Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

Imogene and Clyde Snell were the parents of William Snell and Clyde Allen Snell (Allen). William and Allen were remainder beneficiaries of a revocable trust executed by Imogene. The trust contained a choice of law provision directing that it be construed and governed by the laws of Arkansas. After Imogene’s death, William filed an action for a trust accounting from Clyde, the sole trustee and current beneficiary of the trust. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of William and ordered Clyde to produce certain trust documents. Clyde appealed. The Supreme Court exercised its discretion to convert Clyde’s notice of appeal to a petition for writ of review and granted the writ to resolve the legal issue of whether William was entitled to an accounting, holding (1) the district court’s summary judgment order was not a final appealable order; and (2) the district court correctly determined that, under Arkansas law, William was entitled to an accounting. Remanded to the district court for immediate release of the records. View "Snell v. Snell" on Justia Law

Charlene Ivy was admitted to East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”) in May 2012, and she died on July 17, 2012. Alleging medical negligence by EMSH staff, Ivy’s son Spencer sent a Notice of Claim letter via certified mail dated July 11, 2013, to EMSH Director Charles Carlisle. Carlisle signed for the letter on July 15, 2013, as evidenced by a return receipt. The definitive question in this appeal was whether Carlisle, as the Director of the East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”), was the proper “chief executive officer” for notice purposes under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), as opposed to the Executive Director of the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”). The trial judge found that “proper pre-suit notice” required service “upon the executive director of [DMH], not a facility manager of one of the institutions under its jurisdiction and control.” The trial judge found further that the statute of limitations was not tolled because Ivy had “failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 11-46-11(1)” and dismissed Ivy’s complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that EMSH’s Director was the CEO under the MTCA, and that Ivy provided the "proper pre-suit notice. View "Ivy v. East Mississippi State Hospital" on Justia Law

Coblentz, a law firm partner, died in 2010. Coblentz served for many years as a trustee for the McClatchy Trust before resigning in 2009. In 2012, one of the Trust’s beneficiaries filed a Petition for Relief from Breach of Trust under Probate Code 17200(a), seeking damages for alleged asset mismanagement. The petition included an allegation that “Petitioner is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the Respondents named herein as Does 1 through 20, inclusive, and therefore names these Respondents by such fictitious names." An amended petition, attempting to add the Firm as a named defendant, alleged that after reading an SEC filing dated 2004, plaintiff became aware that Coblentz‘s actions as trustee had been undertaken in his capacity as a partner in the Firm, making the Firm vicariously liable. The Firm argued the beneficiary was not entitled to use the Doe defendant procedure because he had known the Firm‘s identity and the facts allegedly giving rise to its liability when the original petition was filed and that the claims were time-barred. The trial court quashed service, reasoning that plaintiff knew all the relevant facts before filing the original petition. The court of appeal affirmed. View "McClatchy v. Coblentz, Patch, Duffy & Bass, LLP" on Justia Law

Tamara Williford filed a “Petition for Equitable Relief” against Mary Ann Brown, alleging that Brown’s husband, Tommy, was Williford’s biological father; that Tommy Brown was in poor physical health and could not leave home but was in good mental condition and can make decisions for himself; that Williford and Tommy have a good relationship, used to talk on the telephone regularly, and until recently saw each other in person; and that Tommy was prevented from doing so by Mrs. Brown. The petition requested an order requiring Mrs. Brown to allow Williford unimpeded personal access to Tommy, or appointing a guardian ad litem for Tommy. Mrs. Brown filed an answer denying: that Williford was Mr. Brown’s biological daughter, that he was in poor health, that he wished to have contact with Williford, and that Mrs. Brown has interfered in any way with Williford’s access to Mr. Brown. The trial court held that there was no such relief as Williford requested. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of her petition. View "Williford v. Brown" on Justia Law

These matters involved the administration of an estate. In case no. 1141293, Raymond Adams, the executor of the estate of Clifford Wayne Cleveland, appealed the preliminary injunction issued against him at the request of the beneficiaries of the estate, Clifford Wayne Cleveland II ("Chip") and Celeste Cleveland Minor. In case no. 1140732, Adams petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court: (1) to require the beneficiaries of the estate to produce certain materials disclosing the assets and liabilities of the estate; (2) to vacate its order prohibiting Adams from hiring attorneys and accountants to assist him with the administration of the estate; (3) to vacate its order requiring Adams to produce certain corporate documents; and (4) to sanction the beneficiaries; and (5) to direct the trial judge to recuse himself from further presiding over the underlying case. The decedent Cleveland died with of assets whose estimated value was between $2 million and $3 million; however, those assets were significantly encumbered, rendering the estate potentially insolvent. In 1140732, the Supreme Court denied the petition, and consequently, reversed and remanded in 1141293: "Chip and Minor's argument fails to acknowledge the language of Rule 65(d)(2) as well as the numerous decisions of this Court reaffirming that the requirements of Rule 65(d)(2) are mandatory. [. . .] the trial court's order does explain what issue the trial court intends to resolve during the term of the injunction, it wholly fails to state the specific grounds on which the injunction itself issued. That omission, alone, requires reversal of the trial court's order, regardless of the potential underlying merit." View "Adams v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 2001, John Bays and Carole Kiphart, who were married, executed reciprocal wills. Carole also obtained two life-insurance policies with the benefits payable to John and their minor son. In 2007, after Carole was diagnosed with cancer, she executed a new will that largely disinherited John. Carole then created two trusts, removed John as a beneficiary on the life-insurance policies, and named the trusts as the beneficiaries. After Carole died, John renounced the will, elected to take his spousal share, and sought to recover the portion of his spousal share that may have been delivered to various legatees under the will and to the beneficiaries of the life insurance policies. John’s theory was that there was fraud on his statutory spousal interest because the beneficiaries of the insurance policies had been changed and the trusts established without his knowledge or consent. The circuit court found in John’s favor with respect to the claimed fraud on his statutory spousal interest. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where a dying spouse exercises her right to change the beneficiary on her life-insurance policy and instead names a trust for the benefit of the minor child of the marriage, the surviving spouse cannot claim fraud on his statutory spousal interest. View "Bays v. Kiphart" on Justia Law

The circuit court granted Janet Autry’s petition to be appointed temporary guardian of Louise Sheperd. Pam and Don Beckham were allowed to intervene. The circuit court appointed the Beckhams guardians of Sheperd and First Community Bank of Searcy as the guardian of Sheperd’s estate. The court of appeals reversed. Before the mandate issued, Timothy Whaley filed an ex parte petition to be appointed temporary guardian and permanent guardian of Sheperd. Before the circuit court took action, the Beckhams filed another petition to intervene and for appointment as guardians. The circuit court denied Whaley’s motion to dismiss the Beckhams’ motion to intervene, granted the Beckhams’ intervention, and reappointed the Beckhams as temporary guardians of the person of Sheperd and First Community Bank as guardian of the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Whaley’s motion to dismiss the Beckhams’ motion for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings. View "Whaley v. Beckham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the beneficiary of a testamentary trust, entered a long-term care facility in 2012, at which time she applied for financial and medical assistance under Medicaid. The Department of Social Services denied the application for Medical benefits, finding that Plaintiff’s assets, including the trust, exceeded the relevant asset limits. A hearing officer upheld the department’s denial. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trust was not an asset available to her as defined by relevant Medicaid regulations. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the testator intended to create a discretionary, supplemental needs trust and, therefore, the trust corpus and income may not be considered to be available to Plaintiff for the purpose of determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits. View "Pikula v. Dep’t of Social Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, daughter of Martin Schmidt, filed suit against Wells Fargo in Texas state court for negligence, promissory estoppel, and conversion. After removal to federal court, the district court granted summary judgment based on California Probate Code 13106(a), which discharges the holder of funds “from any further liability with respect to the money or property” upon receipt of an affidavit conforming to certain statutory requirements. The court concluded that, because plaintiff has failed to probate her father’s will, the only statutory claim that she may possibly have is under California’s laws of intestate succession, which give a decedent’s surviving children a share in the estate not passing to the decedent’s surviving spouse. A claim under the laws of intestacy, however, is inferior to a claim under the laws of testate succession, and it is questionable whether a claim to a percentage of an estate equates to a claim to specific assets in the estate, like the Wells Fargo bank accounts at issue here. The court also noted that plaintiff has waived any argument based on intestate succession by failing to raise the issue in the district court or in her briefs on appeal. Therefore, the court held that it is immaterial that plaintiff gave Wells Fargo actual notice or whether she reasonably and detrimentally relied on any representation by Wells Fargo’s Houston employees. The California legislative scheme grants Wells Fargo immunity from any injury that plaintiff may have suffered from the disbursement of funds to her stepmother. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Di Angelo v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Steven Lake murdered his wife, Amy, and their two children before committing suicide. George Lake, Steven’s father, was appointed as the personal representative of Steven’s Estate (“the Estate”). Thereafter, Ralph Bagley, Amy’s father and a personal representative of Amy’s estate, filed a creditors’ claim against the Estate, anticipating a wrongful death action on behalf of Amy’s estate against the Estate. Bagley then filed a demand for bond seeking a bond in the amount of $150,000. Nearly two years later, Bagley filed a petition to remove George as the personal representative, alleging that he should be removed because he failed to obtain a bond despite the earlier petition. The court entered an order requiring George to submit a personal surety bond in the amount of $75,000 within thirty days and denied Bagley’s petition for removal. Bagley subsequently filed a motion for contempt against George for failing to timely obtain the bond. The probate court granted the petition, removed George from his position as representative of the Estate, and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the probate court erred in proceeding on the motion for contempt because the motion did not satisfy the requirements of Me. R. Civ. P. 66. View "In re Estate of Steven L. Lake" on Justia Law