Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Decedent named heirs in her will, but the heirs predeceased Decedent. Thus, Decedent’s estate became subject to the laws of intestate succession. The children of Decedent’s brother (collectively, Appellants) were designated as heirs of his estate. The circuit court then determined that the illegitimate daughter of Decedent’s brother (Yvette) was also an heir entitled to inherit equally from Decedent’s estate. In so holding, the circuit court concluded that S.C. Codified Laws 29A-2-114(c), which sets forth the methods under which an illegitimate child must establish paternity for purposes of intestate succession, was unconstitutional as applied to Yvette because it prohibited Yvette’s right to recover as an illegitimate child in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although section 29A-2-114(c) creates a classification between legitimate and illegitimate children, it is constitutional as applied to Yvette under both the federal and state constitutions. View "In re Estate of Flaws" on Justia Law

Decedent named heirs in her will, but the heirs predeceased Decedent. Thus, Decedent’s estate became subject to the laws of intestate succession. The children of Decedent’s brother (collectively, Appellants) were designated as heirs of his estate. The circuit court then determined that the illegitimate daughter of Decedent’s brother (Tamara) was also an heir entitled to inherit equally from Decedent’s estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by rendering a judgment of heirship declaring Tamara a biological child of Decedent’s brother and an equal heir with Appellants. View "In re Estate of Flaws" on Justia Law

After Charles Colombe died, Wesley Colombe filed a petition for informal probate and was appointed as personal representative of Charles’s Estate. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe (RST) filed a notice of creditor’s claim seeking to enforce a Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court order and judgment. Wesley filed a notice of disallowance of claim, asserting that the RST could not show that the order was entitled to comity. The circuit court granted comity to the tribal court order and judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting comity to the tribal court order pursuant to S.D. Codified Laws 1-1-25. View "Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Colombe" on Justia Law

Rufus Call Willey, the founder of R.C. Willey & Son, died in 1954. The day before he died, he signed a last will and testament. In 2011, two of the decedent’s grandchildren, Helen Immelt and Don McBroom, filed a complaint against their grandmother; their uncle, his brother, and his attorney; and a bank. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had deprived Plaintiffs of their rightful inheritance under the terms of the decedent’s will. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) all of Immelt’s claims and most of Broom’s claims were barred by the terms of a 1973 agreement; and (2) McBroom’s breach of fiduciary duty claims were circular and barred by the applicable statute of limitations. View "McBroom v. Child" on Justia Law

After a beneficial owner (Grand Acquisition) of a Delaware statutory trust sought to inspect certain of the trust's books and records, the trust (Passco Trust) denied the request, arguing that the form of the request and the motivations underlying the request both were improper. The bulk of the parties’ dispute centers on whether the trust agreement incorporates the statutory requirements of 12 Del. C. 3819 and, if so, whether the beneficial owner has satisfied those requirements. In this case, the court concluded that Grand Acquisition is entitled to the requested information under its contractual demand where the owners' right to books and records under the Trust Agreement is not subject to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act's, 12 Del. C. 3801-3826, preconditions and defenses, the owners' right to books and records under the Trust Agreement includes the requested information, and Passco Trust has failed to prove its implied improper purpose defense. Accordingly, The court granted Grand Acquisition's motion for summary judgment and denied Passco Trust's motion for summary judgment. View "Grand Aquisition, LLC v. Passco Indian Springs DST" on Justia Law

Trust I, established by Maryon and Robert, became irrevocable when Maryon died in 1994. Robert died in 2013. Months later, Maryon’s son, Funsten, filed a “safe harbor” application, requesting a declaration that he would not violate a “no-contest” clause in Trust I by filing a petition to establish that he is its sole successor trustee, notwithstanding that Robert designated an additional co-successor trustee after Maryon died. The probate court denied the application. The executors of Robert's probate estate sought a determination that Funsten violated no-contest clauses in Trust I and in Robert’s will by filing creditor’s claims against Robert’s probate estate to recover damages for the allegedly improper removal of trust assets. The trial court found that Funsten’s conduct constituted a contest of Robert’s will, but did not constitute a contest under Trust I. The court of appeal held that Funsten was not entitled to a ruling on the merits of his safe harbor application because that statutory procedure has not been available since former Probate Code section 21320 was repealed in 2010. The probate court correctly found that Funsten did not violate the Trust I no-contest clause by filing creditor’s claims against Robert’s probate estate, but erred by finding a contest of Robert’s will. Funsten is not a beneficiary of Robert’s will and could not have violated the no-contest clause in that instrument as a matter of law. View "Funsten v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

The well-known author Thomas Clancy (Decedent) died in 2013. Decedent was survived by his second wife (Mrs. Clancy), a minor child by that marriage, and four adult children from Decedent’s first marriage. Decedent left a will and various amendments. At issue in this case was which beneficiaries, if any, were obligated to pay a portion or all of federal estate taxes. Mrs. Clancy petitioned in the Orphans’ Court for a declaratory judgment in which she sought a determination that a Family Trust was not obligated to pay any estate taxes. The Orphans Court concluded that Decedent’s predominant intent was that the Family Trust be free of any federal estate tax liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the property conveyed in the Family Trust as identified in Decedent’s will and second codicil could not be burdened by the payment of federal estate taxes. View "Bandy v. Clancy" on Justia Law

Defendant Clyde Greco, Jr. was the trustee of his parents’ trust and the administrator of their estates. He used money from the trust and estates to fund litigation against his sister and others, purportedly to recover money they owed to the trust and estates. After he allegedly spent considerably more money on litigation than he could have possibly recovered, his sister, plaintiff Cara Lyn Greco, brought two lawsuits against him, one at the trial court and one at the probate court, to recover the money he spent, plus penalties. She claimed the prior litigation was a personal vendetta. Clyde Jr. responded to each lawsuit by filing separate special motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. In each case, the special motion to strike was denied. On appeal, Clyde Jr. contended he met his burden on the first prong of section 425.16 by establishing that Cara Lyn’s claims arose from protected petitioning activity, funding litigation. He further argued that Cara Lyn could not meet her burden on the second prong of section 425.16 to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of each claim because all her claims are barred by the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal found the gravamen of most of Cara Lyn’s claims was the alleged wrongful taking from the trust and estates and that was not a protected activity under section 425.16. The courts properly denied Clyde Jr.’s special motion to strike as to these claims. The one exception was Cara Lyn’s claim for constructive fraud based on Clyde Jr.’s alleged misrepresentations about the underlying litigation. While Clyde Jr.’s statements about the litigation are protected activity, Clyde Jr. did not show it was covered by the litigation privilege. The Court remanded this matter back to the probate court for a determination of whether Cara Lyn met her evidentiary burden under the second prong of section 425.16 analysis. View "Greco v. Greco" on Justia Law

A.M.M.’s two children - Timothy McCann and Genet McCann (together, Appellants) - appealed from three groups of orders entered by the district court during actions it took to oversee the guardianship and conservatorship of A.M.M., including a preliminary injunction, Rule 11 sanctions, and a request for recusal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Guardian’s motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Appellants from engaging in certain activities the Guardian believed were detrimental to A.M.M.’s health; (2) the district court did not err by denying Genet’s motion to recuse; and (3) the district court did not err by sanctioning Genet for violating Rule 11. View "In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of A.M.M." on Justia Law

Borel's trust states that, upon Borel’s death, a parcel of the trust’s real property is to be distributed to the East Bay Regional Park District for the purposes of establishing an agricultural park. Part of the property is also subject to an option agreement between Borel and Corrie. After Borel’s death, Corrie sought an order instructing the trustee to convey a portion of the property to him pursuant to the option agreement. The District opposed that petition, and filed a competing petition under Probate Code section 17200, seeking an order authorizing the trustee to distribute the property to the District and to receive an $800,000 loan on behalf of the trust. The probate court granted the District’s petition. The District subsequently petitioned the probate court (section 1310(b)) to authorize the immediate distribution of the land and acceptance of the loan while appeal was pending. The order granting that motion was also appealed. While those appeals were pending, the probate court held a trial and found Corrie’s option unenforceable. A third appeal followed. The court of appeal dismissed in part, noting that under section 1310(b), the actions taken by the trustee are valid, regardless of the outcome on appeal. The court affirmed that the option agreement is void and unenforceable. View "East Bay Reg'l Park Dist. v. Griffin" on Justia Law