Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

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This case involves a legal malpractice claim brought by Anne Fahey, Timothy Fife, and Richard Fife (Plaintiffs) against their former attorneys, Andrew Cook, Lukas Andrud, and Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. (Defendants). The claim stems from Defendants' representation of Plaintiffs in a previous case concerning the distribution of their mother's estate. The mother, Marianne Fife, owned a mineral interest in North Dakota and was a resident of Idaho when she died intestate. She had conveyed her mineral interest to her husband, Richard Fife, shortly before her death. Plaintiffs sued their father's estate, claiming their mother lacked capacity to execute the deed due to medication and undue influence from their father. The district court rescinded the deed but held that the mineral interest still passed to Richard Fife under North Dakota's intestate succession laws.The district court's decision was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiffs then initiated a malpractice action against Defendants, alleging negligence in the underlying litigation by failing to contest the validity of a quitclaim deed for their mother's interest in an Idaho home and failing to argue that their mother's estate had a cause of action against their father's estate. Plaintiffs claimed that if Defendants had taken these actions, the value of their mother's estate would have increased, and they would have received some of the minerals under intestate succession laws.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that they did not breach their duty to Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs did not suffer damages caused by the alleged breach of duty. The court reasoned that even if Plaintiffs had successfully taken the suggested actions, they still would not have received their mother's mineral interests.On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their legal malpractice claims. They contended that the court erred in concluding that their mother's estate, for valuation and distribution purposes, did not include real or personal property outside of North Dakota. They also argued that Defendants were collaterally estopped from arguing that their mother's interest in the Idaho home and personal property would never be part of the estate.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in holding that collateral estoppel does not apply in this case. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that the Idaho home would not have been part of the mother's North Dakota intestate estate because it was community property and would have passed to the father as a matter of law. Therefore, the court found that Defendants' alleged failure to challenge the Idaho quitclaim deed's validity and argue that the mother's estate had a cause of action against the father's estate did not proximately cause Plaintiffs any damages. View "Fahey v. Cook" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, was married to Donelson C. Glassie, and they divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement, the testator was to execute a will that would treat his obligations under the agreement as a claim against his estate and bequest to the plaintiff an amount equal to said obligations. A dispute arose over what the agreement required of the testator’s will. In 1997, a Family Court justice determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a bequest of a sum equal to the testator’s obligations. The testator died in 2011, and the plaintiff filed a claim for $2,000,000 against the testator’s estate a year later, which the defendant disallowed.The case was previously reviewed by the Superior Court, which awarded the plaintiff $2,000,000, less the proceeds of a life insurance policy that she received upon the testator’s death and attorneys’ fees. However, this judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court on multiple grounds, including that the disputed provision in the will was ambiguous and required factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to the testator’s intent.In the current review by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice made numerous prejudicial evidentiary rulings that prevented her from presenting her case. After reviewing the record and considering the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found no error in the trial justice’s decisions to prevent the plaintiff from presenting evidence regarding a trust, to allow the defendant to withdraw certain admissions, to admit evidence of a life insurance policy, and to allow evidence of the defendant’s post-death conduct. The court also found that the plaintiff had not preserved her argument regarding the trial justice’s decision to prevent her from examining the defendant about his counterclaim. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the will of the late Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, is the testator’s former wife. She appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Paul Doucette, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The Superior Court affirmed an order of the Newport Probate Court denying the plaintiff’s petition for leave to file a claim out of time against the estate. The denied claim would have alleged a breach of contract, based on the plaintiff’s contention that a key provision of the testator’s will violated the terms of the couple’s property-settlement agreement.The plaintiff and the testator were married in 1986, had three children, and were divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement (PSA), the testator was to execute a will that would not only treat his obligations under the PSA as “a claim against any assets in [his] [e]state” but also “specifically bequest to [plaintiff] an amount equal to said obligations.” A dispute soon unfolded over what the PSA required of the testator’s will.In 2017, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Superior Court judgment on multiple grounds. Relevant to the present appeal, the court determined “that the disputed provision in the will is ambiguous” because it “does not clearly specify under what circumstances plaintiff is to receive the sum of $2,000,000 or the circumstances under which she is to receive such other amount necessary to satisfy all of [the testator’s] remaining obligations.” Because “a proper resolution of this matter require[d] factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to [the] testator’s intent,” the court remanded the case to the Superior Court.Back in Superior Court, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint with a claim for breach of contract. The Superior Court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, in part because she did not first submit the claim to the probate court, and also because the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff thereafter filed a petition in the Newport Probate Court for leave to file a claim out of time and, after the court denied her petition, she appealed that denial to the Superior Court.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to timely present her claim for breach of contract was not due to excusable neglect and, therefore, her claim must be denied. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over a family farm in Minnesota. Richard and Paulette Dunn entered into a contract for deed with their son, Rory, for the sale of their family farm. The contract stipulated that Rory could not sell, assign, or otherwise transfer his interest in the farm without the Dunns' written consent. However, Rory died two years later without a will, and his interest in the farm was transferred to his young son by intestate succession. Jeffrey Kuhn, the personal representative of Rory’s estate, intended to divide the property and sell a portion of the farm on the open market. The Dunns responded by cancelling the contract for deed, arguing that the intestate transfer of Rory’s interest to his son without their consent was a breach of the contract.The district court ruled in favor of the Dunns, stating that the intestate transfer of Rory’s interest in the farm violated the consent-to-transfer provision and materially breached the contract for deed. However, the court of appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the intestate transfer of Rory’s estate as a result of Rory’s inaction did not violate the consent-to-transfer provision.The Minnesota Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an intestate transfer of an interest in a family farm breaches a consent-to-transfer provision in a contract for deed. The court held that the intestate transfer of Rory’s interest in the farm violated the consent-to-transfer provision and that this violation was a material breach of the contract for deed. Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "Kuhn vs. Dunn" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over the interpretation of a trust. Jerry and Mary Trotter established the Trotter Family Revocable Trust in 2011, naming themselves as both trustees and trustors. Upon Jerry's death in 2012, Mary became the sole trustee. The trust provided that upon the death of the surviving spouse, certain stock would be distributed to their son, Timothy, and the rest of the estate would be divided equally among several children, including Jerry's daughter from a previous marriage, Wendy Trotter Van Dyck. In 2020, Mary expressed her intention to exclude Van Dyck from the trust beneficiaries via email and a questionnaire. However, she passed away before a formal amendment to the trust could be made.The probate court was asked to determine whether Mary's emails and the questionnaire constituted a valid amendment to the trust. The court found that Mary's writings were insufficient to constitute an amendment, as they were not signed as required by the trust and did not adequately express an intent to amend the trust. The court ordered that the trust be distributed to its original beneficiaries, including Van Dyck. Timothy appealed this decision.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Mary's writings did not meet the requirements for a valid amendment to the trust. The court found that the writings were not signed as required by the trust, and the electronic signature provision of the Uniform Electronics Transaction Act (UETA) did not apply because a unilateral trust amendment does not constitute a "transaction" within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, the court found that Mary's writings did not adequately express an intent to amend the trust by the writings themselves. View "Trotter v. Van Dyck" on Justia Law

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The case involves Leatrice Tanner-Brown, a descendant of people enslaved by the Cherokee Tribe and emancipated at the end of the Civil War. Her grandfather, George Curls, received land allotments as a minor. Tanner-Brown and the Harvest Institute Freedman Federation, LLC (HIFF) brought suit seeking various remedies related to the allotments, including an accounting from the Secretary of the Interior arising from the alleged creation of a trust relationship between the federal government and Indian beneficiaries.The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that Tanner-Brown failed to establish that she was injured by not receiving an accounting on the ground that there was no trust relationship between Curls and the federal government and that HIFF failed to satisfy the requirements for associational standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that although HIFF cannot sustain standing, Tanner-Brown has alleged a concrete injury-in-fact sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court also found that the case raises factual questions that cannot be resolved at this juncture and remanded for the district court to consider the merits of Tanner-Brown’s allegations and the relevant record documents in the first instance. View "Tanner-Brown v. Haaland" on Justia Law

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In April 2019, Charlotte Blair executed a power of attorney (POA) appointing her daughter, Annette Wiley, as her attorney in fact. The POA was not signed by two disinterested witnesses as required by Kentucky law at the time. In December 2019, Wiley signed admission documents and an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) agreement on Blair's behalf for Blair's admission to a long-term care facility. Blair passed away in June 2020. In July 2020, the Kentucky legislature amended the law to remove the two-witness requirement for POAs.Wiley and her sister, Melanie Persson, sued the care facility, Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc., for various claims. Masonic Homes argued that some of these claims were subject to the ADR agreement and moved to compel arbitration. The Jefferson Circuit Court ruled that the POA was invalid because it did not meet the requirements of the law at the time of its execution and that the 2020 amendment was not retroactive. Therefore, the ADR agreement was unenforceable. Masonic Homes appealed this decision.The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, ruling that the POA was valid because the 2020 amendment to the law was retroactive. Wiley sought review from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the 2020 amendment to the law was not retroactive. Therefore, the POA was invalid at the time of its execution and the ADR agreement was unenforceable. The court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Wiley v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around the issue of whether a guardian can initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of an incapacitated ward. Peter Galbraith, II, the ward, and Belinda Galbraith were married in 2015. Between 2018 and 2019, Mr. Galbraith became ill with Frontotemporal Dementia BV. Mrs. Galbraith obtained a power of attorney and later deeded the marital residence to her separate trust. In 2022, she asked Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother to take care of him, and he was moved out of the marital home. In 2023, Mr. Galbraith's brother and mother petitioned the court for a general guardianship over him and filed a Petition for the Dissolution of Marriage without first obtaining authorization from the guardianship court. Mrs. Galbraith filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the guardians lacked authority to initiate a divorce proceeding on behalf of the ward. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The trial court initially held that the guardian did not have the authority to file a divorce petition on behalf of the ward. After obtaining authorization from the guardianship court, the guardian refiled the petition. However, the trial court again dismissed the petition, stating that Oklahoma law does not allow a guardian to initiate a divorce on behalf of a ward. The guardian appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Oklahoma Guardianship and Conservatorship Act does not explicitly disallow the guardianship court from authorizing a guardian to file a divorce petition on behalf of a ward. The court found that the guardian was acting to protect the ward's rights and manage his financial resources, which aligns with the purpose of the Act. The court also held that the addressed provisions of title 43 of the Oklahoma Statutes do not act as a bar to the initiation of such an action by the guardian. The court concluded that the guardianship court may authorize a guardian to initiate a divorce action on behalf of a ward. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GALBRAITH v. GALBRAITH" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over the estate of Dr. Lester Frank Sumrall, who founded a church that grew into a global evangelical empire, LeSEA, Inc. After his death, his son and grandson, Lester Sumrall, claimed they should have inherited part of his estate, including copyrights to his works and his right of publicity. They alleged that LeSEA, now controlled by other family members, had wrongfully taken ownership of these assets.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court dismissed the claims brought by Lester Sumrall and the Lester Sumrall Family Trust against LeSEA and its affiliates, ruling in favor of LeSEA on all counts. The court found that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to a particular photograph, the "Traveler Photo," taken by Lester Sumrall. The court also dismissed various state law claims for damages under the doctrine of laches, citing inexcusable delay in asserting rights and prejudice to the adverse party.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the copyright claims were untimely and that LeSEA owned the copyright to the Traveler Photo. The court also upheld the application of laches to the state law claims, noting that laches is equally applicable in suits at law in Indiana. Finally, the court dismissed the claim for LeSEA's alleged use of Dr. Sumrall's right of publicity, as the Trust failed to plead the required half-ownership. View "Sumrall v. LeSEA, Inc." on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute over no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Charles Williamson was injured when he was hit by a car and applied for PIP benefits from the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF), which operates the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP). The MAIPF assigned Williamson’s claim to AAA, but AAA refused to pay. After Williamson's death, his daughters, Porsha Williamson and Lateshea Williamson, continued the lawsuit as co-personal representatives of his estate. The Estate claimed benefits for attendant care that was purported to have been provided after Charles Williamson’s death. AAA moved for summary disposition, arguing that the Estate knowingly presented material misrepresentations in support of its claim for no-fault benefits and was therefore barred from recovering all no-fault benefits.The trial court granted AAA’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The Court of Appeals held that statements made during discovery cannot constitute fraudulent insurance acts under the no-fault act. AAA then applied for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that false statements submitted during discovery, after a lawsuit for recovery has been filed, may be statements offered in support of a claim to the MAIPF or the assigned insurer. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' ruling that only prelitigation statements can constitute statements in support of a claim under MCL 500.3173a(4). The court concluded that the Estate’s interrogatory answers, which indicated that the Estate sought no-fault benefits for services rendered after Williamson passed away, were in support of a demand for coverage under the MACP based on bodily injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Estate Of Williamson v. AAA Of Michigan" on Justia Law