Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In April 2019, Charlotte Blair executed a power of attorney (POA) appointing her daughter, Annette Wiley, as her attorney in fact. The POA was not signed by two disinterested witnesses as required by Kentucky law at the time. In December 2019, Wiley signed admission documents and an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreement on Blair's behalf for Blair's admission to a long-term care facility. Blair passed away in June 2020. In July 2020, the Kentucky legislature amended the law to remove the two-witness requirement for POAs.Wiley and her sister, Melanie Persson, sued the care facility, Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc., for various claims. Masonic Homes argued that some of these claims were subject to the ADR agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled that the POA was invalid because it did not meet the requirements of the law at the time of its execution and that the 2020 amendment was not retroactive. Therefore, the ADR agreement was unenforceable. Masonic Homes appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the POA was valid because the 2020 amendment to the law was retroactive. Wiley sought review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the 2020 amendment to the law was not retroactive. Therefore, the POA was invalid at the time of its execution and the ADR agreement was unenforceable. The court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Wiley v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the estate of Dr. Lester Frank Sumrall, who founded a church that grew into a global evangelical empire, LeSEA, Inc. After his death, his son and grandson, Lester Sumrall, claimed they should have inherited part of his estate, including copyrights to his works and his right of publicity. They alleged that LeSEA, now controlled by other family members, had wrongfully taken ownership of these assets.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court dismissed the claims brought by Lester Sumrall and the Lester Sumrall Family Trust against LeSEA and its affiliates, ruling in favor of LeSEA on all counts. The court found that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to a particular photograph, the "Traveler Photo," taken by Lester Sumrall. The court also dismissed various state law claims for damages under the doctrine of laches, citing inexcusable delay in asserting rights and prejudice to the adverse party.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to the Traveler Photo. The court also upheld the application of laches to the state law claims, noting that laches is equally applicable in suits at law in Indiana. Finally, the court dismissed the claim for LeSEA's alleged use of Dr. Sumrall's right of publicity, as the Trust failed to plead the required half-ownership. View "Sumrall v. LeSEA, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Charles Williamson was injured when he was hit by a car and applied for PIP benefits from the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF), which operates the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP). The MAIPF assigned Williamson’s claim to AAA, but AAA refused to pay. After Williamson's death, his daughters, Porsha Williamson and Lateshea Williamson, continued the lawsuit as co-personal representatives of his estate. The Estate claimed benefits for attendant care that was purported to have been provided after Charles Williamson’s death. AAA moved for summary disposition, arguing that the Estate knowingly presented material misrepresentations in support of its claim for no-fault benefits and was therefore barred from recovering all no-fault benefits.The trial court granted AAA’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Court of Appeals held that statements made during discovery cannot constitute fraudulent insurance acts under the no-fault act. AAA then applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that false statements submitted during discovery, after a lawsuit for recovery has been filed, may be statements offered in support of a claim to the MAIPF or the assigned insurer. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that only prelitigation statements can constitute statements in support of a claim under MCL 500.3173a(4). The court concluded that the Estate’s interrogatory answers, which indicated that the Estate sought no-fault benefits for services rendered after Williamson passed away, were in support of a demand for coverage under the MACP based on bodily injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate Of Williamson v. AAA Of Michigan" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the validity of a will. Robert Harrison Ashworth, the deceased, had four children: Christine, Gwendolyn, Brian, and Kimberly. In 2017, Ashworth, who was in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease, executed a will that divided his estate evenly among his four children and named his son, Brian, as the estate's personal representative. However, in 2022, Ashworth executed a new will that named Christine as the personal representative and included only Christine and Gwendolyn as beneficiaries, excluding Brian and Kimberly from any inheritance. After Ashworth's death, Christine submitted the 2022 will for probate. Brian contested its validity and sought access to medical records from the last eight years of Ashworth's life, arguing that the records would shed light on Ashworth's decision-making capacity at the time he executed his final will. Christine, however, refused to provide any medical records, citing the physician-patient privilege.The trial court ordered Christine to provide the medical records for an in camera review, stating that the court would not release any records unrelated to the mental capacity of the decedent. Christine petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado for relief from the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the physician-patient privilege survives the privilege holder's death, but the testamentary exception provides for disclosure of the decedent's privileged medical records if they are required to administer the estate. The court discharged the rule to show cause and lifted the stay on the trial court's in camera review of Ashworth's medical records. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Ashworth" on Justia Law

The case involves the trustees of the Stanley and Sandra Goldberg Trusts, C. Leon Nelson and Marilynn Tetrick, who hired legal counsel to assist them in their duties. The same attorneys later defended them in a lawsuit brought by several beneficiaries of the trusts. The jury found that the trustees had breached their fiduciary duties, and the district court entered a judgment against them, most of which was payable to the trusts. The court then removed the trustees and appointed successor trustees. The former trustees, still represented by the same attorneys, asked the court to reduce the amount of the judgment against them. The successor trustees moved to disqualify the former trustees’ attorneys, arguing that a conflict had surfaced under rule 1.9(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. The district court agreed and disqualified the attorneys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that an attorney-client relationship does not automatically arise merely because an attorney represents a trustee. In this case, the attorneys represented the former trustees only, not the trusts, which were not named in the suit. Thus, because the attorneys never represented the trusts in the litigation, rule 1.9(a) does not prevent the attorneys from continuing to represent the former trustees. View "In re Estate of Goldberg" on Justia Law

This case involves a conservatorship dispute over Susan Davis Malone. Two attorneys involved in the case filed two motions requesting the trial judge to recuse himself. The first recusal motion was denied and affirmed on appeal. The second recusal motion was also denied. The attorneys then filed a second petition for recusal appeal, arguing that trial court orders entered after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the first recusal appeal, but before the mandate issued, are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Court of Appeals agreed with the attorneys and held that the orders were void. The counterpetitioners and co-conservators then filed an accelerated application for permission to appeal in the Supreme Court of Tennessee.The Supreme Court of Tennessee granted the application and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The court held that the stay imposed by the Court of Appeals in the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court also held that the attorneys waived any other argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. View "In Re Conservatorship of Malone" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a Major Land Use Permit issued to Susan Dietz, individually and as Trustee of G&M Trust (G&M), by Flathead County, Montana. G&M had purchased two adjacent 11.5-acre tracts on the shore of Lake Five and began several remodeling, demolition, and construction projects on both tracts. G&M received notices of multiple violations from both the Department of Environmental Quality and Flathead County, advising that these new structures violated local zoning regulations. G&M then submitted an application proposing new structures for short-term/vacation nightly rentals. The application was initially accepted by the County, who issued a Major Land Use Permit, later voided by the District Court.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, voided the Major Land Use Permit issued to G&M, permanently enjoined all future construction or expansion of use or conversion of G&M’s property to any commercial use without first obtaining legal access and complying with all State and local statutes and regulations, ordered restoration of G&M’s property to its previously unaltered condition, and awarded attorney fees and costs to Friends of Lake Five, Inc. (FLF).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the District Court's decision to void the Major Land Use Permit and its award of attorney fees and grant of permanent injunction. However, it reversed the District Court's requirement that G&M restore the property to its previous unaltered condition outside of the lakeshore zone. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Friends of Lake 5 v. County Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mabel Amos Memorial Fund, a charitable trust established to provide financial assistance to beneficiaries seeking higher education. The plaintiffs, Megan Carmack and Leigh Gulley Manning, individually and on behalf of Carmack's minor children, and Tyra Lindsey, a minor, represented by her mother and guardian, alleged that the trustee and board members of the trust breached their fiduciary duties. They sought to remove the trustee and board members, appoint new ones, and restore the allegedly misappropriated assets of the trust. The Montgomery Circuit Court appointed a special master under Rule 53, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Attorney General Steve Marshall, who was added as a party to the underlying actions, petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order appointing a special master.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Marshall's petitions and ordered the circuit court to vacate its order referring the cases to a special master. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in referring all matters in these cases to a special master. The court noted that the referral of matters to be tried without a jury did not indicate that an "exceptional condition" necessitated the referral, and the referral of the accounting did not indicate that the accounting would prove complicated in some way. Even if the accounting was properly referred to a special master, the referral of an accounting does not justify the referral of all the other matters in the cases. View "Ex parte Marshall" on Justia Law

Nella Ruth Braswell passed away in 2014, leaving behind an estate valued at over $2,000,000, 6 cats, and 13 dogs. In her will, she provided for the care of her animals until their death, with the remaining funds to be given to The Humane Society of the United States. The Jefferson Probate Court accepted her will and appointed Marion Kristen McLeroy as the personal representative of the estate. However, The Humane Society became dissatisfied with McLeroy's management of the estate and had the estate proceeding removed from the probate court to the Jefferson Circuit Court. McLeroy objected to this move, but the circuit court refused to relinquish the case.The Humane Society and McLeroy had a working relationship initially, but it deteriorated over time. The Humane Society requested deeds to all the property Braswell had owned, as well as a formal accounting of both the estate and the Animal Trust. The Humane Society also asked the circuit court to remove McLeroy and her husband as cotrustees of the Animal Trust and to order them to reimburse the Animal Trust for any losses caused by their alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and found that once a probate court begins the final-settlement process for an estate, a circuit court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the administration of that estate. Therefore, when the probate court began the final-settlement process for Braswell's estate, the Humane Society's right to remove the proceeding to the circuit court was cut off. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted McLeroy's petition and issued a writ directing the circuit court to vacate its order consolidating the estate proceeding with the Humane Society's other action against McLeroy and her husband and to enter an order remanding the administration of Braswell's estate to the probate court. View "Ex parte McLeroy" on Justia Law