Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Lenard E. Noice worked as a conductor for Petitioner BNSF Railway Company (BNSF). He fell from a BNSF train that was moving at speed and perished. Respondent, Lenard Noice II, acting as personal representative for Noice (the Estate), filed a wrongful death action against BNSF under the Federal Employee’s Liability Act (FELA), asserting, among other claims, that BNSF negligently permitted the train from which Noice fell to operate at an excessive speed. The undisputed facts established that the train from which Noice fell never exceeded the speed limit for the class of track upon which it was operating. BNSF moved for summary judgment arguing that the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim was precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA). The district court accepted this argument and dismissed the Estate’s FELA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that FRSA did not preclude a FELA excessive-speed claim. Because FRSA contained no provision expressly precluding the Estate’s FELA excessive-speed claim and because permitting the Estate’s FELA claim to proceed furthered the purposes of both statutes, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Noice v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Minor Tamarcus Ewing and his mother were involved in a motor-vehicle accident. Tamarcus sustained severe injuries and his mother died. Tommy Lee Ewing, Tamarcus’s father, was appointed guardian of Tamarcus’s person and estate. Tommy filed a negligence complaint on behalf of Tamarcus. At some point, the parties settled the circuit-court case. The Chancery Court sealed the guardianship case file on stipulation and agreement of the parties and attorneys of record in the circuit-court action. Then in 2010, the chancellor removed Tommy as guardian of Tamarcus’s estate after finding that seventy-five thousand dollars in annuity payments had been redirected from a frozen guardianship account into an unfrozen account jointly owned by Tommy and Tamarcus. The court also found that Tommy had spent those funds without court approval. Chokwe Lumumba and Roy Perkins were appointed as coguardians of the estate. Tommy was not removed as the guardian of Tamarcus’s person. Tommy later sought a copy of the sealed settlement documents after he had been removed as guardian. The chancellor denied his request. But because he had access to those documents as guardian and participated in the settlement process, no purpose was served by keeping the sealed documents from him. So, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the chancellor to grant him access to the documents. View "Ewing, Jr. v. Neese" on Justia Law

After Barbara Frost died, her half-sister, Nancy Gamash, initiated a will contest, asserting that Frost’s will was a product of undue influence. In conjunction with that contest, Gamash sought a declaratory judgment that a note and mortgage held by Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) encumbering property of Frost’s estate were invalid. The probate court entered summary judgment in favor of BANA, concluding that the note and mortgage, as well as advances on BANA’s mortgage, were valid obligations of Frost’s estate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated it in part, holding (1) judgment was correctly entered in BANA’s favor as to the validity of the note and mortgage; but (2) summary judgment on the issue of the validity of certain mortgage advances should have been entered in favor of Gamash. View "In re Estate of Frost" on Justia Law

At the center of this appeal was a dispute over the ownership of certain real property between appellant Scott Walters, as the administrator of his father Randy Walters' estate and Randy's former girlfriend, respondent Valerie Boosinger. A 2003 deed named Randy and Boosinger as owners in joint tenancy of the Property. Upon Randy's death in 2013, Boosinger claimed sole ownership of the Property as the surviving joint tenant. Scott brought a quiet title claim premised on the theory that the grant deed was void ab initio. The Court of Appeal rejected Scott's claim on appeal that such a claim could be brought "at any time." Instead, the Court concluded that the claim was subject to a statute of limitation and that Scott failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that his quiet title cause of action was time barred. Scott also contended that he properly stated a claim for quiet title premised on the alternative theory that Randy and Boosinger severed their joint tenancy in the Property prior to Randy's death. As to this contention, the Court of Appeal concluded that Scott failed to sufficiently allege facts demonstrating such severance and that he did not demonstrate that he could amend his complaint to properly allege a severance of the joint tenancy. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Scott did not properly state a quiet title claim pursuant to this alternative theory either. View "Walters v. Boosinger" on Justia Law

In 2005, Cecile Poulin, then approximately eighty-five years old, asked her nephew, Paul Gagnon, to assist her with her financial affairs. In 2011, Poulin signed a durable power of attorney appointing Gagnon as her agent. In 2012, Gagnon died. In 2013, Poulin filed a claim against Gagnon’s Estate, alleging unauthorized withdrawal of funds, fraud, undue influence, and breach of fiduciary duty. After an evidentiary hearing, the probate court concluded that Gagnon had misappropriated Poulin’s funds and was not acting pursuant to the authority granted to him by the power of attorney. The court denied Poulin’s motion for attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment; (2) there was no error in the court’s award of damages; and (3) the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Poulin an award of attorney fees. View "In re Estate of Gagnon" on Justia Law

The Trusts filed suits in federal and state court over the course of two-and-a-half decades, claiming rights as the beneficiaries, successors, or assigns of the owners of coal mining royalty interests in Kentucky. In this case, the Trusts sued their former attorneys, alleging legal malpractice based on the adverse outcome of one of these cases. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court rejected the Trusts' assertion that the attorneys committed malpractice by failing to raise preclusion arguments based on the outcome of a prior case. The court agreed with the district court that the proffered argument would not have changed the outcome in Willits II. The court concluded that the Trusts have not stated a malpractice claim based on failure to press this preclusion theory in Willits II. The court also rejected the Trusts' assertion that the attorneys committed malpractice by failing to raise certain constitutional arguments at an earlier phase. The court agreed with the district court that the constitutional arguments lack merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "The PPW Royalty Trust v. Barton" on Justia Law

After learning of allegations of inappropriate and unwanted physical contact by Mark Langlais against Marviline Luneau in Luneau’s nursing home, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition for ex parte appointment of a public guardian. After a hearing, the probate court adjudicated Luneau incapacitated and appointed the Department Luneau’s temporary and permanent public guardian. Langlais appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because the probate court found that Langlais was unsuitable to serve as Luneau’s guardian, the court did not err by declining to appoint Langlais as Luneau’s guardian. View "In re Guardianship of Luneau" on Justia Law

In 2000, Paul Kurth, who never married or had children, died at the age of eighty-two. In 2013, Sinda and Marty Puryer, Kurth’s niece and her husband, petitioned to probate a document entitled “Instructions and Last Will and Testament of Paul L. Kurth.” Marty claimed Kurth dictated the contents of this document to him and then signed it in the presence of two witnesses. Kurth’s nephew challenged the will. The district court eventually ruled that Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-122(1) barred probate of Kurth’s alleged will and, therefore, that Kurth had died intestate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that Kurth died intestate and that his estate must be distributed in accordance with Montana’s intestacy statutes. View "In re Estate of Kurth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as personal representative of the Estate of Theodore Meiners, filed an action seeking enforcement of a divorce settlement agreement entered into between Theodore and his former wife, Colleen Meiners. The district court granted summary judgment to Colleen on some claims and to Plaintiff on other claims. The district court certified its ruling as final pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal, holding that the district court’s summary judgment ruling was not properly certified as a final, appealable order pursuant to Rule 54(b). Remanded with directions. View "Meiners v. Meiners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against USB and Recon challenging the complete foreclosure sale of their residential property. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the trustee’s sale was invalid under the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA), ORS 86.770(1), because several assignments of the Trust Deed that took place prior to the 2010 assignment to USB were never recorded. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, holding that ORS 86.770(1) barred plaintiffs' claims. In this case, the only defect the foreclosure process identified by plaintiffs has to do with the content of the notice. The defect is the incorrect listing of the beneficiary in the notice they received. However, plaintiffs do not dispute that: (1) they were in default; (2) they were served in the manner required by ORS 86.740 (requiring, at a minimum, service by certified mail 120 days before the sale) and ORS 86.750 (requiring personal service on grantors who occupy the property 120 days before the sale); (3) they had no financial ability to cure the default and redeem the property; (4) they took no action to challenge the sale prior to it becoming final; and (5) they only challenged the foreclosure sale many months after the foreclosure sale was completed. Therefore, plaintiffs' post-sale claims are barred as their property interests have been terminated and foreclosed pursuant to ORS 86.770(1). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Woods v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law