Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

This dispute arose out of an attempt to enter a copy of a lost will into probate. Decedent Isabel Wilner died at age 91 in March 2011. Decedent never married. Her intestate heirs were her niece, appellee Dana Wilner and her nephew David Wilner, who was not involved in this litigation. Charles Welles, Esq., a lawyer in Tunkhannock, drafted a will for Decedent, nominating Decedent’s friend Margaret Young as executrix and naming the Decedent's church as the primary beneficiary. Decedent executed the will in June 2007. Attorney Welles made two conformed copies of the will: one copy for his files and gave the other copy was the original will and given to Decedent. Decedent’s live-in caregiver was appellant Linda Baker, a close friend and a cousin by marriage. In April 2010, Attorney Welles prepared two additional documents for Decedent: a codicil which specifically referenced the June 2007 will and changed the executrix from Young to Baker, and a deed transferring ownership of Decedent’s Tunkhannock home to the Pennsylvania church while retaining a life estate. The executed deed was recorded with the county recorder of deeds. As for the codicil, Attorney Welles followed the same procedure as with the will: he made conformed copies, kept one copy for his files, and gave the original and a conformed copy to Decedent. Decedent died on March 16, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Baker went to Decedent’s house to retrieve the will. She discovered that the will had been removed from a downstairs metal box, although other items – including two original codicils and the envelope that had contained the will – were still there. When Baker checked an upstairs safe, she found that all papers had been removed, including a conformed copy of the will. Baker conducted a thorough search of the home but was unable to locate any of the missing items. Without the original will, Baker sought to have Attorney Welles’ conformed copy of the will, together with the original codicils, entered into probate. The court held two evidentiary hearings to determine whether the conformed copy of the will, as produced by Attorney Welles from his files, should have been accepted into probate. During the hearings, the witnesses to the will (members of Attorney Welles' office) testified that they saw Decedent execute the will. However, only one was able to testify to the will’s contents, stating that the terms appearing in the conformed copy accurately reflected the contents of the original will. The Superior Court reversed, concluding that the orphans’ court erred in accepting the conformed copy on the testimony of a single witness. The Supreme Court granted further review to consider the continuing vitality of the two-witness rule and, in particular, whether it properly applied to a will’s contents, as opposed to its execution. Finding that the Superior Court erred in reversing the orphans' court's order, the Supreme Court reinstated the original order. View "In re: Estate of Wilner" on Justia Law

When the decedent in this case died he owed over $340,000 in unpaid federal income tax liabilities. The decedent was survived by his wife, Appellant, and four minor children. Appellant, the decedent’s wife, was appointed executrix of the decedent’s estate. When Appellant told the IRS she was not cooperate with the IRS’s attempt to collect on the estate’s federal tax debts, the IRS served Appellant with a formal notice of potential liability under the federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. 3713. The government then sued the decedent’s estate and Appellant, both individually and in her capacity as executrix. The district court concluded that Appellant was personally liable for the value of the estate’s assets Appellant transferred to herself without first paying the estate’s federal tax debts. The district court then entered judgment holding that estate and Appellant as executrix liable for $351,218 and holding Appellant, individually, liable for $125,938. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment against Appellant personally, as the government showed that Appellant’s conduct satisfied the requirements of section 3713(b) to be held personally liable for amounts not paid to the United States. View "United States v. McNicol" on Justia Law

Defendants Providence Hospital and Bio-Medical Applications of Alabama, Inc., d/b/a BMA Magnolia a/k/a Fresenius Medical Care Magnolia Grove separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Pamela Howard died in 2012. One of Pamela's sons, Michael Darrick Howard ("Darrick"), petitioned the probate court to probate her will and to grant him letters testamentary. Attached to Darrick's petition was a document in which Pamela's other son, William Corey Howard ("Corey"), agreed that Darrick should be granted letters testamentary. In 2014, the probate court granted Darrick letters testamentary, establishing him as the personal representative of Pamela's estate. Under 6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975, only Darrick, as personal representative, had the authority to bring a wrongful-death action. However, Corey filed a wrongful-death action against the defendants, which had provided health-care services to their mother shortly before her death. Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that that Corey's wrongful-death action was a nullity because it had not been initiated by Darrick as personal representative of Pamela's estate. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the wrongful-death action filed against the defendants was indeed a nullity, it granted the petitions and issue mandamus relief. View "Ex parte Providence Hospital." on Justia Law

In 2006, a Colorado court entered a decree for adult adoption making Plaintiff, who was fifty-eight years old at the time, the heir of Merrill Maddocks under the intestacy laws. In 2014, Merrill died without leaving any surviving children. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint to quiet title to a section of farmland, arguing that he was the owner of the property because he was the “eldest son” of Merrill under the will of Merrill’s great-uncle. Defendant, the person who takes the property if Plaintiff is not Merrill’s “eldest son,” argued that Plaintiff was not Merrill’s eldest son under the will because “it was not legally possible to adopt an adult” in Nebraska when the great-uncle died. The trial court quieted title in the property in Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff was Merrill’s eldest son because the Colorado decree was entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Merrill and Plaintiff did not have a parent-child relationship, Plaintiff was not Merrill’s “eldest son” under the great-uncle’s will. Remanded with directions to quiet title to the property in Defendant. View "Burnett v. Maddocks" on Justia Law

The two decedents in these consolidated cases were residents at two different nursing homes operating by Virginia Health Services, Inc. After their deaths, the executors asked the nursing homes to provide copies of the written policies and procedures in effect during the decedents’ stays. The nursing homes refused, and the decedents’ estates filed declaratory judgment complaints seeking to assert a private right of action for the production of documents under 12 VAC 5-371-140(G). Specifically, the estates sought an order of “specific performance” compelling the nursing homes to provide the requested documents. The circuit court dismissed both complaints, holding that the regulation did not require the production of documents requested by the estates. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) the governing statute does not imply a private right of action for the enforcement of this regulation; and (2) therefore, the estates’ claims cannot be enforced in a declaratory judgment action. View "Cherrie v. Virginia Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

William's wife died in 1996; he died in 2011. Upon the wife's death, their trust established the decedent’s irrevocable trust, and the survivor’s amendable, revocable trust. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, both trusts would terminate; 30 percent of the survivor’s trust would be distributed to William’s children, with the rest set aside in a grandchildren’s trust. The document contained a no contest provision. In 1997, William executed the first amendment to the survivor’s trust After William’s death, a grandson filed a Probate Code section 17200 petition to determine the validity of a 2008 amendment, alleging that William lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence when he executed the amendment. The court dismissed, based the fact that another grandchild disclaimed his interest, thereby restoring the petitioner’s interest in the trust estate. The court of appeal reversed. Acceptance of the disclaimer was contrary to public policies of effectuating a testator’s intent and dissuading elder abuse, and was premised on the erroneous view that the disclaimer effectuated a settlement of the lawsuit. A settlement assumes the consent of the parties; it is not a side deal between the court and a nonlitigant. The petitioner had an interest in challenging the validity of the 2008 amendment, and the prosecution of his petition was necessary to protect that interest. View "Gregge v. Hugill" on Justia Law

Petitioner Estate of Thea Braiterman filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a final decision of the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), that upheld the determination that applicant Thea Braiterman was ineligible for Medicaid-Old Age Assistance (Medicaid-OAA) benefits because her assets exceeded the eligibility threshold. On appeal, petitioner argued that the AAU erroneously found that the Thea G. Braiterman Irrevocable Trust (the Trust) was includable as an asset for the purpose of determining applicant’s eligibility for Medicaid-OAA benefits. Petitioner argued, and DHHS did not dispute, that petitioner’s challenge was not moot even though applicant had died prior to the conclusion of this matter. Given the facts of this case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court could not say that there were no circumstances under which payments from the Trust could be made “for the benefit” of the applicant. “Finally, we take this opportunity to stress that we have no doubt that self-settled, irrevocable trusts may, if so structured, so insulate trust assets that those assets will be deemed unavailable to the settlor.” The Trust in this case was not such a vehicle. In the Supreme Court's view, the Trust, as structured, allowed applicant “a degree of discretionary authority that would . . . permit [her] to enjoy her assets, preserve those assets for her heirs, and receive public assistance, to, in effect, have her cake and eat it too." As such, the Court denied certiorari. View "Petition of Estate of Thea Braiterman" on Justia Law

This case concerns a lease and a purported joint venture agreement entered into between defendant and his now-deceased father, the former president and majority shareholder of a real estate development corporation. The lease granted defendant control over a multi-million-dollar property for a period of 20 years in exchange for a payment of $20. AHC sought damages for defendant's use and occupancy of the property and a judgment declaring the lease and joint venture agreement void. Defendant counterclaimed. The district court granted AHC’s motion for partial summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claims and denied defendant's requests for additional discovery. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's FRCP 56(d) motion seeking more discovery materials where none of the items defendant specifically requested is germane to the issues before the court; the court applied Pennsylvania law to its analysis of the joint‐venture dispute and New York law to the lease dispute; and the district court correctly concluded that the business judgment rule should not apply to the lease and thus the lease was void as a gift or act of corporate waste. As to the joint venture agreement, the court declined to certify the issue of parol evidence to the state court. The court concluded that the parol evidence rule applies in this case and that the integration clause in the lease retains its preclusive effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran" on Justia Law

Bank of America, N.A., in its capacity as a corporate trustee of several inter vivos trusts, applied for abatement of fiduciary income taxes paid by thirty-four inter vivos trusts. The Commissioner of Revenue denied the applications. The Bank appealed, arguing that, where the Bank was not domiciled in Massachusetts, these trusts did not qualify as “resident inter vivos trusts” and therefore were not subject to fiduciary income tax under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 10. The Appellate Tax Board upheld the Commissioner’s decision, concluding that the Bank, in its capacity as trustee, was an inhabitant of the Commonwealth within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, 1(f) and 10(c). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err in ruling that the Bank was subject to the fiduciary income tax imposed by section 10. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Comm’r of Revenue" on Justia Law

Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC ("Northstar"), and Maria Bolyard, CRNA; Parkway Medical Clinic, Inc., d/b/a Parkway Medical Center ("Parkway"); and Jeffrey Markham, M.D. ("Dr. Markham") (collectively referred to as "appellants"), filed three petitions for a permissive appeal of Circuit Court orders denying their motions for a summary judgment in a wrongful-death action brought by Paula Noble ("Paula"), as personal representative of the estate of Thomas Noble ("Thomas"). Thomas died in late 2011. In early 2012, Paula was appointed personal representative of Thomas' estate. When the business of the estate had closed, Paula petitioned to be discharged as personal representative. Then in 2013 (three days before the statute of limitations was set to run), Paula filed a wrongful-death action against the appellants. A month after filing her complaint, and having become aware of the fact that she lacked the representative capacity to maintain the wrongful-death action because she had been discharged and released as the personal representative of Thomas's estate before she commenced the action, Paula filed a petition to "re-open" Thomas's estate "so that she [could] continue as Personal Representative" for purposes of pursuing the wrongful-death action she filed. Appellants moved to dismiss, citing Paula's capacity to bring suit on behalf of the estate. After review, the Supreme Court found that Paula's initial complaint was a nullity. As a result, appellants were not under an obligation to raise the affirmative defense of capacity because the filing of Paula's complaint was "an act or proceeding in a cause which the opposite party may treat as though it had not taken place, or which has absolutely no legal force or effect." As such, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying appellants' summary-judgment motions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Markham v. Noble" on Justia Law