Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

R.V. Bebout died testate on March 30, 1980, as a resident of Tarrant County, Texas. His Last Will and Testament, dated March 8, 1977, was admitted in the Probate Court of Tarrant County, Texas. At the time of his death, Bebout owned mineral interests in Canadian County, Oklahoma. On September 30, 1981, an ancillary Petition for Probate of Foreign Will was filed in the District Court of Canadian County. Bebout's will provided that his estate was to be distributed in trust to his wife, if she survived him. In the event his wife predeceased him, which she did, his will provided that one-half of his estate was to be distributed to his daughter, Betty Ewell, and one-half to his granddaughter, Betsy Kuykendall. The will made no mention of Bebout's son, Russell Bebout, who had predeceased him, or Bebout's grandsons, John Bebout and James Bebout (Grandsons). The Final Order in the Estate of R.V. Bebout, filed in 1982, distributed his mineral interests to his daughter and granddaughter in equal shares pursuant to the terms of his will. In 2014, the grandsons filed this action in Canadian County, alleging that the mineral interest distribution was void to the extent it failed to distribute the mineral interests one-quarter each to his grandsons who were pretermitted heirs under the will. Citing the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in “Booth v. McKnight,” (70 P.3d 855 (2003)), the District Court agreed with the grandsons and found the Final Order issued in 1982 was void on its face for lack of proper notice to the grandsons. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that notice to the grandsons was constitutionally sufficient, and thus, the Final Order was not void for lack of proper notice. Grandsons' challenge to the Final Order more than thirty years later was deemed untimely. View "Bebout v. Ewell" on Justia Law

In 2015, the court of appeal upheld the probate court’s decision to grant the petition of Alexander Hughes, the sole noncontingent trust beneficiary (and trustor Mark Hughes’ only child), to suspend and remove trustees due to their breach of trust in failing to exercise reasonable prudence in connection with the trust’s sale of Tower Grove, a 157-acre parcel of previously undeveloped Beverly Hills real property. A subsequent order allowed the former trustees to withhold from the successor trustee and Alexander Hughes, some, but not all, of a collection of documents identified on a supplemental privilege log submitted by the former trustees under court order. The documents, which are from the trust’s legal files and relate to two trust accountings submitted by the former trustees prior to their removal, were withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege. The court of appeal reversed in part, finding that the probate court failed to consistently and appropriately apply the legal standards prescribed by the California Supreme Court. View "Fiduciary Trust International of California v. Klein" on Justia Law

This certified questions in this case arose out of divorce proceedings pending in Connecticut between Wife and Husband, who was the beneficiary of a Massachusetts irrevocable trust. The Connecticut Supreme Court certified three questions to the Supreme Judicial Court concerning the authority of a trustee to distribute substantially all of the assets of an irrevocable trust into another trust. The Supreme Judicial Court did not answer the second question but answered the remaining questions as follows: (1) under Massachusetts law, the terms of the Paul John Ferri, Jr. Trust (1983 Trust) empowered its trustees to distribute substantially all of its assets to the Declaration of Trust for Paul John Ferri, Jr.; and (2) under Massachusetts law, a court, in interpreting whether the 1983 Trust’s settlor intended to permit decanting to another trust, should consider an affidavit of the settler offered to establish what he intended when he created the 1983 Trust. View "Ferri v. Powell-Ferri" on Justia Law

James Broten, individually, and as personal representative of the estate of Olaf Broten, appealed a second amended judgment denying him restitution for payments he made to his parents during their lifetimes. In 1979, Broten and his parents Helen and Olaf Broten executed a contract for deed to purchase approximately 480 acres of farmland. Broten agreed to purchase the farmland for $200,000 plus six percent annual interest through 2006. After his father's death in 1998, Broten, as personal representative of the estate, conveyed the farmland to himself with his mother receiving a life estate. After Broten's mother died in 2010, his sisters, as personal co-representatives of the estate, sued Broten alleging he breached his fiduciary duties by transferring the farmland to himself after his father's death. At trial in 2013, Broten testified that under an oral modification to the contract, he agreed to pay his parents' living expenses for the rest of their lives in addition to the $12,000 annual interest payment in exchange for the farmland. After trial the district court found the parties mutually agreed to abandon the terms of the written contract for deed. The court also found Broten did not prove the oral modification to the contract and breached his fiduciary duties to his father's estate by transferring the farmland to himself. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment finding a breach of fiduciary duty and award of damages, but remanded to the district court to decide whether Broten was entitled to compensation for improvements he made to the farmland or for payments he made to his parents or on their behalf. The district court entered a second amended judgment reducing the amount Broten owed by $20,000 for improvements he made to the property. The court did not award Broten restitution for the payments he made to his parents or on their behalf. The court concluded Broten benefited from the relationship with his parents and failed to prove his parents were unjustly enriched by the payments he made to them or on their behalf. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment finding Broten breached his fiduciary duty, and to pay plaintiffs $103,054 as compensation for his use of the land from June 16, 2010, through December 31, 2013, including interest. The Court also affirmed the judgment holding the reduction of the land value by $20,000 for improvements to the land. The Court reversed the judgment holding Broten was not entitled to any restitution, and remanded for entry of judgment requiring Broten to pay to plaintiffs $1,197,000 for the value of the land as of December 31, 2013, reduced by $191,789.40 for restitution and $20,000 for improvements. View "Broten v. Broten" on Justia Law

Bernard Norton, by and through Kim Norton, brought a wrongful death action against a number of defendants who were affiliated with a nursing home in which his wife, Lola Norton, died. Bernard claimed that negligent treatment caused Lola’s death. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of all claims in accordance with an agreement entered into by Lola at the time she was admitted to the nursing home. The trial court granted the motion to stay and compel arbitration, and Bernard appealed, contending that, as a wrongful death beneficiary, he could not be bound to Lola’s arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that Lola’s beneficiaries were not required to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the defendants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and entered into by a decedent and/or her power of attorney, which bound the decedent and her estate to arbitration, was also enforceable against the decedent’s beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. The Court found that such an arbitration agreement did bind the decedent’s beneficiaries with respect to their wrongful death claims, and, accordingly, reversed the Court of Appeals. View "United Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Norton" on Justia Law

Paternal grandmother and paternal aunt appealed a decision by the probate court dismissing their petition for guardianship over N.P., and a decision declaring as moot their motion to transfer guardianship proceedings to the family court. The probate court dismissed the petition for appointment of guardian because it believed it “may not even consider a Petition for Appointment of Guardian” because the family division “has exclusive jurisdiction over the child.” The Supreme Court concluded that while the probate court was correct in asserting the general statement on jurisdiction, it failed to recognize the responsibilities imposed upon it when confronted with the petition for guardianship and the motion to transfer the cause to the family division. It failed to comply with the statutory procedures set forth in Title 14 designed to avoid judicial duplication and confusion and to assist in prompt resolution of child custody issues. The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded the probate court for further proceedings. View "In re Guardianship of N.P." on Justia Law

Testator Elaine A. Holbrook died on February 3, 2013. She was survived by six children, including appellant-executors David and Cheryl Holbrook, appellee Amy Holbrook, and seven grandchildren, including appellant-grandson Charles Holbrook III. Testator did not have a surviving spouse. Testator signed a three-page handwritten document entitled "My Last Will & Testament." The will was in the form of a letter and was addressed "To all my children." The main source of contention between testator’s children reads: "In the event that I don’t make it through surgery on Thurs the 23rd of Jan. ’03, I wish to bequeath you all of the property and personal belongings divided equally to the six of you & to the seven grandchildren." Testator did, in fact, survive the surgery in January 2003 and lived for ten more years before her death in 2013. In April 2013, appellee Amy Holbrook filed a motion with the probate court seeking clarification of the will. Appellant-executors responded with two motions questioning whether the will was properly allowed, raising issues concerning the will’s execution, ambiguity in its devise, notice to the grandchildren, and whether the will was “conditional” and therefore invalid. The question presented in this will contest was whether the trial court correctly determined on summary judgment that the testator intended her last will and testament which she executed on the eve of surgery to be absolute rather than contingent on her surviving the surgery. The Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment was premature in this case because material factual issues remained in dispute concerning the testator’s intent, and therefore reversed. View "In re Appeal of the Estate of Elaine A. Holbrook" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the interpretation of the procedural requirements that the Kansas Probate Code sets for parties petitioning for probate. Specifically, this appeal concerned a contest between the disinherited son (Son) of the decedent and the son’s daughters (Granddaughters), who were the beneficiaries under the decedent’s will. In its final order, the district court held that the decedent’s estate passed under the will to the Granddaughters in equal shares. The Supreme Court affirmed the analysis and conclusions of both the district court and the court of appeals as to the issues raised in an appeal and petition for review, holding (1) an order setting aside the order admitting the will to probate did not end the proceeding; (2) the district court did not commit reversible error in concluding that the Granddaughters timely commenced a probate proceeding; and (3) the district court did not commit reversible error when it refused to find that a putative 1997 will revoked the 1992 will. View "In re Estate of Rickabaugh" on Justia Law

Emil Frei and Adoria Frei, husband and wife, created an irrevocable trust (Trust) that was a spendthrift trust. The couple’s ten children were named equal beneficiaries under the Trust. After Adoria died, her son, Stephen Brock, successfully petitioned to modify the Trust with Emil’s consent. The petition proposed to alter the language controlling distribution of the Trust property, granting any beneficiary the right to compel distribution of his share of the Trust. The next year, Stephen settled several lawsuits that Emil and his children had brought against him. In the settlement, Stephen agreed to make payments to an alternate family trust, which he did not do. When Emil died, Stephen did not receive his share of the Trust funds. The trustee of the Trust used Stephen’s share of the Trust to pay a portion of his settlement debt. Stephen filed a petition to construe the terms of the Trust and compel repayment of the amount the trustee paid out on his behalf. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an irrevocable spendthrift trust may be modified by the survivor of two settlers and interested beneficiaries; and (2) therefore, the district court correctly determined that the modification and settlement were valid. View "In re Frei Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

In 2013, Michael Clare shot and killed his wife, Deborah Clare, and then took his own life. Jessica Crosslin, Deborah’s biological daughter, filed a petition for letters of examination seeking to file a claim against Michael’s estate under the Kansas Probate Code. Crosslin was subsequently appointed administrator of Deborah’s estate, and Christine Clare, Michael’s aunt, was appointed administrator of Michael’s estate. The district court determined that Crosslin had failed to satisfy a statutory time limitation for filing a claim against the estate because she failed to obtain a written, signed judicial order setting the matter for hearing. The court cited specific local rules with which Crosslin apparently did not comply. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the local rules did not consistently preclude Crosslin from following the procedures that she took, the local rules conflicted with certain statutory requirements, and local rules that add requirements to the statutory scheme and create jurisdictional obstacles are invalid. View "In re Estate of Clare" on Justia Law