Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

A judgment creditor obtained a judgment against a judgment debtor (individually and as trustee of the debtor's trust), but did not levy on the debtor's property until after the debtor died. A third party claimant to the property filed a third party claim, and the judgment creditor filed a petition under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (EJL), Code Civ. Proc., 680.010 et seq., to invalidate the third party claim. The trial court granted the judgment creditor's petition. The third party claimant did not appeal from that ruling. Two years later, the third party claimant filed a motion to vacate the order granting the petition, on the ground that it is void because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed under the EJL. The trial court denied the motion, and the third party claimant appealed. The court concluded that the underlying order invalidating the third party claim was voidable, not void, and became final once the time to appeal that order ran. Therefore, the court held that the trial court properly denied the third party claimant's belated motion to vacate that order. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Torjesen, v. Mansdorf" on Justia Law

During the course of the guardianship proceedings involving the decedent’s estate in this case the district court entered several orders, including a distribution order. The previous guardian of the decedent’s estate later petitioned the district court for distribution of money held in an operating account associated with certain real property. The district court entered a stipulation and order without the participation, signature, or agreement of the decedent’s judgment creditor. At issue on appeal was whether Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.1365 or the district court’s distribution order governed the distribution of funds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if the source of the funds is the sale of real property, Chapter 159 applies, and if the source of the funds was not the sale of the property, the district court must determine whether its distribution order or Chapter 159 applies, and the district court erred by failing to identify the source of the funds in the operating account; and (2) a valid stipulation requires mutual assent to its terms and either a signed writing indicating assent by the party against whom the stipulation is offered or the presence of all interested parties, and the district court in this case erred by approving the stipulation. View "In re Guardianship & Estate of Echevarria" on Justia Law

This dispute revolved around the administration of two trusts established by now-deceased Thomas H. Gentry. When the beneficiaries and co-trustees disputed how the trust assets should be distributed, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Petitioner, a beneficiary of both trusts, filed a petition to enforce settlement agreement and appoint receiver. The probate court denied Petitioner’s petition to enforce (enforcement judgment) and granted in part and denied in part the co-trustees’ petition for instructions regarding the distribution of the assets (distribution judgment). Petitioner appealed from the enforcement judgment, arguing that the probate court ignored the settlement agreement in refusing to grant her petition to enforce. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that because Petitioner had failed to directly appeal the distribution judgment, Petitioner’s appeal of the enforcement judgment constituted a collateral attack on the distribution judgment. Because it was unable to grant Petitioner effective relief, the ICA dismissed her appeal as moot. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding that the ICA erred in concluding that Petitioner’s appeal was an impermissible collateral attack and that Petitioner’s appeal was moot. Remanded. View "In re Thomas H. Gentry Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute primarily among siblings regarding the substance of and rights to their mother’s estate. Plaintiff commenced an action against Defendants for tortious interference with an expectancy of an inheritance. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff did not make a prima facie case for the causation element of his cause of action. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case for tortious interference with an expectancy interest, and therefore, the trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Cote v. Cote" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over who was the proper beneficiary of an individual retirement account ("IRA") owned by decedent Edward F. Dees, Sr. ("Dees"). Timothy Dees, Edward Dees, Jr., and Donna Dees Maddox, Dees's adult children, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of Dees's surviving spouse, Martha Lafaye Dees. Martha cross-appealed the dismissal of her claims against Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, the financial-services firm that managed the IRA. The children argued that it was their father's intent to pass the funds in the IRA to his natural children. They contended that, because no copy of a signed IRA agreement had been produced, there was no evidence indicating that Dees had assented to any default-beneficiary provision. Thus, they argued, the funds in the IRA should have passed through Dees's estate. In her cross-motion for a summary judgment, Martha argued that the default-beneficiary provisions of the IRA agreement applied. Specifically, she argued that, even if Dees had originally executed a beneficiary-designation form naming the children as contingent beneficiaries, there was uncontradicted evidence that Dees had executed a new beneficiary-designation form naming her as the sole beneficiary. The trial court concluded that neither side had established that Dees had provided Morgan Stanley with a beneficiary-designation form and that, therefore, the default provisions of the IRA agreement applied. Thus, in accordance with those provisions, the trial court ordered Morgan Stanley to distribute the proceeds of the IRA to Martha. The court dismissed all remaining claims sua sponte, including Martha's tort claims against Morgan Stanley. After review of the trial court record, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded there were "a myriad" of genuine issues of material fact that made summary judgment improper in this case. As such, summary judgment granted to Martha was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dees v. Dees" on Justia Law

In January 2012, after the death of John Gilbert, intestate probate proceedings were commenced. In November 2013, the probate court concluded that the relationship between Judith Gilbert, John’s widow, and Nathan Gilbert, John’s son from a prior relationship, had “risen to the level of causing concern” and ordered that it would supervise Judith’s distribution and settlement of the estate. In 2015, a court-appointed referee filed a report recommending a plan to distribute the estate. Judith objected to many of the report’s findings and recommendations. Nathan moved the court to adopt the report. The probate court did not hold a hearing regarding Judith’s objections and did not act on the report but, rather, continued to supervise Judith’s administration of the estate by entering orders. The Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded, holding that because the court had not held a hearing on Judith’s objections and acted on the report, the court erred by continuing to enter orders supervising the disposition of the estate. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Gilbert" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether a property titled in the name of a judgment debtor's co-settled revocable trust was subject to a judgment lien against the debtor. Petitioners were co-settlors and co-trustees of a revocable trust that held title to some Colorado property. Respondent obtained two judgments, and filed a quiet title action for a decree of foreclosure. Petitioner moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that respondent's complaint was barred by the statute of limitations in 13-80-101(1)(k), C.R.S. (2015). The trial court denied the motion. After granting certiorari review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that as a settlor of a revocable trust, petitioner held an ownership interest in the trust's assets. Respondent could properly seek to enforce its judgment against petitioner, and the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Pandy v. Independent Bank" on Justia Law

John F. LeBouef, an attorney, appeals a probate judgment invalidating a will and living trust purportedly executed by John Patton. Patton's will and trust named LeBouef as the principal beneficiary to a $5 million estate. The trial court factually found that LeBouef caused the loss of the original trust instrument, which made it impossible for the trial court to determine the true terms of the trust. The trial court declared the will and trust invalid and removed Lebouef as trustee. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the trial court's factual findings are disturbing, fatal to LeBouef's contentions, and suggest criminal culpability. The court also affirmed the trial court's postjudgment order approving LeBouef's trust accounting but denied his request for trustee fees, attorney fees, and reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses and property management services where the trial court ruled that an award for fees, costs, services, and out-of-pocket expenses would be inequitable and reward LeBouef for his misconduct. View "Butler v. LeBouef" on Justia Law

In two consolidated actions, Edward Voccola (Mr. Voccola) sought to recover property which he alleged his daughter, Patricia, had wrongfully transferred. Patricia and her company, Red Fox Realty, LLC, were named as defendants. Mr. Voccola died during the pendency of the actions, and Mr. Voccola’s children, Barbara and Edward, in their capacities as co-executors of Mr. Voccola’s estate, were substituted as plaintiffs. The superior court entered final judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err when she (1) concluded that Mr. Voccola’s signatures authorizing the transfer of the properties to Red Fox were not genuine; (2) determined that the transfer of Mr. Voccola’s properties was not a gift to Patricia; and (3) awarded Patricia $82,000 on her counterclaim. View "Voccola v. Forte" on Justia Law

Sharon Born, the cousin of John Born, held two installment promissory notes upon which the inter vivos revocable trust created by John (“the Born Trust”) assets had been pledged as security when John died. When Betty Born, John’s wife, attempted to make payments on the notes, Sharon asserted that the notes were in default because of John’s death, that the entire remaining balances were immediately due and payable under the notes’ acceleration clauses, and that Sharon’s only remedy under the security agreements was to accept all of the Born Trust’s pledged assets in full satisfaction of the note balances. Betty, in her capacity as a Born Trust trustee, brought this injunction and declaratory judgment action against Sharon, challenging Sharon’s right unilaterally to effect an acceptance-of-collateral remedy. The district court granted summary judgment for Sharon and ordered the Born Trust to turn over the collateral to Sharon. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Born Trust had the right under the promissory notes to pay the accelerated balances due thereon to prevent Sharon’s acceptance of the pledged assets under the security agreement. Remanded. View "Born v. Born" on Justia Law