Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Bessie Maae Turner was a widower and had no children. In 1994, Bessie executed a will leaving her entire estate to a nephew, Claude Wilbur Moye. In 2010, Bessie executed a new will and revoked all former wills. In the May 2010 will, Bessie left her entire estate to Claude Michael Moye and his wife, Barbara. She also named Claude’s son and her grandnephew Michael Moye as the executor of the May 2010 will. Bessie died in 2012, leaving her estate to Claude and other nieces, nephews and grandnieces and grandnephews. Claude would go on to marry several times. Those marriages produced four children in addition to Michael. Claude also died in 2012. Michael admitted Bessie’s will into probate. Despite the existence of numerous other heirs at law of Bessie's, Michael represented in the verified petition to admit the will to probate that he and his wife Barbara were Bessie's only heirs and next of kin. The probate court entered an order admitting the will to probate. Michael then petitioned to admit Claude’s will to probate; the probate ultimately admitted the will into probate and issued letters testamentary to Michael. The heirs of Bessie and Claude appealed the dismissal of their claims in these separate but almost identical actions contesting, respectively, the validity of Turner's and Moye's wills. After careful consideration of the issues presented by the parties, the Alabama Supreme Court remanded case no. 1140819 back to the circuit court for the entry of an order removing the administration of Claude's estate from the probate court to the circuit court. The Court further reversed the circuit court's judgment in case no. 1140819 dismissing the will contest filed by the contestants of Claude's will. The Court remanded case no. 1140820 to the circuit court for the entry of an order removing the administration of Bessie's estate from the probate court to the circuit court. The Court also reversed the circuit court's judgment in case no. 1140820 dismissing the will contest filed by the contestants of Bessie's will. View "Daniel v. Moye" on Justia Law

The testator, Margor Rachael Dayan, the mother of plaintiff and defendant, had an interest in commercial real property located in North Hollywood. Her will conveyed all her rights, title, and interests in the property to plaintiff’s trust. Plaintiff filed a petition for an order to establish that Ms. Dayan’s estate had title to the property in its entirety. Defendant opposed the Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a)(2) petition. The probate court ruled defendant owned a one-third interest in the property and denied plaintiff’s judgment on the pleadings motion. The court concluded that the probate court did not err by denying plaintiff's petition where substantial evidence supports the probate court's findings. In this case, the probate court found Ms. Dayan intended to convey a one-third interest in the property to defendant. The court also concluded that the probate court correctly denied plaintiff’s judgment on the pleadings motion. View "Estate of Dayan" on Justia Law

After the death of James Kenneth Slavens (Jim), James Adam Slavens, Alexa Slavens, Tanner Slavens, Twin G Holdings, LLC, and Jim’s Estate (Respondents) sought a declaratory judgment as to the parties’ rights in Twin G Holdings, LLC (Twin G), which Jim formed before he died. The district court determined that Jim's wife (and administrator of his estate) Melanie Slavens had no rights in Twin G and entered judgment that: (1) Jim’s three oldest children, James Adam, Alexa, and Tanner, each owned 33% of Twin G; (2) the Eldest Children were Twin G’s sole members; (3) James Adam was Twin G’s sole manager; and (4) Melanie was never a member or manager of Twin G. Melanie, both personally and as administrator, appealed. The trial court found that Jim formed Twin G for asset protection purposes. Twin G’s Articles of Organization listed Jim as Twin G’s managing member. Twin G’s Operating Agreement designated Jim and Johnny Slavens, Jim’s brother, as members, with Jim owning 1% and Johnny owning the remaining 99%. Johnny held a largely passive role in Twin G and testified he held the 99% ownership interest in Twin G for Jim’s benefit until Jim’s death and then for the Eldest Children’s benefit. Jim’s relationship with Johnny soured when real property recorded in Johnny’s name became involved in a lawsuit in spring 2011. Jim took efforts to remove Johnny from Twin G. Jim first sent to Johnny an “Addendum” to Twin G in 2011. If signed, the Addendum purported to transfer Johnny’s ownership interest. The Addendum recited that Johnny “desires to have no interest in Twin G” and, therefore, “has agreed to convey his entire interest to James K. Slavens and Melanie Slavens in such a way that they will share an equal interest in the property.” Johnny never signed the Addendum. After Jim died, Melanie opened a probate proceeding in Utah, where Jim was domiciled, and was appointed special administrator of Jim’s estate. Melanie then asserted rights in Twin G and filed the Amended Certificate with the Idaho Secretary of State. Johnny maintained he still had membership and ownership rights in Twin G, despite having executed the Amended Certificate. As Johnny explained, delivery of the Amended Certificate to Jim was conditional on Jim filing it with the Idaho Secretary of State, which Jim never did. Thus, in August 2013, Johnny executed transfer documents purporting to transfer and assign membership, management, and ownership rights in Twin G to the Eldest Children. With regard to the declaratory judgment action, Melanie moved to dismiss, which the district court denied. Respondents then moved for partial summary judgment, which the district court granted. Melanie filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Johnny's affidavit at trial under the Deadman Statutes, but that the trial court properly denied Melanie's motion to dismiss. View "Slavens v. Slavens" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a nonjudicial foreclosure on real property conducted pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 667-5. The circuit court entered final judgment in favor of the Mounts, the purchasers of the real property through the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, and U.S. Bank National Association. The final judgment was entered against the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The circuit court ruled that a nonjudicial foreclosure conducted pursuant to section 667-5 is exempt from the time limits for presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate and that U.S. Bank did not violate section 667-5(c)(1) by failing to provide former co-personal representative Sesha Lovelace with information she requested regarding the required funds to reinstate the loan (“reinstatement figures”). The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s final judgment, holding (1) a nonjudicial foreclosure conducted pursuant to section 667-5 is not exempt from the time limits under Haw. Rev. Stat. 560:3-803 for presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate; and (2) the nonjudicial foreclosure was conducted in violation of section 667-5(c)(1) when U.S. Bank failed to provide Lovelace with loan reinstatement figures, and this failure rendered the nonjudicial foreclosure sale voidable at the Estate’s election unless the Mounts were innocent purchasers for value. Remanded. View "Mount v. Apao" on Justia Law

The issue in this cause is whether Plaintiff-appellant Rhonda Brown was estopped from asserting her status as the surviving spouse of the Decedent, Bobby Joe Brown, Jr. Plaintiff and Bobby Joe Brown, Jr. were married in 1995, and three children were born of the marriage. Rhonda testified that after a few years of marriage, she told Bobby she could no longer stay with him if he did not cease his extra-marital affairs. He did not comply with this condition, and Rhonda moved out of the marital home. They were never divorced through a court proceeding. She moved frequently and, at different times, lived in several Oklahoma cities, as well as in Kansas. After Bobby and Rhonda separated, he began living with Ami Alley in 2004. Two children were born to the couple. Ami testified she and Bobby held themselves out as husband and wife to everyone and established a home together in Perry, Oklahoma. Rhonda testified she was aware of the relationship between Ami and Bobby and that he was living with her and their two children. Rhonda testified that Bobby referred to Ami as his girlfriend. In 2013, Bobby died in a motorcycle accident. Ami was named Personal Representative of his estate upon the court's finding she was Bobby's surviving spouse in a common law marriage. Rhonda was not sent notice of the proceeding, and Ami did not advise the court of Rhonda's relationship with Bobby. Ami explained that the court asked if there was anybody to object, and no one appeared to do so. She said the court did not ask about Rhonda, and she did not raise the issue. She also testified Rhonda knew about the proceeding but would not give Ami her address. In the judgment denying Rhonda's Petition and Motion to Revoke Letters of Administration, the trial court found Bobby and Ami's relationship met the requirements of a common law marriage; and that Rhonda re-married in a ceremonial, traditional marriage in 2012. The court based its decision to deny Rhonda's motion to revoke the letters of administration on the issue of estoppel, rather than the legal classification of her marriage to Bobby. Finding that the trial court properly held that Rhonda was estopped from asserting she should have been appointed Personal Representative of Bobby's estate (instead of Ami), the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Brown v. Alley" on Justia Law

Frances Scott and her husband Galen Amerson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Scott amended her petition to identify as an asset her interest in a Florida state action that she and her half-sister had filed contesting the legitimacy of their father’s will. The bankruptcy trustee retained Florida counsel, who in turn reached a tentative settlement of the ongoing probate contest. The trustee then moved the bankruptcy court to approve the settlement agreement. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion over Scott’s objection and approved the settlement agreement. Scott appealed to the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Scott appealed the BAP’s decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. At issue was whether Scott’s interest in a spendthrift trust created by her late father was properly treated as property of the bankruptcy estate, or if that interest was excluded. Finding no error in the BAP's conclusion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed inclusion of that Florida interest in Scott's bankruptcy estate. View "Scott v. King" on Justia Law

Alabama resident Joan McCullough Scott petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Probate Court to vacate its order requiring all Alabama resident-beneficiaries of the estate of Kathryn Marie Lange to pay the probate court distributions they received from a concurrent administration of the estate in London, England. Lange was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1930. In 1953 she married a Danish citizen and moved to Copenhagen. She divorced her husband in 1961, and in 1962 she became a resident of London, where she resided until her death in 2010. Despite living overseas for the majority of her adult life, Lange retained her United States citizenship, and she never became a British citizen. At her death, Lange owned the several parcels of real property in England, a small sum of money in an English bank account, some personal property located in England, and approximately $350,000 in personal property located in Alabama. The probate court granted Lange's nephew, Charles Lange Clark's petition on the day it was filed and issued him letters of administration. Clark hired legal counsel in London to assist in the administration of the estate overseas. At some point in the relationship, Clark terminated the London firm, and the firm invoiced Clark for work done to the point of termination. Clark did not pay the invoice, and the firm sued him in England. Clark sought indemnification as to costs incurred in defending against the London law firm, and asked the Alabama Probate Court for relief. At the time of Clark's motion, he had already distributed all but approximately $70 of the assets under his control. Scott did not object to the motion for indemnification, nor the probate court's order granting the motion. An "Order of Escrow" was entered, requiring all beneficiaries of the estate in Alabama to pay the probate all monies that had been previously paid out so that a determination could be made about Clark's indemnification claim. The monies asked for included money any Alabama beneficiary received from the English administration of the estate. In her writ application, Scott argued that the probate had no jurisdiction as to the estate assets she received from the English administration. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, granted Scott's petition, issued the writ, and directed the probate court to vacate the escrow order. View "Ex parte Joan McCullough Scott." on Justia Law

Bonnie Jean Pease executed a holographic will approximately seven months before her death. The will disinherited Pease’s mother, sister, and brother but not her brother Douglas Hubert. At issue before the circuit court was whether Pease intended to devise anything to Lisa and Lynn Schock, who were named in the will as the executors of Pease’s estate and to whom Pease gave “all [her] belongings…” contingent on them giving a share to Hubert, to a search for a home for her bird, and to fund litigation against the State. The circuit court ruled that after the Schocks set aside the requested funds, they were to distribute the entire residual estate to Hubert. The Schocks appealed, arguing that the gifting language of the will gave them a conditional gift. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will gave Pease’s property to Schocks subject to the stated convictions. View "In re Estate of Hubert" on Justia Law

Appellant Sandra O'Donoghue, as personal representative of the estate of David O'Donoghue, brought suit seeking an adjudication that the estates of David L. Dooley's grandchildren, Erin and David O'Donoghue, were the beneficiaries of bequests of trust principal under the David L. Dooley and Carolyn Ann Collins Dooley Trusts. The district court granted summary judgment to Carolyn Dooley, Trustee, and determined that the per stirpes bequests of trust principal to Erin and David, lapsed upon their death leaving no lineal descendants. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed finding Appellant, as the spouse and beneficiary of the estate of David O'Donoghue, was entitled to take his share of the trust principal upon the death of Settlor's spouse. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Trust principal remainder interest was intended for lineal descendants of the two grandchildren, and not to the grandchild's widow. View "O'Donoghue v. Dooley" on Justia Law

In 2005, Mother executed a power of attorney that appointed her son (Son) as her attorney-in-fact. Mother held a life estate in several properties to which her daughters (Daughters) held remainder interests. Prior to Mother’s death in 2013, Son had been leasing from Mother the land in which Daughters held remainder interests. In 2014, Daughters initiated this suit alleging that Son had breached his farmland lease by failing to pay rent on the property in which they received their remainder interests. The Estate also brought suit alleging that Son breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Mother. Prior to trial, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude extrinsic evidence of Mother’s intent with regards to the power of attorney. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Daughters on the breach of contract claim and in favor of the Estate on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred when it prevented Son from introducing relevant evidence related to, inter alia, the circumstances surrounding Mother’s arrangement of leasing her land to her family without charging rent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Hein v. Zoss" on Justia Law