approximately $760,000 in attorney’s fees. Almer appealed, challenging the court's interpretation of the will, the court’s findings concerning the personal representative’s conduct during administration, and the court’s approval of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Estate of Almer" on Justia Law
Janssen v. The Security National Bank of Sioux City
The case revolves around a dispute over the will of Richard D. Janssen, who had six children: Dean, Sheryl, Debra, Jeff, Larry, and Gary. Richard and his wife Melva owned three parcels of farmland, which they held as tenants-in-common. Over the years, they executed several "mirror image" wills, with the final one in 2014 leaving the farmland to Larry and Gary, $60,000 each to Dean, Jeff, and Debra, and nothing to Sheryl. After Melva's death in 2017, Richard, upset about the terms of his 2014 will, drafted a new will in 2018 with the help of his daughter Sheryl. This will left his one-half interest in each of the farm properties to Debra and Sheryl, and the remainder of his estate would be equally divided between Larry, Gary, Sheryl, and Debra. Richard passed away in June 2018.After Richard's 2018 will was admitted to probate, Dean, Larry, Gary, and Jeff filed a petition for will contest against Sheryl, Debra, and Security National Bank, seeking to set aside Richard’s 2018 will based on lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence exercised by their sisters. The first trial ended in a hung jury. Before the second trial, Gary and Larry sought dismissal of all claims against Debra. The second trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Larry and Gary, concluding that Sheryl had unduly influenced Richard in drafting his 2018 will and that her tortious interference caused actual damages to Larry and Gary in the amount of $480,000.After the verdict, the district court granted Sheryl’s posttrial motion to dismiss for lack of an indispensable party (Debra), ordering a new trial instead of dismissal. Larry and Gary appealed this decision, arguing that Debra's dismissal did not entitle Sheryl to a new trial where section 633.312’s joinder requirement was satisfied.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision, holding that when a party, once joined and actively participating in a will contest, affirmatively agrees to be dismissed from the lawsuit without objection from any other party, section 633.312 has been satisfied and does not prevent their dismissal. The court remanded the case for the district court to address any unresolved issues in the pending posttrial motions and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Janssen v. The Security National Bank of Sioux City" on Justia Law
Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board
A dispute arose over whether a transfer of property from a family corporation to a trust constituted a "change in ownership" under California's Proposition 13, which would trigger a reassessment of the property's value for tax purposes. The Los Angeles County Assessor determined that the transfer did constitute a change in ownership because the transfer eliminated the interests of individual shareholders who held nonvoting stock in the corporation. The Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board reversed this decision, asserting that the beneficial interest in the corporation's real property was held by the persons who controlled the corporation through its voting stock. The Superior Court granted a petition by the assessor to vacate the Appeals Board's decision, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision. The court held that the term "ownership interests" in the relevant statute, Revenue and Taxation Code section 62, subdivision (a)(2), refers to beneficial ownership interests in real property, not interests in a legal entity. For a corporation, these beneficial ownership interests are measured by all corporate stock, not just voting stock. The court rejected the argument that the term "stock" in section 62, subdivision (a)(2) must be interpreted to mean voting stock. The court concluded that the transfer of the properties from the corporation to the trust resulted in a change in ownership because the proportional beneficial ownership interests in the properties did not remain the same before and after the transfer. View "Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals Board" on Justia Law
Key v. Tyler
The case revolves around a dispute between two sisters, Sarah Plott Key (Key) and Elizabeth Plott Tyler (Tyler), over the enforcement of a "no contest" clause in a 1999 trust established by their parents. The trust had a lengthy appellate history with three prior appeals concerning the same trust. Key filed a petition in probate court to disinherit her sister, Tyler, based on the "no contest" clause in the trust. Tyler had previously defended a 2007 amendment to the trust, which was found to have been procured through undue influence.Previously, the probate court had granted Tyler's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Tyler had not directly contested the trust as she had only defended the 2007 amendment. However, this was reversed on appeal, with the appellate court holding that Tyler's defense of the 2007 amendment constituted a direct contest of the trust.On remand, Tyler raised a new issue: whether the lack of a no contest clause in a 2003 amendment to the trust meant that her share of the assets distributed under the terms of that amendment were exempt from forfeiture. The trial court agreed with Tyler, concluding that her share of the assets was exempt from forfeiture.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain language of the original trust's no contest provision required that if Tyler lacked probable cause to contest the trust, she must be disinherited. The court found that Tyler's share of the trust's residual monetary assets was not exempt from forfeiture simply because her specific share was specified by a subsequent amendment that did not contain a no contest clause. The court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Key v. Tyler" on Justia Law
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California Courts of Appeal, Trusts & Estates
Estate of Giguere
The case revolves around the estate of Linda C. Giguere, who passed away in 2021. Her will, dated 2013, nominated her husband, William Giguere, as the personal representative and established a trust for his benefit if she predeceased him. The will also stated that upon William's death, the remaining balance would be paid to his children. However, the will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate if William predeceased her, which he did in 2015. Linda did not execute a new will after William’s death. The will also explicitly stated that Linda's estranged daughter, Hilary Barlow, was to receive nothing.In the Cumberland County Probate Court, Hilary Barlow filed an application for the informal appointment of a personal representative of her mother’s estate. The court appointed Hilary as personal representative. Later, Eric and Mark Giguere, William's sons, filed petitions for the formal probate of the will and appointment of a personal representative. The court removed Hilary as personal representative and appointed Attorney LeBlanc as successor personal representative. Attorney LeBlanc filed a petition for instructions, asserting that the 2013 will did not dispose of Linda’s estate because it made no provision for the disposition of the residuary estate in the event that William predeceased Linda.The Probate Court rejected the request to reform the 2013 will to name Eric and Mark as residuary devisees, stating that the evidence was not clear and convincing. The court concluded that since the 2013 will did not fully dispose of Linda’s estate, the residuary estate passed by intestate succession to Hilary.On appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Eric and Mark argued that the Probate Court’s finding was against the preponderance of the believable evidence. They contended that the absence of a provision disposing of the residuary estate must have been a scrivener's error. However, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Probate Court’s judgment, stating that Eric and Mark failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Linda intended that they be the residuary devisees of her estate if William predeceased Linda. The court also concluded that the 2013 will did not provide for the disposition of Linda’s residuary estate in the event she survived William, and thus those assets passed by way of intestate succession to Hilary. View "Estate of Giguere" on Justia Law
LUCA MCDERMOTT CATENA GIFT TRUST v. FRUCTUOSO-HOBBS SL
The case involves the Luca McDermott Catena Gift Trust (Appellant) and two related family trusts, all of which are minority owners of California-based Paul Hobbs Winery, L.P. (Hobbs Winery). The trusts collectively own 21.6% of the partnership. Hobbs Winery owns the registered trademark PAUL HOBBS for wines. The Appellant and the two related family trusts filed a consolidated petition to cancel the registered marks ALVAREDOS-HOBBS and HILLICK AND HOBBS, owned by Fructuoso-Hobbs SL and Hillick & Hobbs Estate, LLC (Appellees), respectively. The petition alleged that the use of these marks by the Appellees was likely to cause confusion in the marketplace with Hobbs Winery's use of PAUL HOBBS for the same goods.The Appellees moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the family trusts were not entitled by statute to cancel the challenged marks because they were not the owners of the allegedly infringed PAUL HOBBS mark. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the Board) granted the motions to dismiss, concluding that the family trusts lacked a statutory entitlement to bring the cancellation action. The Board also concluded that the family trusts had failed to adequately plead likelihood of confusion and fraud.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. The court found that the Appellant lacked entitlement to a statutory cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1064. The court held that the Appellant's alleged injury, the diminishment in value of its ownership interest in Hobbs Winery due to Appellees' use of their marks, was merely derivative of any injury suffered by Hobbs Winery itself and was too remote to provide the Appellant with a cause of action under § 1064. View "LUCA MCDERMOTT CATENA GIFT TRUST v. FRUCTUOSO-HOBBS SL " on Justia Law
White v. White
This case involves a dispute between a decedent's wife and the co-personal representatives of the decedent's estate over the ownership of $100,000 and a camper under the terms of a premarital agreement. The decedent's wife, Yvonne M. White, argued that she was entitled to these assets based on the premarital agreement she had with her late husband, Leonard P. White. The co-personal representatives of Leonard's estate, his sons Jamison Patrick White and Ryan Howard White, contested this claim.The District Court for Washington County, Nebraska, ruled in favor of Yvonne, awarding her the $100,000 and the camper. The co-personal representatives appealed this decision to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. They then sought further review from the Nebraska Supreme Court.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court found that Yvonne's suit for the $100,000 and the camper did not constitute a "claim" against the estate, but rather, she was a beneficiary of the estate entitled to the assets she sought under a breach of contract theory according to the terms of the premarital agreement. Therefore, her suit was not subject to the nonclaim statute's requirements for the timely filing of a claim. The court also found that the camper was a joint asset under the premarital agreement, rejecting the co-personal representatives' argument that it was the decedent's separate property. View "White v. White" on Justia Law
Demskie vs. U.S. Bank National Association
The case revolves around the beneficiaries of a trust established by John Demskie, the founder of Remote Technologies, Inc. (RTI). The trust's principal asset was John Demskie’s 90 percent ownership interest in RTI. After his death in 2016, the beneficiaries alleged that U.S. Bank, the sole trustee, became the controlling shareholder of RTI and took actions that severely diminished the value of RTI and frustrated their reasonable expectations as owners of beneficial interests in RTI. The beneficiaries brought claims against U.S. Bank for breach of fiduciary duty and unfairly prejudicial conduct under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act, seeking damages and a buy-out of their interests in RTI.The district court granted U.S. Bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the beneficiaries could not bring a shareholder action against U.S. Bank under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act because the allegations in the complaint were not sufficient to establish that either the beneficiaries or U.S. Bank were shareholders of RTI. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of both claims.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the beneficiaries sufficiently pleaded the shareholder status of U.S. Bank under the notice pleading standard, reversing the dismissal of their breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. However, the court was evenly divided on the issue of whether owners of beneficial interests in a corporation may initiate an action for a buy-out of their interests, affirming the decision of the court of appeals dismissing their claim for buy-out relief. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Demskie vs. U.S. Bank National Association" on Justia Law
IN THE MATTER OF TRUST A AND TRUST C. ESTABLISHED UNDER THE BERNARD L. AND JEANNETTE FENENBOCK LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT
The case revolves around a family dispute over the management of a trust established by Bernard and Jeannette Fenenbock. The trust was divided into three sub-trusts (Trust A, Trust B, and Trust C) to benefit their children, Glenna Fenenbock Gaddy and Mark Fenenbock. After Bernard's death, Glenna began serving as co-trustee with her mother Jeannette. Upon Jeannette's death, Glenna transferred shares from the sub-trusts to her own trust and sold them to her sons, Weston and Lane. Mark filed a lawsuit against Glenna, asserting that she had breached her duties as a trustee by transferring the shares without his approval as a co-trustee.The probate court ruled in favor of Mark, declaring that Mark is a co-trustee and that the transfer of shares to Glenna's Trust was void. The court ordered that the shares be restored to the sub-trusts. Glenna appealed this decision, and the court of appeals vacated the probate court’s order, concluding that the buyers of the shares, Weston and Lane, were “jurisdictionally indispensable parties” whose absence deprived the probate court of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals, holding that the probate court had jurisdiction but erred by ordering Glenna to restore property she no longer owns or controls. The court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment vacating the probate court’s order, reversed the probate court’s order, and remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings. The court noted that any appropriate relief must come from Glenna or Glenna’s Trust or through the ultimate distribution of the assets remaining in the Sub-Trusts. View "IN THE MATTER OF TRUST A AND TRUST C. ESTABLISHED UNDER THE BERNARD L. AND JEANNETTE FENENBOCK LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT" on Justia Law