Justia Trusts & Estates Opinion Summaries

In this lengthy estate dispute, Testator’s daughter (Daughter) appealed several rulings of the circuit court, including the circuit court’s denial of her request for relief from an order under S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Daughter relief under section 15-6-60(b); (2) did not err when it considered extrinsic evidence to interpret Testator’s last will and testament and subsequent codicil; (3) properly approved the personal representative’s proposed distribution of Testator’s assets; (4) did not err in reforming the will and codicil; and (5) did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Testator’s grandson. View "In re Estate of Bickel" on Justia Law

Hiroaki (Rocky) Aoki, the founder of the Benihana restaurant chain, formed the Benihana Protective Trust (BPT) in 1998 to hold stock and assets relating to Benihana. In 2002, Rocky married Keiko Aoki. In September 2002, Rocky executed a partial release of his testamentary power of appointment whereby Rocky could appoint only his descendants at the time of his death. In December 2002, Rocky executed a second release further restricting his power to appoint by excluding any descendants who were non-resident aliens. After Rocky’s death, the BPT trustees commenced this proceeding seeking a determination as to the validity of the September and December releases. The Surrogate Court decreed the September and December Releases invalid on the grounds that Rocky was not aware that the Releases were irrevocable and that Rocky’s execution of the Releases was not voluntary. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Keiko failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the Releases were signed as a result of fraud or other wrongful conduct. View "Aoki v. Aoki" on Justia Law

Before Russell Banks died, Russell and his brother, David Banks, owned together fifteen parcels of real estate in Sussex County, Delaware. The granting language of the deed to each parcel stated that the property was conveyed to the brothers as “joint tenants with right of survivorship.” David asserted that this language granted joint tenancies with right of survivorship (WROS) and that the properties passed to him in full upon Russell’s death. Mackie Banks, the executrix of Russell’s estate, filed an inventory for Russell’s estate asserting that the properties were conveyed to the brothers as tenants in common and that the Estate held a fifty percent ownership interest in the properties. David filed a petition to quiet title on the properties. The Court of Chancery granted David’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the language conveying the property as “joint tenants with right of survivorship” was sufficient to create a joint tenancy WROS and not a tenancy in common. View "Banks v. Banks" on Justia Law

Settlor executed a will stating that First Presbyterian and First Baptist churches were to receive the remainder of his estate, which consisted largely of farmland. The Settlor named a trustee and directed it to hold the farmland as a testamentary trust during the life of the will’s lifetime beneficiaries and, thereafter, to distribute the proceeds of the property to the churches. First Presbyterian later dissolved its congregation and transferred its assets to Covenant Presbytery. The trustee for the Settlor’s trust requested that the circuit court determine the rights of First Baptist and Covenant Presbytery to the farmland and its income. The circuit court applied the cy pres doctrine and reformed the trust to provide that First Presbyterian’s distributions should be transferred to First Baptist. Covenant Presbytery appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the will did not create a charitable trust, the cy pres doctrine was inapplicable; and (2) per the parties’ stipulation, First Presbyterian assigned its rights under the trust to Covenant Presbytery. View "Covenant Presbytery v. First Baptist Church" on Justia Law

Father, a Florida resident, filed this diversity suit against Daughter, a Massachusetts resident, in the District of Massachusetts, alleging that Daughter, to whom he had given a power of attorney, breached her fiduciary duty to him. The jury returned a verdict in Father’s favor. Daughter appealed, and Father cross-appealed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Daughter’s motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) did not err in awarding Father prejudgment interest from the date that he filed this lawsuit rather than the date Daughter breached her fiduciary duty. View "Berkowitz v. Berkowitz" on Justia Law

Liberty National Life Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision: (1) holding, as a matter of first impression, that 27-14-3(f), Ala. Code 1975, required an insurable interest in a life-insurance policy to exist at a point other than the time at which the policy becomes effective; and (2) reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint filed by Misty Ann Barton, as administratrix of the estate of Benjamin H. Miller, Jr, in which Barton alleged that Liberty National was negligent in allowing Leanne Miller, Benjamin Jr.'s stepmother, to substitute herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy insuring the life of Benjamin Jr. The Court granted Liberty National's petition, and, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. Barton alleged that Liberty National was negligent in allowing Leanne to name herself as beneficiary of an insurance policy that was owned by Benjamin Sr. at his death and, pursuant to the terms of the policy, payable to Benjamin Jr.'s estate. The Court found that the policy was not produced or viewed by the trial court, nor had any discovery ensued concerning ownership of the policy, and who exactly had the right to effect a beneficiary change. Accordingly, in viewing the allegations of Barton's complaint most strongly in Barton's favor, it appeared to the Supreme Court that Barton could, under certain circumstances, maintain a cause of action against Liberty National alleging negligence on its part in allowing Leanne, either as personal representative of Benjamin Sr.'s estate or individually, to substitute herself as beneficiary on the policy insuring Benjamin Jr.'s life. The Court affirmed that portion of the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion reversing the trial court's order dismissing Barton's complaint. The Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment insofar as it interpreted section 27-14-3(f) to require an insurable interest in personal insurance to exist at any point beyond the time the policy of insurance becomes effective. View "Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Company." on Justia Law

L.D. Owen III, as guardian ad litem for Wanda L. and Wesley A. Schlumpf ("Owen"), minor children, appealed a probate court order allowing the sale of real property held by the estate of James W. Schlumpf ("the decedent"). The decedent died intestate in 2014. James's two children, Wanda and Wesley, both of whom were under the age of majority, were the decedent's only surviving heirs. John Schlumpf, the decedent's brother, had legal custody of the Schlumpf children. At the time of the decedent's death, he owned real property in Baldwin County that he used as his personal residence. The probate court granted letters of administration for the decedent's estate to Romaine Scott. Scott decided to sell the decedent's real property and petitioned the probate court for permission; Owen and John objected to the petition for sale. The probate court entered an order granting Scott the authority to sell the property for the offered purchase price of $450,000. After the probate court entered the order for sale, it granted Scott's petition to resign as the administrator of the estate. The probate court appointed Harry M. D'Olive, Jr., as successor to Scott. Owen then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded that the probate court erred in ordering the sale of the property: upon the decedent's death, the Schlumpf children inherited the property subject to a mortgage on the property. Because the mortgagee did not file a claim against the estate, the mortgage was not a debt that could justify forcing the sale of the property to satisfy that mortgage. In the event the mortgage was not satisfied by the Schlumpf children, then the mortgagee had the remedy of foreclosure available if such an action became necessary to satisfy the debt. View "Schlumpf v. D'Olive" on Justia Law

Virginia Ladd appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Margaret Stockham, as personal representative of the estate of Herbert Stockham, deceased (appeal no. 1140365). Stockham cross-appealed the circuit court's denial of her motion for reimbursement of costs and attorney fees (appeal no. 1140407). Ladd was a beneficiary of three trusts that each held preferred and common stock in SVI Corporation ("SVI") (collectively, "the trusts"). Ladd sued Stockham for actions taken when Stockham served on the Board of Directors for SVI. After review of the specific facts entered in the circuit court record, the Alabama Supreme Court found no reversible error as to the grant of summary judgment in case 1140365. The Court concluded Stockham demonstrated that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying her request for reimbursement of costs and attorney fees. In case no. 1140407, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Stockham's motion for the reimbursement of costs, attorney fees, and litigation expenses and remanded the case for the circuit court to reconsider Stockham's motion. View "Stockham v. Ladd" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an inter vivos trust. The trust provided for three shares that were to be apportioned among the Settlor’s daughter and successor trustee, Lynne, the Settlor's son, Neil, and the Settlor's grandchildren, Kimberly and Jeffrey. Here, Kimberly sought to vacate an order of the superior court requiring that the disposition of funds held in trust for her be used to pay attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err when he approved the first and final accounting of Lynne and when he approved the payment of the Settlor’s final debts and expenses, as well as administration costs, from the corpus of the trust; (2) the trial justice did not err in discharging and releasing Lynne from her fiduciary duty because Lynne did not breach that duty; (3) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he concluded that attorneys’ fees should be satisfied from Kimberly’s share of the trust; and (4) the trial justice did not violate Kimberly’s due process rights during certain hearings. View "In re Janet S. Bagdis Living Trust Agreement" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the interpretation and administration of the Donald W. Callender Family Trust (Trust), executed by Donald Callender (Donald) as the settlor and original trustee in 2003. The trust held assets of money and property, including royalties for use of the "Marie Callendar" name. Defendant-appellants Cathleen Callender (Cathe) and Catherine Callender (Katy), and defendant Donald Lucky Callender (Lucky), the primary beneficiaries of the Callender Trust, were at odds primarily about how the residuary of the Trust was to be divided. The Trust provided that upon Donald's death, the residuary was to be divided into thirds and vested in each of the Beneficiaries. Plaintiffs-respondents Douglas Ammerman and Janet Feldmar (collectively, Trustees) succeeded Donald as the trustees upon his death in January 2009. When disputes arose among the Beneficiaries as to division of the residuary, they filed a petition for instructions. After trial, the court ruled the Trust residuary should be divided based on what the parties referred to as the "changing fraction method." The central issue on appeal was whether the court erred in ruling the changing fraction method applied to the residuary. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in ruling the changing fraction method applied to the Trust residuary, and that Cathe should have been charged taxes on the gift of her property. Therefore the Court reversed the judgment. View "Ammerman v. Callender" on Justia Law