Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s application to probate his father’s will. Plaintiff allegedly learned about his father’s will more than three years after he and his brother commenced an informal probate proceeding to administer their father’s intestate estate. The father’s other two children objected to probating the will. The district court granted summary judgment to the objectors and dismissed the amended petition as time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in determining that the three-year statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s application to probate his father’s will; (2) in determining that Plaintiff failed to prove elements of equitable estoppel; and (3) in rejecting Plaintiff’s argument of equitable tolling. View "In re Estate of Fuchs" on Justia Law

This civil action arose out of the alleged mishandling of the Conservatorship of Victoria Newsome. Victoria Newsome’s mother and conservator, Marilyn Newsome, filed suit against former chancellor Joe Dale Walker, Chancellor David Shoemake, and other parties. Victoria’s severely infirm condition was the result of medical malpractice. A trust was established out of the proceeds from settlement of the malpractice case. Newsome raised numerous claims seeking redress, and a full accounting of the conservatorship, when the two chancellors were sanctioned by the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the doctrine of judicial immunity applied to bar Newsome’s claims, made on behalf of the Victoria Newsome Conservatorship, against former chancellor Joe Dale Walker and Chancellor David Shoemake. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court of Simpson County granting a Rule 54(b) dismissal. In addition, the Court granted Keely McNulty’s Motion to Strike Allegation and others involved in the administration of the conservatorship. View "Newsome v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment entered by the probate court in favor of David Gourevitch, a qualified beneficiary of a 1907 trust, on Gourevitch’s complaint for a declaratory judgment that Maxwell is not a beneficiary of the trust, holding that Gourevitch’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court additionally held that Gourevitch did not receive the benefit of tolling because he had the full ability to determine why Maxwell was receiving trust income distributions under a circumstance contrary to a certain provision in the trust when he was serving as a trustee but did not commence legal action until twelve years after ending his service as a trustee. View "In re George Parsons 1907 Trust" on Justia Law

Anita White appealed the Chancery Court of DeSoto County’s confirmation of title to certain real property located in Yalobusha County to Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”). Anita claimed the property through the residuary clause of Charles William White’s (“Bill’s”) will. Tommy claimed the property through an earlier conveyance from his father and long-time partner, Bill. The chancellor found the earlier conveyance valid. Anita appealed. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of C.W. White v. White" on Justia Law

The will submitted to probate in this case satisfied the statutory requirements for valid execution, particularly the requirement of attestation, and therefore, the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the testator’s estate. The challenger of the will petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the will did not satisfy the requirement of Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 4-102(3) that the will be “attested…by two or more credible witnesses.” Specifically, the challenger argued that attestation requires that the witnesses sign, either upon the same sheet as the signature of the testator or on some sheet physically connected with it, and that the witnesses signed a page of the will not physically connected with the page the testator signed. The Court of Appeals held (1) when the testator and the witnesses sign on separate pages of a multi-page will, attestation does not require that the pages be “physically connected” at the time of signing; and (2) the circuit court properly found that the presumption of due execution attached to the will. View "Castruccio v. Estate of Castruccio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the probate court denying the application of the decedent’s wife (Wife) to be treated as an omitted spouse under a section of the Nebraska Probate Code after the decedent made no provision for her in his will. The decedent’s estate resisted the application, arguing that Wife waived her rights to the estate in a prenuptial agreement. The probate court found that the prenuptial agreement was valid and that Wife had waived the right to take as an omitted spouse. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the probate court did not err in concluding that Wife executed the waiver voluntarily and in denying her application to take as an omitted spouse. View "In re Estate of Psota" on Justia Law

In the mid-1990s Martha (now 79) and Fred (now 86) purchased life insurance policies, with $1,000,000 death benefits for a $14,000 annual premium, naming their children as beneficiaries. The policies were held by a revocable trust. The couple put money in the Trust; it was self-sustaining. In 2013, Fred, at the end of his career as a lawyer, was suffering from cognitive decline; Martha had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. The defendants provided life insurance advisory services to the couple; they allegedly carried out a scheme that involved arranging the surrender of one policy and the replacement of the other with a policy providing less coverage. Premiums for the new coverage, spread over its term, totaled $800,000; they also paid $100,000 in commissions. The couple and their trustee sued under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Welfare and Institutions Code 15600. Defendants responded that the Trust has always owned the policies and that the commissions were paid by the Trust so that the only proper plaintiff is the Trust, which does not have a “because [it] is not 65 years old.” The court of appeal reversed dismissal of the claims. Defendants deprived the couple of property indirectly, using the Trust as an instrument of their scheme. View "Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

PNC Bank appealed a jury verdict in favor of a special deputy receiver finding PNC liable for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in violation of its duties as trustee of various preneed trusts created by NPS. The Eighth Circuit held that appellees' claims arose under trust law rather than tort law and appellees were thus entitled only to the damages afforded under trust law; damages to the Missouri trusts after Allegiant's trusteeship or outside of the Missouri trusts were not recoverable from PNC as Allegiant's successor; the trust beneficiaries were NPS, consumers in Missouri, and the funeral homes that were to provide services to those consumers pursuant to the consumers' preneed contract; PNC was not relieved of liability unless Allegiant ensured that Wulf was investing trust assets within the authority of a reasonably prudent trustee; appellees' trust-law claim should have been tried to the court under the general rule; and the court rejected appellees' cross-appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jo Ann Howard and Associates v. National City Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the county court’s denial of Petitioners’ petition for removal of the personal representative of the estate of the decedent pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 30-2454. Petitioners, devisees under the decedent’s will, disagreed with the personal representative’s decision to enter into a purchase agreement for the sale of a farm, arguing that the sale price was not in the best interests of the estate because, according to Petitioners’ appraiser, the value of the land was substantially higher. The county court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the county court did not err in concluding that Petitioners did not show cause for removal of the personal representative of the estate. View "In re Estate of Etmund" on Justia Law

Absent clear error, a district court's valuation of a decedent's estate will not be reversed on appeal. Plaintiffs Anne Fahey, Timothy Fife and Richard D. Fife appealed a district court judgment in their action seeking cancellation of a quit claim deed from their deceased mother Marianne Fife to their deceased father Richard A. Fife relating to North Dakota minerals. Anne Fahey's aunt Carole Hill informed her about the circumstances surrounding Marianne’s conveyance of her mineral interest. Hill witnessed Richard Fife present a quit claim deed for Marianne to sign, and Richard held Marianne's hand to help her sign her name on the deed. Hill believed Marianne was not competent at the time to sign the deed, and was not informed as to what she was signing. Plaintiffs sued Joanne Fife, individually and as personal representative of Richard Fife's estate, claiming their mother lacked capacity to execute the deed because she was under medication to treat her pain. Plaintiffs also claimed their father exercised undue influence over their mother when she signed the deed. The trial court rescinded the deed but concluded that under North Dakota's intestacy laws in effect at Marianne’s death, the minerals passed to Richard A. Fife. The court concluded Richard A. Fife's surviving spouse Joanne Fife owned the minerals. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fahey v. Fife" on Justia Law